diff --git a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro
index f20495deb5..2026f9bfa2 100644
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro
@@ -493,40 +493,41 @@ export {
 	} &default="UNKNOWN";
 
 	const x509_errors: table[count] of string = {
-		[0] = "X509_V_OK",
-		[1] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT",
-		[2] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL",
-		[3] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE",
-		[4] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE",
-		[5] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY",
-		[6] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE",
-		[7] = "X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE",
-		[8] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID",
-		[9] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED",
-		[10] = "X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID",
-		[11] = "X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED",
-		[12] = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD",
-		[13] = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD",
-		[14] = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD",
-		[15] = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD",
-		[16] = "X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM",
-		[17] = "X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT",
-		[18] = "X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN",
-		[19] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY",
-		[20] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE",
-		[21] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG",
-		[22] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED",
-		[23] = "X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA",
-		[24] = "X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED",
-		[25] = "X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE",
-		[26] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED",
-		[27] = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED",
-		[28] = "X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH",
-		[29] = "X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH",
-		[30] = "X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH",
-		[31] = "X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN",
-		[32] = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER",
-		[33] = "X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION"
+		[0]  = "ok",
+		[1]  = "unable to get issuer cert",
+		[2]  = "unable to get crl",
+		[3]  = "unable to decrypt cert signature",
+		[4]  = "unable to decrypt crl signature",
+		[5]  = "unable to decode issuer public key",
+		[6]  = "cert signature failure",
+		[7]  = "crl signature failure",
+		[8]  = "cert not yet valid",
+		[9]  = "cert has expired",
+		[10] = "crl not yet valid",
+		[11] = "crl has expired",
+		[12] = "error in cert not before field",
+		[13] = "error in cert not after field",
+		[14] = "error in crl last update field",
+		[15] = "error in crl next update field",
+		[16] = "out of mem",
+		[17] = "depth zero self signed cert",
+		[18] = "self signed cert in chain",
+		[19] = "unable to get issuer cert locally",
+		[20] = "unable to verify leaf signature",
+		[21] = "cert chain too long",
+		[22] = "cert revoked",
+		[23] = "invalid ca",
+		[24] = "path length exceeded",
+		[25] = "invalid purpose",
+		[26] = "cert untrusted",
+		[27] = "cert rejected",
+		[28] = "subject issuer mismatch",
+		[29] = "akid skid mismatch",
+		[30] = "akid issuer serial mismatch",
+		[31] = "keyusage no certsign",
+		[32] = "unable to get crl issuer",
+		[33] = "unhandled critical extension"
+		
 	};
 
 }
diff --git a/scripts/policy/misc/loaded-scripts.bro b/scripts/policy/misc/loaded-scripts.bro
index 7dd7025689..27275156ea 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/misc/loaded-scripts.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/misc/loaded-scripts.bro
@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
+##! 
+
 module LoadedScripts;
 
 export {
 	redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
 	
 	type Info: record {
-		name:   string &log;
+		## Name of the script loaded potentially with spaces included before
+		## the file name to indicate load depth.  The convention is two spaces
+		## per level of depth.
+		name: string &log;
 	};
 }
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/known-services.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/known-services.bro
index c2343157dc..557fe35fb2 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/known-services.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/known-services.bro
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ export {
 }
 
 redef record connection += {
+	## This field is to indicate whether or not the processing for detecting 
+	## and logging the service for this connection is complete.
 	known_services_done: bool &default=F;
 };
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/weirds.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/weirds.bro
index a4db61e51f..9d6730819c 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/weirds.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/conn/weirds.bro
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 ##! This script handles core generated connection related "weird" events to 
 ##! push weird information about connections into the weird framework.
 ##! For live operational deployments, this can frequently cause load issues
-##! due to large numbers of these events being passed between nodes.
+##! due to large numbers of these events and quite possibly shouldn't be
+##! loaded.
 
 @load base/frameworks/notice
 
-module Weird;
+module Conn;
 
 export {
 	redef enum Notice::Type += {
@@ -20,14 +21,11 @@ export {
 
 event rexmit_inconsistency(c: connection, t1: string, t2: string)
 	{
-	if ( c$id !in did_inconsistency_msg )
-		{
-		NOTICE([$note=Retransmission_Inconsistency,
-		        $conn=c,
-		        $msg=fmt("%s rexmit inconsistency (%s) (%s)",
-		                 id_string(c$id), t1, t2)]);
-		add did_inconsistency_msg[c$id];
-		}
+	NOTICE([$note=Retransmission_Inconsistency,
+	        $conn=c,
+	        $msg=fmt("%s rexmit inconsistency (%s) (%s)",
+	                 id_string(c$id), t1, t2),
+	        $identifier=fmt("%s", c$id)]);
 	}
 
 event ack_above_hole(c: connection)
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/auth-addl.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/auth-addl.bro
index dd00e59c2e..8c04379c1c 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/auth-addl.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/auth-addl.bro
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+##! This script adds authoritative and additional responses for the current
+##! query to the DNS log.  It can cause severe overhead due to the need
+##! for all authoritative and additional responses to have events generated.
+##! This script is not recommended for use on heavily loaded links.
+
 @load base/protocols/dns/main
 
 redef dns_skip_all_auth = F;
@@ -7,12 +12,14 @@ module DNS;
 
 export {
 	redef record Info += {
+		## Authoritative responses for the query.
 		auth:       set[string] &log &optional;
+		## Additional responses for the query.
 		addl:       set[string] &log &optional;
 	};
 }
 
-event do_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, reply: string) &priority=4
+event DNS::do_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, reply: string) &priority=4
 	{
 	# The "ready" flag will be set here.  This causes the setting from the 
 	# base script to be overridden since the base script will log immediately 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/detect-external-names.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/detect-external-names.bro
index f6f0e596cc..a1897d06e7 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/detect-external-names.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/dns/detect-external-names.bro
@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
-##! Script for detecting strange activity within DNS.
-##!
-##! Notices raised:
-##!
-##!   * :bro:enum:`DNS::External_Name`
-##!
-##!     A remote host resolves to a local host, but the name is not considered
-##!     to be within a local zone.  :bro:id:`local_zones` variable **must**
-##!     be set appropriately for this detection.
+##! This script detects names which are not within zones considered to be
+##! local but resolving to addresses considered local.  
+##! The :bro:id:`Site::local_zones` variable **must** be set appropriately for 
+##! this detection.
 
-@load base/frameworks/notice/main
+@load base/frameworks/notice
 @load base/utils/site
 
 module DNS;
@@ -16,8 +11,8 @@ module DNS;
 export {
 	redef enum Notice::Type += { 
 		## Raised when a non-local name is found to be pointing at a local host.
-		## This only works appropriately when all of your authoritative DNS
-		## servers are located in your :bro:id:`Site::local_nets`.
+		## :bro:id:`Site::local_zones` variable **must** be set appropriately 
+		## for this detection.
 		External_Name,
 		};
 }
@@ -30,11 +25,11 @@ event dns_A_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, a: addr) &priori
 	# Check for responses from remote hosts that point at local hosts
 	# but the name is not considered to be within a "local" zone.
 	if ( Site::is_local_addr(a) &&            # referring to a local host
-	     !Site::is_local_addr(c$id$resp_h) && # response from an external nameserver
-	     !Site::is_local_name(ans$query) )    # name isn't in a local zone.
+	     ! Site::is_local_name(ans$query) )   # name isn't in a local zone.
 		{
 		NOTICE([$note=External_Name,
 		        $msg=fmt("%s is pointing to a local host - %s.", ans$query, a),
-		        $conn=c]);
+		        $conn=c, 
+		        $identifier=cat(a,ans$query)]);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/detect.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/detect.bro
index cb89599a93..abb62e08fc 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/detect.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/detect.bro
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-@load base/frameworks/notice/main
-@load base/protocols/ftp/main
+##! Detect various potentially bad FTP activities.
+
+@load base/frameworks/notice
+@load base/protocols/ftp
 
 module FTP;
 
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ event ftp_reply(c: connection, code: count, msg: string, cont_resp: bool) &prior
 	     /[Ee][Xx][Ee][Cc]/ in c$ftp$cmdarg$arg )
 		{
 		NOTICE([$note=Site_Exec_Success, $conn=c,
-		        $msg=fmt("%s %s", c$ftp$cmdarg$cmd, c$ftp$cmdarg$arg)]);
+		        $msg=fmt("FTP command: %s %s", c$ftp$cmdarg$cmd, c$ftp$cmdarg$arg),
+		        $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h, "SITE EXEC")]);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/software.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/software.bro
index 7dfd54ddca..622357a608 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/software.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ftp/software.bro
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 ##! Software detection with the FTP protocol.
-##!
-##! TODO:
-##!
-##! * Detect server software with initial 220 message
-##! * Detect client software with password given for anonymous users
-##!   (e.g. cyberduck@example.net)
 
-@load base/frameworks/software/main
+# TODO:
+#
+# * Detect server software with initial 220 message
+# * Detect client software with password given for anonymous users
+#   (e.g. cyberduck@example.net)
+
+@load base/frameworks/software
 
 module FTP;
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-MHR.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-MHR.bro
index 7b99184a9b..3b2e8bf968 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-MHR.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-MHR.bro
@@ -4,10 +4,8 @@
 ##! documentation for the :doc:base/protocols/http/file-hash.bro script to see how to 
 ##! configure which transfers will have hashes calculated.
 
-@load base/frameworks/notice/main
-@load base/protocols/http/main
-@load base/protocols/http/utils
-@load base/protocols/http/file-hash
+@load base/frameworks/notice
+@load base/protocols/http
 
 export {
 	redef enum Notice::Type += { 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli.bro
index 89a37728f4..c4ba7ee74e 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli.bro
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-##! SQL injection detection in HTTP.
+##! SQL injection attack detection in HTTP.
 
 @load base/frameworks/notice
 @load base/frameworks/metrics
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ module HTTP;
 
 export {
 	redef enum Notice::Type += {
+		## Indicates that a host performing SQL injection attacks was detected.
 		SQL_Injection_Attacker,
+		## Indicates that a host was seen to have SQL injection attacks against
+		## it.  This is tracked by IP address as opposed to hostname.
 		SQL_Injection_Attack_Against,
 	};
 	
@@ -49,9 +52,13 @@ export {
 
 event bro_init() &priority=3
 	{
+	# Add filters to the metrics so that the metrics framework knows how to 
+	# determine when it looks like an actual attack and how to respond when
+	# thresholds are crossed.
+	
 	Metrics::add_filter(SQL_ATTACKER, [$log=F,
 	                                   $notice_threshold=sqli_requests_threshold,
-	                                   $break_interval=sqli_requests_interval, 
+	                                   $break_interval=sqli_requests_interval,
 	                                   $note=SQL_Injection_Attacker]);
 	Metrics::add_filter(SQL_ATTACKS_AGAINST, [$log=F, 
 	                                          $notice_threshold=sqli_requests_threshold,
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-webapps.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-webapps.bro
index 493ea9b44b..4a94d1adbd 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-webapps.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/detect-webapps.bro
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-@load base/frameworks/signatures/main
-@load base/frameworks/software/main
-@load base/protocols/http/main
-@load base/protocols/http/utils
+@load base/frameworks/signatures
+@load base/frameworks/software
+@load base/protocols/http
 
 module HTTP;
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software-browser-plugins.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software-browser-plugins.bro
index 51d452cf5f..db9eafd1a7 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software-browser-plugins.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software-browser-plugins.bro
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 ##! This script take advantage of a few ways that installed plugin information
-##! leaks from web browsers
+##! leaks from web browsers.
+
 @load base/protocols/http
 @load base/frameworks/software
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software.bro
index f45d4d7542..8732634359 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/software.bro
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ##! Software identification and extraction for HTTP traffic.
 
-@load base/frameworks/software/main
+@load base/frameworks/software
 
 module HTTP;
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/var-extraction-uri.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/var-extraction-uri.bro
index 32ea147961..b03474bb94 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/http/var-extraction-uri.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/http/var-extraction-uri.bro
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 ##! This script extracts and logs variables from the requested URI
 
-@load base/protocols/http/main
-@load base/protocols/http/utils
+@load base/protocols/http
 
 module HTTP;
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/detect-bruteforcing.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/detect-bruteforcing.bro
index 1bed741da2..3abe185d58 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/detect-bruteforcing.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/detect-bruteforcing.bro
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ export {
 	const ignore_guessers: table[subnet] of subnet &redef;
 
 	## Keeps track of hosts identified as guessing passwords.
-	global password_guessers: set[addr] &read_expire=guessing_timeout+1hr &synchronized;
+	global password_guessers: set[addr] 
+		&read_expire=guessing_timeout+1hr &synchronized &redef;
 }
 
 event bro_init()
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/geo-data.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/geo-data.bro
index 1ac38e5a5b..daa05f4ebc 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/geo-data.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/geo-data.bro
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ##! This implements all of the additional information and geodata detections 
 ##! for SSH analysis.
 
-@load base/frameworks/notice/main
-@load base/protocols/ssh/main
+@load base/frameworks/notice
+@load base/protocols/ssh
 
 module SSH;
 
@@ -11,17 +11,17 @@ export {
 		## If an SSH login is seen to or from a "watched" country based on the
 		## :bro:id:`SSH::watched_countries` variable then this notice will
 		## be generated.
-		Login_From_Watched_Country,
+		Watched_Country_Login,
+	};
+	
+	redef record Info += {
+		## Add geographic data related to the "remote" host of the connection.
+		remote_location: geo_location &log &optional;
 	};
 	
 	## The set of countries for which you'd like to throw notices upon 
 	## successful login
 	const watched_countries: set[string] = {"RO"} &redef;
-
-	redef record Info += {
-		## Add geographic data related to the "remote" host of the connection.
-		remote_location: geo_location &log &optional;
-	};
 }
 
 event SSH::heuristic_successful_login(c: connection) &priority=5
@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ event SSH::heuristic_successful_login(c: connection) &priority=5
 	
 	if ( location?$country_code && location$country_code in watched_countries )
 		{
-		NOTICE([$note=Login_From_Watched_Country,
+		NOTICE([$note=Watched_Country_Login,
 		        $conn=c,
-		        $msg=fmt("SSH login from watched country: %s", location$country_code)]);
+		        $msg=fmt("SSH login %s watched country: %s", 
+		                 (c$ssh$direction == OUTBOUND) ? "to" : "from", 
+		                 location$country_code)]);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/software.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/software.bro
index d9bfdffb3c..a239655270 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/software.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssh/software.bro
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-@load base/frameworks/software/main
+##! This script extracts SSH client and server information from SSH 
+##! connections and forwards it to the software framework.
+
+@load base/frameworks/software
 
 module SSH;
 
diff --git a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs.bro b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs.bro
index f9294ed650..5a663864d2 100644
--- a/scripts/policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs.bro
+++ b/scripts/policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs.bro
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
 ##! Perform full certificate chain validation for SSL certificates.
 
-@load base/frameworks/notice/main
-@load base/protocols/ssl/main
-
+@load base/frameworks/notice
+@load base/protocols/ssl
 @load protocols/ssl/cert-hash
 
 module SSL;
 
 export {
 	redef enum Notice::Type += {
+		## This notice indicates that the result of validating the certificate
+		## along with it's full certificate chain was invalid.
 		Invalid_Server_Cert
 	};
 	
 	redef record Info += {
+		## This stores and logs the result of certificate validation for 
+		## this connection.
 		validation_status: string &log &optional;
 	};
 	
 	## MD5 hash values for recently validated certs along with the validation
-	## status message are kept in this table so avoid constant validation 
+	## status message are kept in this table to avoid constant validation 
 	## everytime the same certificate is seen.
 	global recently_validated_certs: table[string] of string = table() 
-		&read_expire=5mins &synchronized;
+		&read_expire=5mins &synchronized &redef;
 }
 
 event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=3