Mirror/zeek
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/zeek/zeek.git synced 2025-10-04 15:48:19 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 2

Adjust coding style & fix test failures.

Browse source 
I am still not 100% convinced that there is no memory leak hidden
somwehere...

This also makes everything compile with OpenSSL 1.0.2 for me.
This commit is contained in:
Johanna Amann 2017-12-07 14:01:47 -08:00
parent ea4cf7dbe9
commit 6a93abea32
4 changed files with 53 additions and 44 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

4
src/file_analysis/analyzer/x509/X509.cc
View file

@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ RecordVal* file_analysis::X509::ParseCertificate(X509Val* cert_val, const char*
// actually should be (namely - rsaEncryption), so that OpenSSL will parse out the
// key later. Otherwise it will just fail to parse the certificate key.
if ( X509_get_signature_nid(ssl_cert) == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption )
if ( OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm) == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption )
X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(ssl_cert), OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
else
algorithm = 0;
@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ StringVal* file_analysis::X509::KeyCurve(EVP_PKEY *key)
const EC_GROUP *group;
int nid;
if ( (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key))) == NULL)
if ( (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key))) == NULL )
// I guess we could not parse this
return NULL;

45
src/file_analysis/analyzer/x509/X509.h
View file

@ -12,42 +12,49 @@
#define X509_get_signature_nid(x) OBJ_obj2nid((x)->sig_alg->algorithm)
#define X509_OBJECT_new() (X509_OBJECT*)malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT))
#define X509_OBJECT_free(a) free(a)
static X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a)
{
if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_X509)
return NULL;
return a->data.x509;
}
#define OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(s) (s)->certId
#define OCSP_resp_get0_certs(x) (x)->certs
#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL)
#define X509_OBJECT_new() (X509_OBJECT*)malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT))
#define X509_OBJECT_free(a) free(a)
#define OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(s) (s)->certId
#define OCSP_resp_get0_certs(x) (x)->certs
#define EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(p) ((p)->pkey.dsa)
#define EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(p) ((p)->pkey.ec)
#define EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(p) ((p)->pkey.rsa)
static X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a)
{
if ( a == nullptr || a->type != X509_LU_X509 )
return nullptr;
return a->data.x509;
}
static void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
{
if (p != NULL) *p = d->p;
if (q != NULL) *q = d->q;
if (g != NULL) *g = d->g;
if ( p != nullptr )
*p = d->p;
if ( q != nullptr )
*q = d->q;
if ( g != nullptr )
*g = d->g;
}
static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
if (n != NULL) *n = r->n;
if (e != NULL) *e = r->e;
if (d != NULL) *d = r->d;
if ( n != nullptr )
*n = r->n;
if ( e != nullptr )
*e = r->e;
if ( d != nullptr )
*d = r->d;
}
#endif
namespace file_analysis {

11
src/file_analysis/analyzer/x509/X509Common.cc
View file

@ -240,10 +240,13 @@ void file_analysis::X509Common::ParseExtension(X509_EXTENSION* ex, EventHandlerP
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if( ! X509V3_EXT_print(bio, ex, 0, 0))
{
unsigned char **buf = NULL;
int len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex), buf);
if (len >=0 )
BIO_write(bio, *buf, len);
unsigned char *buf = nullptr;
int len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex), &buf);
if ( len >=0 )
{
BIO_write(bio, &buf, len);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
}
StringVal* ext_val = GetExtensionFromBIO(bio);

37
src/file_analysis/analyzer/x509/functions.bif
View file

@ -239,8 +239,6 @@ function x509_get_certificate_string%(cert: opaque of x509, pem: bool &default=F
## x509_get_certificate_string x509_verify
function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_certs: table_string_of_string, verify_time: time &default=network_time()%): X509::Result
%{
stack_st_X509* ocsp_certs;
RecordVal* rval = 0;
X509_STORE* ctx = x509_get_root_store(root_certs->AsTableVal());
if ( ! ctx )
@ -284,6 +282,7 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc = 0;
OCSP_CERTID *certid = 0;
stack_st_X509* ocsp_certs = nullptr;
int status = -1;
int out = -1;
int result = -1;
@ -310,7 +309,6 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
goto x509_ocsp_cleanup;
}
// the following code took me _forever_ to get right.
// The OCSP_basic_verify command takes a list of certificates. However (which is not immediately
// visible or understandable), those are only used to find the signer certificate. They are _not_
@ -319,21 +317,10 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
// the lookup.
// Yay.
ocsp_certs = sk_X509_dup(OCSP_resp_get0_certs(basic));
if ( !ocsp_certs )
{
ocsp_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if ( !ocsp_certs )
{
rval = x509_result_record(-1, "Could not allocate basic x509 stack");
goto x509_ocsp_cleanup;
}
}
issuer_certificate = 0;
for ( int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted_certs); i++)
{
sk_X509_push(ocsp_certs, X509_dup(sk_X509_value(untrusted_certs, i)));
OCSP_basic_add1_cert(basic, sk_X509_value(untrusted_certs, i));
if ( X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(untrusted_certs, i))) == 0 )
issuer_certificate = sk_X509_value(untrusted_certs, i);
@ -358,6 +345,14 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
goto x509_ocsp_cleanup;
}
{
auto basic_certs = OCSP_resp_get0_certs(basic);
if ( basic_certs )
ocsp_certs = sk_X509_dup(basic_certs);
assert(ocsp_certs);
}
csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, signer, ocsp_certs);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(csc, 0, (time_t) verify_time);
@ -383,7 +378,7 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
// ok, now we verified the OCSP response. This means that we have a valid chain tying it
// to a root that we trust and that the signature also hopefully is valid. This does not yet
// mean that the ocsp response actually matches the certificate the server send us or that
// mean that the ocsp response actually matches the certificate the server sent us or that
// the OCSP response even says that the certificate is valid.
// let's start this out by checking that the response is actually for the certificate we want
@ -457,6 +452,9 @@ function x509_ocsp_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, ocsp_reply: string, root_c
x509_ocsp_cleanup:
if ( ocsp_certs )
sk_X509_free(ocsp_certs);
if ( untrusted_certs )
sk_X509_free(untrusted_certs);
@ -573,12 +571,13 @@ function x509_verify%(certs: x509_opaque_vector, root_certs: table_string_of_str
x509_verify_chainerror:
RecordVal* rrecord = x509_result_record(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc), X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc)), chainVector);
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(csc);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
sk_X509_free(untrusted_certs);
RecordVal* rrecord = x509_result_record(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc), X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc)), chainVector);
return rrecord;
%}
@ -673,7 +672,7 @@ function sct_verify%(cert: opaque of x509, logid: string, log_key: string, signa
x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
cert_length = i2d_X509_CINF(x->cert_info, &cert_out);
#else
i2d_re_X509_tbs(x, &cert_out);
cert_length = i2d_re_X509_tbs(x, &cert_out);
#endif
data.append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(issuer_key_hash->Bytes()), issuer_key_hash->Len());
}