Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into topic/seth/smb

# Conflicts: # scripts/base/init-default.bro
2025-10-07 17:18:20 +00:00 · 2016-01-16 21:04:43 -05:00 · 2016-01-16 21:04:43 -05:00 · 7251b0f240
commit 7251b0f240
parent e4ca588127 374e61ee20
1182 changed files with 45819 additions and 13446 deletions
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/conn/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/conn/load.bro
@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
@load ./contents
@load ./inactivity
@load ./polling
+@load ./thresholds
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/conn/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/conn/main.bro
@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ export {
 		## field will be left empty at all times.
 		local_orig:   bool            &log &optional;

+		## If the connection is responded to locally, this value will be T.
+		## If it was responded to remotely it will be F.  In the case that
+		## the :bro:id:`Site::local_nets` variable is undefined, this
+		## field will be left empty at all times.
+		local_resp:   bool            &log &optional;
+
 		## Indicates the number of bytes missed in content gaps, which
 		## is representative of packet loss.  A value other than zero
 		## will normally cause protocol analysis to fail but some
@ -81,7 +87,8 @@ export {
 		## f       packet with FIN bit set
 		## r       packet with RST bit set
 		## c       packet with a bad checksum
-		## i       inconsistent packet (e.g. SYN+RST bits both set)
+		## i       inconsistent packet (e.g. FIN+RST bits set)
+		## q       multi-flag packet (SYN+FIN or SYN+RST bits set)
 		## ======  ====================================================
 		##
 		## If the event comes from the originator, the letter is in
@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ redef record connection += {

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(Conn::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_conn]);
+	Log::create_stream(Conn::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_conn, $path="conn"]);
 	}

 function conn_state(c: connection, trans: transport_proto): string
@ -201,7 +208,10 @@ function set_conn(c: connection, eoc: bool)
 		add c$conn$tunnel_parents[c$tunnel[|c$tunnel|-1]$uid];
 	c$conn$proto=get_port_transport_proto(c$id$resp_p);
 	if( |Site::local_nets| > 0 )
+		{
 		c$conn$local_orig=Site::is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h);
+		c$conn$local_resp=Site::is_local_addr(c$id$resp_h);
+		}

 	if ( eoc )
 		{
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/conn/thresholds.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/conn/thresholds.bro
@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+##! Implements a generic API to throw events when a connection crosses a
+##! fixed threshold of bytes or packets.
+
+module ConnThreshold;
+
+export {
+
+	type Thresholds: record {
+		orig_byte: set[count] &default=count_set(); ##< current originator byte thresholds we watch for
+		resp_byte: set[count] &default=count_set(); ##< current responder byte thresholds we watch for
+		orig_packet: set[count] &default=count_set(); ##< corrent originator packet thresholds we watch for
+		resp_packet: set[count] &default=count_set(); ##< corrent responder packet thresholds we watch for
+	};
+
+	## Sets a byte threshold for connection sizes, adding it to potentially already existing thresholds.
+	## conn_bytes_threshold_crossed will be raised for each set threshold.
+	##
+	## cid: The connection id.
+	##
+	## threshold: Threshold in bytes.
+	##
+	## is_orig: If true, threshold is set for bytes from originator, otherwise for bytes from responder.
+	##
+	## Returns: T on success, F on failure.
+	global set_bytes_threshold: function(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool;
+
+	## Sets a packet threshold for connection sizes, adding it to potentially already existing thresholds.
+	## conn_packets_threshold_crossed will be raised for each set threshold.
+	##
+	## cid: The connection id.
+	##
+	## threshold: Threshold in packets.
+	##
+	## is_orig: If true, threshold is set for packets from originator, otherwise for packets from responder.
+	##
+	## Returns: T on success, F on failure.
+	global set_packets_threshold: function(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool;
+
+	## Deletes a byte threshold for connection sizes.
+	##
+	## cid: The connection id.
+	##
+	## threshold: Threshold in bytes to remove.
+	##
+	## is_orig: If true, threshold is removed for packets from originator, otherwhise for packets from responder.
+	##
+	## Returns: T on success, F on failure.
+	global delete_bytes_threshold: function(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool;
+
+	## Deletes a packet threshold for connection sizes.
+	##
+	## cid: The connection id.
+	##
+	## threshold: Threshold in packets.
+	##
+	## is_orig: If true, threshold is removed for packets from originator, otherwise for packets from responder.
+	##
+	## Returns: T on success, F on failure.
+	global delete_packets_threshold: function(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool;
+
+	## Generated for a connection that crossed a set byte threshold
+	##
+	## c: the connection
+	##
+	## threshold: the threshold that was set
+	##
+	## is_orig: True if the threshold was crossed by the originator of the connection
+	global bytes_threshold_crossed: event(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool);
+
+	## Generated for a connection that crossed a set byte threshold
+	##
+	## c: the connection
+	##
+	## threshold: the threshold that was set
+	##
+	## is_orig: True if the threshold was crossed by the originator of the connection
+	global packets_threshold_crossed: event(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool);
+}
+
+redef record connection += {
+	thresholds: ConnThreshold::Thresholds &optional;
+};
+
+function set_conn(c: connection)
+	{
+	if ( c?$thresholds )
+		return;
+
+	c$thresholds = Thresholds();
+	}
+
+function find_min_threshold(t: set[count]): count
+	{
+	if ( |t| == 0 )
+		return 0;
+
+	local first = T;
+	local min: count = 0;
+
+	for ( i in t )
+		{
+		if ( first )
+			{
+			min = i;
+			first = F;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			if ( i < min )
+				min = i;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return min;
+	}
+
+function set_current_threshold(c: connection, bytes: bool, is_orig: bool): bool
+	{
+	local t: count = 0;
+	local cur: count = 0;
+
+	if ( bytes && is_orig )
+		{
+		t = find_min_threshold(c$thresholds$orig_byte);
+		cur = get_current_conn_bytes_threshold(c$id, is_orig);
+		}
+	else if ( bytes && ! is_orig )
+		{
+		t = find_min_threshold(c$thresholds$resp_byte);
+		cur = get_current_conn_bytes_threshold(c$id, is_orig);
+		}
+	else if ( ! bytes && is_orig )
+		{
+		t = find_min_threshold(c$thresholds$orig_packet);
+		cur = get_current_conn_packets_threshold(c$id, is_orig);
+		}
+	else if ( ! bytes && ! is_orig )
+		{
+		t = find_min_threshold(c$thresholds$resp_packet);
+		cur = get_current_conn_packets_threshold(c$id, is_orig);
+		}
+
+	if ( t == cur )
+		return T;
+
+	if ( bytes && is_orig )
+		return set_current_conn_bytes_threshold(c$id, t, T);
+	else if ( bytes && ! is_orig )
+		return set_current_conn_bytes_threshold(c$id, t, F);
+	else if ( ! bytes && is_orig )
+		return set_current_conn_packets_threshold(c$id, t, T);
+	else if ( ! bytes && ! is_orig )
+		return set_current_conn_packets_threshold(c$id, t, F);
+	}
+
+function set_bytes_threshold(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool
+	{
+	set_conn(c);
+
+	if ( threshold == 0 )
+		return F;
+
+	if ( is_orig )
+		add c$thresholds$orig_byte[threshold];
+	else
+		add c$thresholds$resp_byte[threshold];
+
+	return set_current_threshold(c, T, is_orig);
+	}
+
+function set_packets_threshold(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool
+	{
+	set_conn(c);
+
+	if ( threshold == 0 )
+		return F;
+
+	if ( is_orig )
+		add c$thresholds$orig_packet[threshold];
+	else
+		add c$thresholds$resp_packet[threshold];
+
+	return set_current_threshold(c, F, is_orig);
+	}
+
+function delete_bytes_threshold(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool
+	{
+	set_conn(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$orig_byte )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$orig_byte[threshold];
+		set_current_threshold(c, T, is_orig);
+		return T;
+		}
+	else if ( ! is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$resp_byte )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$resp_byte[threshold];
+		set_current_threshold(c, T, is_orig);
+		return T;
+		}
+
+	return F;
+	}
+
+function delete_packets_threshold(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool): bool
+	{
+	set_conn(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$orig_packet )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$orig_packet[threshold];
+		set_current_threshold(c, F, is_orig);
+		return T;
+		}
+	else if ( ! is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$resp_packet )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$resp_packet[threshold];
+		set_current_threshold(c, F, is_orig);
+		return T;
+		}
+
+	return F;
+	}
+
+event conn_bytes_threshold_crossed(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$orig_byte )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$orig_byte[threshold];
+		event ConnThreshold::bytes_threshold_crossed(c, threshold, is_orig);
+		}
+	else if ( ! is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$resp_byte )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$resp_byte[threshold];
+		event ConnThreshold::bytes_threshold_crossed(c, threshold, is_orig);
+		}
+
+	set_current_threshold(c, T, is_orig);
+	}
+
+event conn_packets_threshold_crossed(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$orig_packet )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$orig_packet[threshold];
+		event ConnThreshold::packets_threshold_crossed(c, threshold, is_orig);
+		}
+	else if ( ! is_orig && threshold in c$thresholds$resp_packet )
+		{
+		delete c$thresholds$resp_packet[threshold];
+		event ConnThreshold::packets_threshold_crossed(c, threshold, is_orig);
+		}
+
+	set_current_threshold(c, F, is_orig);
+	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/dhcp/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/dhcp/main.bro
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { 67/udp };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(DHCP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dhcp]);
+	Log::create_stream(DHCP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dhcp, $path="dhcp"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DHCP, ports);
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/dhcp/utils.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/dhcp/utils.bro
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ export {

 function reverse_ip(ip: addr): addr
 	{
-	local octets = split(cat(ip), /\./);
-	return to_addr(cat(octets[4], ".", octets[3], ".", octets[2], ".", octets[1]));
+	local octets = split_string(cat(ip), /\./);
+	return to_addr(cat(octets[3], ".", octets[2], ".", octets[1], ".", octets[0]));
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/dnp3/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/dnp3/dpd.sig
@ -5,5 +5,11 @@ signature dpd_dnp3_server {
 	ip-proto == tcp
 	payload /\x05\x64/
 	tcp-state responder
- 	enable "dnp3"
+ 	enable "dnp3_tcp"
+}
+
+signature dpd_dnp3_server_udp {
+	ip-proto == udp
+	payload /\x05\x64/
+	enable "dnp3_udp"
 }
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/dnp3/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/dnp3/main.bro
@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ redef record connection += {
 	dnp3: Info &optional;
 };

-const ports = { 20000/tcp };
+const ports = { 20000/tcp , 20000/udp };
 redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(DNP3::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dnp3]);
-	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DNP3, ports);
+	Log::create_stream(DNP3::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dnp3, $path="dnp3"]);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DNP3_TCP, ports);
 	}

-event dnp3_application_request_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, fc: count)
+event dnp3_application_request_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, application_control: count, fc: count)
 	{
 	if ( ! c?$dnp3 )
 		c$dnp3 = [$ts=network_time(), $uid=c$uid, $id=c$id];
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ event dnp3_application_request_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, fc: count)
 	c$dnp3$fc_request = function_codes[fc];
 	}

-event dnp3_application_response_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, fc: count, iin: count)
+event dnp3_application_response_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, application_control: count, fc: count, iin: count)
 	{
 	if ( ! c?$dnp3 )
 		c$dnp3 = [$ts=network_time(), $uid=c$uid, $id=c$id];
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/dns/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/dns/main.bro
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(DNS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dns]);
+	Log::create_stream(DNS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_dns, $path="dns"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DNS, ports);
 	}

@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ hook DNS::do_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, reply: string)

 	if ( ans$answer_type == DNS_ANS )
 		{
+		if ( ! c$dns?$query )
+			c$dns$query = ans$query;
+
 		c$dns$AA    = msg$AA;
 		c$dns$RA    = msg$RA;

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/files.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/files.bro
@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ export {

 	## Describe the file being transferred.
 	global describe_file: function(f: fa_file): string;
+
+	redef record fa_file += { 
+		ftp: FTP::Info &optional;
+	};
 }

 function get_file_handle(c: connection, is_orig: bool): string
@ -48,7 +52,6 @@ event bro_init() &priority=5
 	                          $describe        = FTP::describe_file]);
 	}

-
 event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
 	{
 	if ( [c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p] !in ftp_data_expected ) 
@ -56,6 +59,17 @@ event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priori

 	local ftp = ftp_data_expected[c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p];
 	ftp$fuid = f$id;
-	if ( f?$mime_type )
-		ftp$mime_type = f$mime_type;
+
+	f$ftp = ftp;
+	}
+
+event file_sniff(f: fa_file, meta: fa_metadata) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( ! f?$ftp )
+		return;
+
+	if ( ! meta?$mime_type )
+		return;
+
+	f$ftp$mime_type = meta$mime_type;
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/gridftp.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/gridftp.bro
@ -11,13 +11,13 @@
 ##! GridFTP data channels are identified by a heuristic that relies on
 ##! the fact that default settings for GridFTP clients typically
 ##! mutually authenticate the data channel with TLS/SSL and negotiate a
-##! NULL bulk cipher (no encryption).  Connections with those
-##! attributes are then polled for two minutes with decreasing frequency
-##! to check if the transfer sizes are large enough to indicate a
-##! GridFTP data channel that would be undesirable to analyze further
-##! (e.g. stop TCP reassembly).  A side effect is that true connection
-##! sizes are not logged, but at the benefit of saving CPU cycles that
-##! would otherwise go to analyzing the large (and likely benign) connections.
+##! NULL bulk cipher (no encryption). Connections with those attributes
+##! are marked as GridFTP if the data transfer within the first two minutes
+##! is big enough to indicate a GripFTP data channel that would be
+##! undesirable to analyze further (e.g. stop TCP reassembly).  A side
+##! effect is that true connection sizes are not logged, but at the benefit
+##! of saving CPU cycles that would otherwise go to analyzing the large
+##! (and likely benign) connections.

@load ./info
@load ./main
@ -32,23 +32,14 @@ export {
 	## GridFTP data channel.
 	const size_threshold = 1073741824 &redef;

-	## Max number of times to check whether a connection's size exceeds the
+	## Time during which we check whether a connection's size exceeds the
 	## :bro:see:`GridFTP::size_threshold`.
-	const max_poll_count = 15 &redef;
+	const max_time = 2 min &redef;

 	## Whether to skip further processing of the GridFTP data channel once
 	## detected, which may help performance.
 	const skip_data = T &redef;

-	## Base amount of time between checking whether a GridFTP data connection
-	## has transferred more than :bro:see:`GridFTP::size_threshold` bytes.
-	const poll_interval = 1sec &redef;
-
-	## The amount of time the base :bro:see:`GridFTP::poll_interval` is
-	## increased by each poll interval.  Can be used to make more frequent
-	## checks at the start of a connection and gradually slow down.
-	const poll_interval_increase = 1sec &redef;
-
 	## Raised when a GridFTP data channel is detected.
 	##
 	## c: The connection pertaining to the GridFTP data channel.
@ -79,23 +70,27 @@ event ftp_request(c: connection, command: string, arg: string) &priority=4
 		c$ftp$last_auth_requested = arg;
 	}

-function size_callback(c: connection, cnt: count): interval
+event ConnThreshold::bytes_threshold_crossed(c: connection, threshold: count, is_orig: bool)
 	{
-	if ( c$orig$size > size_threshold || c$resp$size > size_threshold )
+	if ( threshold < size_threshold || "gridftp-data" in c$service || c$duration > max_time )
+		return;
+
+	add c$service["gridftp-data"];
+	event GridFTP::data_channel_detected(c);
+
+	if ( skip_data )
+		skip_further_processing(c$id);
+	}
+
+event gridftp_possibility_timeout(c: connection)
+	{
+	# only remove if we did not already detect it and the connection
+	# is not yet at its end.
+	if ( "gridftp-data" !in c$service && ! (c?$conn && c$conn?$service) )
 		{
-		add c$service["gridftp-data"];
-		event GridFTP::data_channel_detected(c);
-
-		if ( skip_data )
-			skip_further_processing(c$id);
-
-		return -1sec;
+		ConnThreshold::delete_bytes_threshold(c, size_threshold, T);
+		ConnThreshold::delete_bytes_threshold(c, size_threshold, F);
 		}
-
-	if ( cnt >= max_poll_count )
-		return -1sec;
-
-	return poll_interval + poll_interval_increase * cnt;
 	}

 event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=5
@ -118,5 +113,9 @@ event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=-3
 	# By default GridFTP data channels do mutual authentication and
 	# negotiate a cipher suite with a NULL bulk cipher.
 	if ( data_channel_initial_criteria(c) )
-		ConnPolling::watch(c, size_callback, 0, 0secs);
+		{
+		ConnThreshold::set_bytes_threshold(c, size_threshold, T);
+		ConnThreshold::set_bytes_threshold(c, size_threshold, F);
+		schedule max_time { gridftp_possibility_timeout(c) };
+		}
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ftp/main.bro
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(FTP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ftp]);
+	Log::create_stream(FTP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ftp, $path="ftp"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_FTP, ports);
 	}

@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ event file_transferred(c: connection, prefix: string, descr: string,
 	if ( [id$resp_h, id$resp_p] in ftp_data_expected )
 		{
 		local s = ftp_data_expected[id$resp_h, id$resp_p];
-		s$mime_type = split1(mime_type, /;/)[1];
+		s$mime_type = split_string1(mime_type, /;/)[0];
 		}
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/http/entities.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/http/entities.bro
@ -35,11 +35,15 @@ export {
 		## body.
 		resp_mime_depth: count            &default=0;
 	};
+
+	redef record fa_file += {
+		http: HTTP::Info &optional;
+	};
 }

 event http_begin_entity(c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=10
 	{
-	set_state(c, F, is_orig);
+	set_state(c, is_orig);

 	if ( is_orig )
 		++c$http$orig_mime_depth;
@ -67,6 +71,8 @@ event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priori
 	{
 	if ( f$source == "HTTP" && c?$http ) 
 		{
+		f$http = c$http;
+
 		if ( c$http?$current_entity && c$http$current_entity?$filename )
 			f$info$filename = c$http$current_entity$filename;

@ -76,14 +82,6 @@ event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priori
 				c$http$orig_fuids = string_vec(f$id);
 			else
 				c$http$orig_fuids[|c$http$orig_fuids|] = f$id;
-
-			if ( f?$mime_type )
-				{
-				if ( ! c$http?$orig_mime_types )
-					c$http$orig_mime_types = string_vec(f$mime_type);
-				else
-					c$http$orig_mime_types[|c$http$orig_mime_types|] = f$mime_type;
-				}
 			}
 		else
 			{
@ -91,17 +89,32 @@ event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priori
 				c$http$resp_fuids = string_vec(f$id);
 			else
 				c$http$resp_fuids[|c$http$resp_fuids|] = f$id;
-
-			if ( f?$mime_type )
-				{
-				if ( ! c$http?$resp_mime_types )
-					c$http$resp_mime_types = string_vec(f$mime_type);
-				else
-					c$http$resp_mime_types[|c$http$resp_mime_types|] = f$mime_type;
-				}
 			}
 		}
+	}

+event file_sniff(f: fa_file, meta: fa_metadata) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( ! f?$http || ! f?$is_orig )
+		return;
+
+	if ( ! meta?$mime_type )
+		return;
+
+	if ( f$is_orig )
+		{
+		if ( ! f$http?$orig_mime_types )
+			f$http$orig_mime_types = string_vec(meta$mime_type);
+		else
+			f$http$orig_mime_types[|f$http$orig_mime_types|] = meta$mime_type;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if ( ! f$http?$resp_mime_types )
+			f$http$resp_mime_types = string_vec(meta$mime_type);
+		else
+			f$http$resp_mime_types[|f$http$resp_mime_types|] = meta$mime_type;
+		}
 	}

 event http_end_entity(c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/http/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/http/main.bro
@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ export {
 		current_request:  count                &default=0;
 		## Current response in the pending queue.
 		current_response: count                &default=0;
+		## Track the current deepest transaction.
+		## This is meant to cope with missing requests
+		## and responses.
+		trans_depth:      count                &default=0;
 	};

 	## A list of HTTP headers typically used to indicate proxied requests.
@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };
 # Initialize the HTTP logging stream and ports.
 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(HTTP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_http]);
+	Log::create_stream(HTTP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_http, $path="http"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_HTTP, ports);
 	}

@ -150,13 +154,11 @@ function new_http_session(c: connection): Info
 	tmp$ts=network_time();
 	tmp$uid=c$uid;
 	tmp$id=c$id;
-	# $current_request is set prior to the Info record creation so we
-	# can use the value directly here.
-	tmp$trans_depth = c$http_state$current_request;
+	tmp$trans_depth = ++c$http_state$trans_depth;
 	return tmp;
 	}

-function set_state(c: connection, request: bool, is_orig: bool)
+function set_state(c: connection, is_orig: bool)
 	{
 	if ( ! c?$http_state )
 		{
@ -165,15 +167,20 @@ function set_state(c: connection, request: bool, is_orig: bool)
 		}

 	# These deal with new requests and responses.
-	if ( request || c$http_state$current_request !in c$http_state$pending )
-		c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_request] = new_http_session(c);
-	if ( ! is_orig && c$http_state$current_response !in c$http_state$pending )
-		c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_response] = new_http_session(c);
-
 	if ( is_orig )
+		{
+		if ( c$http_state$current_request !in c$http_state$pending )
+			c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_request] = new_http_session(c);
+
 		c$http = c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_request];
+		}
 	else
+		{
+		if ( c$http_state$current_response !in c$http_state$pending )
+			c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_response] = new_http_session(c);
+
 		c$http = c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_response];
+		}
 	}

 event http_request(c: connection, method: string, original_URI: string,
@ -186,7 +193,7 @@ event http_request(c: connection, method: string, original_URI: string,
 		}

 	++c$http_state$current_request;
-	set_state(c, T, T);
+	set_state(c, T);

 	c$http$method = method;
 	c$http$uri = unescaped_URI;
@ -208,8 +215,10 @@ event http_reply(c: connection, version: string, code: count, reason: string) &p
 	if ( c$http_state$current_response !in c$http_state$pending ||
 	     (c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_response]?$status_code &&
 	       ! code_in_range(c$http_state$pending[c$http_state$current_response]$status_code, 100, 199)) )
+		{
 		++c$http_state$current_response;
-	set_state(c, F, F);
+		}
+	set_state(c, F);

 	c$http$status_code = code;
 	c$http$status_msg = reason;
@ -233,7 +242,7 @@ event http_reply(c: connection, version: string, code: count, reason: string) &p

 event http_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, name: string, value: string) &priority=5
 	{
-	set_state(c, F, is_orig);
+	set_state(c, is_orig);

 	if ( is_orig ) # client headers
 		{
@ -242,7 +251,7 @@ event http_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, name: string, value: string) &pr

 		else if ( name == "HOST" )
 			# The split is done to remove the occasional port value that shows up here.
-			c$http$host = split1(value, /:/)[1];
+			c$http$host = split_string1(value, /:/)[0];

 		else if ( name == "RANGE" )
 			c$http$range_request = T;
@ -257,17 +266,17 @@ event http_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, name: string, value: string) &pr
 				add c$http$proxied[fmt("%s -> %s", name, value)];
 				}

-		else if ( name == "AUTHORIZATION" )
+		else if ( name == "AUTHORIZATION" || name == "PROXY-AUTHORIZATION" )
 			{
 			if ( /^[bB][aA][sS][iI][cC] / in value )
 				{
-				local userpass = decode_base64(sub(value, /[bB][aA][sS][iI][cC][[:blank:]]/, ""));
-				local up = split(userpass, /:/);
+				local userpass = decode_base64_conn(c$id, sub(value, /[bB][aA][sS][iI][cC][[:blank:]]/, ""));
+				local up = split_string(userpass, /:/);
 				if ( |up| >= 2 )
 					{
-					c$http$username = up[1];
+					c$http$username = up[0];
 					if ( c$http$capture_password )
-						c$http$password = up[2];
+						c$http$password = up[1];
 					}
 				else
 					{
@ -278,12 +287,11 @@ event http_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, name: string, value: string) &pr
 				}
 			}
 		}
-
 	}

 event http_message_done(c: connection, is_orig: bool, stat: http_message_stat) &priority = 5
 	{
-	set_state(c, F, is_orig);
+	set_state(c, is_orig);

 	if ( is_orig )
 		c$http$request_body_len = stat$body_length;
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/http/utils.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/http/utils.bro
@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ function extract_keys(data: string, kv_splitter: pattern): string_vec
 	{
 	local key_vec: vector of string = vector();
 	
-	local parts = split(data, kv_splitter);
+	local parts = split_string(data, kv_splitter);
 	for ( part_index in parts )
 		{
-		local key_val = split1(parts[part_index], /=/);
-		if ( 1 in key_val )
-			key_vec[|key_vec|] = key_val[1];
+		local key_val = split_string1(parts[part_index], /=/);
+		if ( 0 in key_val )
+			key_vec[|key_vec|] = key_val[0];
 		}
 	return key_vec;
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/irc/files.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/irc/files.bro
@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ export {

 	## Default file handle provider for IRC.
 	global get_file_handle: function(c: connection, is_orig: bool): string;
+
+	redef record fa_file += {
+		irc: IRC::Info &optional;
+	};
 }

 function get_file_handle(c: connection, is_orig: bool): string
@ -34,6 +38,12 @@ event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priori
 	irc$fuid = f$id;
 	if ( irc?$dcc_file_name )
 		f$info$filename = irc$dcc_file_name;
-	if ( f?$mime_type )
-		irc$dcc_mime_type = f$mime_type;
+
+	f$irc = irc;
+	}
+
+event file_sniff(f: fa_file, meta: fa_metadata) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( f?$irc && meta?$mime_type )
+		f$irc$dcc_mime_type = meta$mime_type;
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/irc/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/irc/main.bro
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(IRC::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=irc_log]);
+	Log::create_stream(IRC::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=irc_log, $path="irc"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_IRC, ports);
 	}
 	
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/README
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Support for Kerberos protocol analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/load.bro
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+@load ./main
+@load ./files
+@load-sigs ./dpd.sig
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/consts.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/consts.bro
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+module KRB;
+
+export {
+
+	const error_msg: table[count] of string = {
+		[0] = "KDC_ERR_NONE",
+		[1] = "KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP",
+		[2] = "KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP",
+		[3] = "KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO",
+		[4] = "KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO",
+		[5] = "KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO",
+		[6] = "KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN",
+		[7] = "KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN",
+		[8] = "KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE",
+		[9] = "KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY",
+		[10] = "KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE",
+		[11] = "KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID",
+		[12] = "KDC_ERR_POLICY",
+		[13] = "KDC_ERR_BADOPTION",
+		[14] = "KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP",
+		[15] = "KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP",
+		[16] = "KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP",
+		[17] = "KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP",
+		[18] = "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED",
+		[19] = "KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED",
+		[20] = "KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED",
+		[21] = "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET",
+		[22] = "KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET",
+		[23] = "KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED",
+		[24] = "KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED",
+		[25] = "KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED",
+		[26] = "KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH",
+		[27] = "KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER",
+		[28] = "KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED",
+		[29] = "KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE",
+		[31] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY",
+		[32] = "KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED",
+		[33] = "KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV",
+		[34] = "KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT",
+		[35] = "KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US",
+		[36] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH",
+		[37] = "KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW",
+		[38] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR",
+		[39] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION",
+		[40] = "KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE",
+		[41] = "KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED",
+		[42] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER",
+		[44] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER",
+		[45] = "KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY",
+		[46] = "KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL",
+		[47] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION",
+		[48] = "KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD",
+		[49] = "KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ",
+		[50] = "KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM",
+		[51] = "KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED",
+		[52] = "KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG",
+		[60] = "KRB_ERR_GENERIC",
+		[61] = "KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG",
+		[62] = "KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED",
+		[63] = "KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED",
+		[64] = "KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG",
+		[65] = "KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK",
+		[66] = "KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH",
+		[67] = "KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT",
+		[68] = "KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM",
+		[69] = "KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED",
+		[70] = "KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE",
+		[71] = "KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE",
+		[72] = "KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE",
+		[73] = "KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN",
+		[74] = "KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE",
+		[75] = "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH",
+		[76] = "KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH",
+	};
+
+	const cipher_name: table[count] of string = {
+		[1] = "des-cbc-crc",
+		[2] = "des-cbc-md4",
+		[3] = "des-cbc-md5",
+		[5] = "des3-cbc-md5",
+		[7] = "des3-cbc-sha1",
+		[9] = "dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID",
+		[10] = "md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID",
+		[11] = "sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID",
+		[12] = "rc2CBC-EnvOID",
+		[13] = "rsaEncryption-EnvOID",
+		[14] = "rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID",
+		[15] = "des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID",
+		[16] = "des3-cbc-sha1-kd",
+		[17] = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
+		[18] = "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
+		[23] = "rc4-hmac",
+		[24] = "rc4-hmac-exp",
+		[25] = "camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		[26] = "camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		[65] = "subkey-keymaterial",
+	};
+
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/dpd.sig
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# This is the ASN.1 encoded version and message type headers
+
+signature dpd_krb_udp_requests {
+	ip-proto == udp
+	payload /(\x6a|\x6c).{1,4}\x30.{1,4}\xa1\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa2\x03\x02\x01/
+	enable "krb"
+}
+
+signature dpd_krb_udp_replies {
+	ip-proto == udp
+	payload /(\x6b|\x6d|\x7e).{1,4}\x30.{1,4}\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa1\x03\x02\x01/
+	enable "krb"
+}
+
+signature dpd_krb_tcp_requests {
+	ip-proto == tcp
+	payload /.{4}(\x6a|\x6c).{1,4}\x30.{1,4}\xa1\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa2\x03\x02\x01/
+	enable "krb_tcp"
+}
+
+signature dpd_krb_tcp_replies {
+	ip-proto == tcp
+	payload /.{4}(\x6b|\x6d|\x7e).{1,4}\x30.{1,4}\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa1\x03\x02\x01/
+	enable "krb_tcp"
+}
+
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/files.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/files.bro
@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+@load ./main
+@load base/utils/conn-ids
+@load base/frameworks/files
+@load base/files/x509
+
+module KRB;
+
+export {
+	redef record Info += {
+		# Client certificate
+		client_cert:		Files::Info &optional;
+		# Subject of client certificate, if any
+		client_cert_subject:	string &log &optional;
+		# File unique ID of client cert, if any
+		client_cert_fuid:	string &log &optional;
+
+		# Server certificate
+		server_cert:		Files::Info &optional;
+		# Subject of server certificate, if any
+		server_cert_subject:	string &log &optional;
+		# File unique ID of server cert, if any
+		server_cert_fuid:	string &log &optional;
+	};
+
+	## Default file handle provider for KRB.
+	global get_file_handle: function(c: connection, is_orig: bool): string;
+
+	## Default file describer for KRB.
+	global describe_file: function(f: fa_file): string;
+}
+
+function get_file_handle(c: connection, is_orig: bool): string
+	{
+	# Unused.  File handles are generated in the analyzer.
+	return "";
+	}
+
+function describe_file(f: fa_file): string
+	{
+	if ( f$source != "KRB_TCP" && f$source != "KRB" )
+		return "";
+
+	if ( ! f?$info || ! f$info?$x509 || ! f$info$x509?$certificate )
+		return "";
+
+	# It is difficult to reliably describe a certificate - especially since
+	# we do not know when this function is called (hence, if the data structures
+	# are already populated).
+	#
+	# Just return a bit of our connection information and hope that that is good enough.
+	for ( cid in f$conns )
+		{
+		if ( f$conns[cid]?$krb )
+			{
+			local c = f$conns[cid];
+			return cat(c$id$resp_h, ":", c$id$resp_p);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return cat("Serial: ", f$info$x509$certificate$serial, " Subject: ",
+			       f$info$x509$certificate$subject, " Issuer: ",
+			       f$info$x509$certificate$issuer);
+	}
+
+event bro_init() &priority=5
+	{
+	Files::register_protocol(Analyzer::ANALYZER_KRB_TCP,
+	                         [$get_file_handle = KRB::get_file_handle,
+	                          $describe        = KRB::describe_file]);
+
+	Files::register_protocol(Analyzer::ANALYZER_KRB,
+	                         [$get_file_handle = KRB::get_file_handle,
+	                          $describe        = KRB::describe_file]);
+	}
+
+event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( f$source != "KRB_TCP" && f$source != "KRB" )
+		return;
+
+	local info: Info;
+
+	if ( ! c?$krb )
+		{
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+		}
+	else
+		info = c$krb;
+
+	if ( is_orig )
+		{
+		info$client_cert = f$info;
+		info$client_cert_fuid = f$id;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		info$server_cert = f$info;
+		info$server_cert_fuid = f$id;
+		}
+
+	c$krb = info;
+
+	Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_X509);
+	# Always calculate hashes. They are not necessary for base scripts
+	# but very useful for identification, and required for policy scripts
+	Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_MD5);
+	Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_SHA1);
+	}
+
+function fill_in_subjects(c: connection)
+	{
+	if ( !c?$krb )
+		return;
+
+	if ( c$krb?$client_cert && c$krb$client_cert?$x509 && c$krb$client_cert$x509?$certificate )
+		c$krb$client_cert_subject = c$krb$client_cert$x509$certificate$subject;
+
+	if ( c$krb?$server_cert && c$krb$server_cert?$x509 && c$krb$server_cert$x509?$certificate )
+		c$krb$server_cert_subject = c$krb$server_cert$x509$certificate$subject;
+	}
+
+event krb_error(c: connection, msg: Error_Msg)
+	{
+	fill_in_subjects(c);
+	}
+
+event krb_as_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response)
+	{
+	fill_in_subjects(c);
+	}
+
+event krb_tgs_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response)
+	{
+	fill_in_subjects(c);
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection)
+	{
+	fill_in_subjects(c);
+	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/krb/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/krb/main.bro
@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+##! Implements base functionality for KRB analysis. Generates the kerberos.log
+##! file.
+
+module KRB;
+
+@load ./consts
+
+export {
+	redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
+
+	type Info: record {
+		## Timestamp for when the event happened.
+		ts:			time    &log;
+		## Unique ID for the connection.
+		uid:			string  &log;
+		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
+		id:			conn_id &log;
+
+		## Request type - Authentication Service ("AS") or
+		## Ticket Granting Service ("TGS")
+		request_type:		string &log &optional;
+		## Client
+		client:			string &log &optional;
+		## Service
+		service:		string &log;
+
+		## Request result
+		success:		bool &log &optional;
+		## Error code
+		error_code: 		count &optional;
+		## Error message
+		error_msg: 		string &log &optional;
+
+		## Ticket valid from
+		from:			time &log &optional;
+		## Ticket valid till
+		till:			time &log &optional;
+		## Ticket encryption type
+		cipher:			string &log &optional;
+
+		## Forwardable ticket requested
+		forwardable: 		bool &log &optional;
+		## Renewable ticket requested
+		renewable:		bool &log &optional;
+
+		## We've already logged this
+		logged: 		bool &default=F;
+	};
+
+	## The server response error texts which are *not* logged.
+	const ignored_errors: set[string] = {
+		# This will significantly increase the noisiness of the log.
+		# However, one attack is to iterate over principals, looking
+		# for ones that don't require preauth, and then performn
+		# an offline attack on that ticket. To detect that attack,
+		# log NEEDED_PREAUTH.
+		"NEEDED_PREAUTH",
+		# This is a more specific version of NEEDED_PREAUTH that's used
+		# by Windows AD Kerberos.
+		"Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
+	} &redef;
+
+	## Event that can be handled to access the KRB record as it is sent on
+	## to the logging framework.
+	global log_krb: event(rec: Info);
+}
+
+redef record connection += {
+	krb: Info &optional;
+};
+
+const tcp_ports = { 88/tcp };
+const udp_ports = { 88/udp };
+redef likely_server_ports += { tcp_ports, udp_ports };
+
+event bro_init() &priority=5
+	{
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_KRB, udp_ports);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_KRB_TCP, tcp_ports);
+	Log::create_stream(KRB::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_krb, $path="kerberos"]);
+	}
+
+event krb_error(c: connection, msg: Error_Msg) &priority=5
+	{
+	local info: Info;
+
+	if ( msg?$error_text && msg$error_text in ignored_errors )
+		{
+		if ( c?$krb ) delete c$krb;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if ( c?$krb && c$krb$logged )
+		return;
+
+	if ( c?$krb )
+		info = c$krb;
+
+	if ( ! info?$ts )
+		{
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+		}
+
+	if ( ! info?$client && ( msg?$client_name || msg?$client_realm ) )
+		info$client = fmt("%s%s", msg?$client_name ? msg$client_name + "/" : "",
+				 	  msg?$client_realm ? msg$client_realm : "");
+
+	info$service = msg$service_name;
+	info$success = F;
+
+	info$error_code = msg$error_code;
+
+	if ( msg?$error_text )			info$error_msg = msg$error_text;
+	else if ( msg$error_code in error_msg ) info$error_msg = error_msg[msg$error_code];
+
+	c$krb = info;
+	}
+
+event krb_error(c: connection, msg: Error_Msg) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$krb )
+		{
+		Log::write(KRB::LOG, c$krb);
+		c$krb$logged = T;
+		}
+	}
+
+event krb_as_request(c: connection, msg: KDC_Request) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$krb && c$krb$logged )
+		return;
+
+	local info: Info;
+
+	if ( !c?$krb )
+		{
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+		}
+	else
+		info = c$krb;
+
+	info$request_type = "AS";
+	info$client = fmt("%s/%s", msg$client_name, msg$service_realm);
+	info$service = msg$service_name;
+
+	if ( msg?$from )
+		info$from = msg$from;
+
+	info$till = msg$till;
+
+	info$forwardable = msg$kdc_options$forwardable;
+	info$renewable = msg$kdc_options$renewable;
+
+	c$krb = info;
+	}
+
+event krb_tgs_request(c: connection, msg: KDC_Request) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$krb && c$krb$logged )
+		return;
+
+	local info: Info;
+	info$ts  = network_time();
+	info$uid = c$uid;
+	info$id  = c$id;
+	info$request_type = "TGS";
+	info$service = msg$service_name;
+	if ( msg?$from ) info$from = msg$from;
+	info$till = msg$till;
+
+	info$forwardable = msg$kdc_options$forwardable;
+	info$renewable = msg$kdc_options$renewable;
+
+	c$krb = info;
+	}
+
+event krb_as_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response) &priority=5
+	{
+	local info: Info;
+
+	if ( c?$krb && c$krb$logged )
+		return;
+
+	if ( c?$krb )
+		info = c$krb;
+
+	if ( ! info?$ts )
+		{
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+		}
+
+	if ( ! info?$client )
+		info$client = fmt("%s/%s", msg$client_name, msg$client_realm);
+
+	info$service = msg$ticket$service_name;
+	info$cipher  = cipher_name[msg$ticket$cipher];
+	info$success = T;
+
+	c$krb = info;
+	}
+
+event krb_as_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response) &priority=-5
+	{
+	Log::write(KRB::LOG, c$krb);
+	c$krb$logged = T;
+	}
+
+event krb_tgs_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response) &priority=5
+	{
+	local info: Info;
+
+	if ( c?$krb && c$krb$logged )
+		return;
+
+	if ( c?$krb )
+		info = c$krb;
+
+	if ( ! info?$ts )
+		{
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+		}
+
+	if ( ! info?$client )
+		info$client = fmt("%s/%s", msg$client_name, msg$client_realm);
+
+	info$service = msg$ticket$service_name;
+	info$cipher  = cipher_name[msg$ticket$cipher];
+	info$success = T;
+
+	c$krb = info;
+	}
+
+event krb_tgs_response(c: connection, msg: KDC_Response) &priority=-5
+	{
+	Log::write(KRB::LOG, c$krb);
+	c$krb$logged = T;
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$krb && ! c$krb$logged )
+		Log::write(KRB::LOG, c$krb);
+	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/modbus/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/modbus/main.bro
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(Modbus::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_modbus]);
+	Log::create_stream(Modbus::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_modbus, $path="modbus"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_MODBUS, ports);
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/README
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Support for MySQL protocol analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/load.bro
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+@load ./main
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/consts.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/consts.bro
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+module MySQL;
+
+export {
+	const commands: table[count] of string = {
+		[0]  = "sleep",
+		[1]  = "quit",
+		[2]  = "init_db",
+		[3]  = "query",
+		[4]  = "field_list",
+		[5]  = "create_db",
+		[6]  = "drop_db",
+		[7]  = "refresh",
+		[8]  = "shutdown",
+		[9]  = "statistics",
+		[10] = "process_info",
+		[11] = "connect",
+		[12] = "process_kill",
+		[13] = "debug",
+		[14] = "ping",
+		[15] = "time",
+		[16] = "delayed_insert",
+		[17] = "change_user",
+		[18] = "binlog_dump",
+		[19] = "table_dump",
+		[20] = "connect_out",
+		[21] = "register_slave",
+		[22] = "stmt_prepare",
+		[23] = "stmt_execute",
+		[24] = "stmt_send_long_data",
+		[25] = "stmt_close",
+		[26] = "stmt_reset",
+		[27] = "set_option",
+		[28] = "stmt_fetch",
+		[29] = "daemon",
+		[30] = "binlog_dump_gtid",
+		[31] = "reset_connection",
+	} &default=function(i: count): string { return fmt("unknown-%d", i); };
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/mysql/main.bro
@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+##! Implements base functionality for MySQL analysis. Generates the mysql.log file.
+
+module MySQL;
+
+@load ./consts
+
+export {
+	redef enum Log::ID += { mysql::LOG };
+
+	type Info: record {
+		## Timestamp for when the event happened.
+		ts:     time    &log;
+		## Unique ID for the connection.
+		uid:    string  &log;
+		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
+		id:     conn_id &log;
+		## The command that was issued
+		cmd:	string	&log;
+		## The argument issued to the command
+		arg:	string	&log;
+		## Did the server tell us that the command succeeded?
+		success: bool &log &optional;
+		## The number of affected rows, if any
+		rows: count &log &optional;
+		## Server message, if any
+		response: string &log &optional;
+	};
+
+	## Event that can be handled to access the MySQL record as it is sent on
+	## to the logging framework.
+	global log_mysql: event(rec: Info);
+}
+
+redef record connection += {
+	mysql: Info &optional;
+};
+
+const ports = { 1434/tcp, 3306/tcp };
+
+event bro_init() &priority=5
+	{
+	Log::create_stream(mysql::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_mysql, $path="mysql"]);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_MYSQL, ports);
+	}
+
+event mysql_handshake(c: connection, username: string)
+	{
+	if ( ! c?$mysql )
+		{
+		local info: Info;
+		info$ts = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id = c$id;
+		info$cmd = "login";
+		info$arg = username;
+		c$mysql = info;
+		}
+	}
+
+event mysql_command_request(c: connection, command: count, arg: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		# We got a request, but we haven't logged our
+		# previous request yet, so let's do that now.
+		Log::write(mysql::LOG, c$mysql);
+		delete c$mysql;
+		}
+
+	local info: Info;
+	info$ts = network_time();
+	info$uid = c$uid;
+	info$id = c$id;
+	info$cmd = commands[command];
+	info$arg = sub(arg, /\0$/, "");
+	c$mysql = info;
+	}
+
+event mysql_command_request(c: connection, command: count, arg: string) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql && c$mysql?$cmd && c$mysql$cmd == "quit" )
+		{
+		# We get no response for quits, so let's just log it now.
+		Log::write(mysql::LOG, c$mysql);
+		delete c$mysql;
+		}
+	}
+
+event mysql_error(c: connection, code: count, msg: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		c$mysql$success = F;
+		c$mysql$response = msg;
+		}
+	}
+
+event mysql_error(c: connection, code: count, msg: string) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		Log::write(mysql::LOG, c$mysql);
+		delete c$mysql;
+		}
+	}
+
+event mysql_ok(c: connection, affected_rows: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		c$mysql$success = T;
+		c$mysql$rows = affected_rows;
+		}
+	}
+
+event mysql_ok(c: connection, affected_rows: count) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		Log::write(mysql::LOG, c$mysql);
+		delete c$mysql;
+		}
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$mysql )
+		{
+		Log::write(mysql::LOG, c$mysql);
+		delete c$mysql;
+		}
+	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/radius/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/radius/README
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Support for RADIUS protocol analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/radius/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/radius/main.bro
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ const ports = { 1812/udp };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(RADIUS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_radius]);
+	Log::create_stream(RADIUS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_radius, $path="radius"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_RADIUS, ports);
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/README
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Support for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/load.bro
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+@load ./consts
+@load ./main
+@load-sigs ./dpd.sig
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/consts.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/consts.bro
@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+module RDP;
+
+export {
+	# http://www.c-amie.co.uk/technical/mstsc-versions/
+	const builds = {
+		[0419] = "RDP 4.0",
+		[2195] = "RDP 5.0",
+		[2221] = "RDP 5.0",
+		[2600] = "RDP 5.1",
+		[3790] = "RDP 5.2",
+		[6000] = "RDP 6.0",
+		[6001] = "RDP 6.1",
+		[6002] = "RDP 6.2",
+		[7600] = "RDP 7.0",
+		[7601] = "RDP 7.1",
+		[9200] = "RDP 8.0",
+		[9600] = "RDP 8.1",
+		[25189] = "RDP 8.0 (Mac)",
+		[25282] = "RDP 8.0 (Mac)"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("client_build-%d", n); };
+
+	const security_protocols = {
+		[0x00] = "RDP",
+		[0x01] = "SSL",
+		[0x02] = "HYBRID",
+		[0x08] = "HYBRID_EX"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("security_protocol-%d", n); };
+
+	const failure_codes = {
+		[0x01] = "SSL_REQUIRED_BY_SERVER",
+		[0x02] = "SSL_NOT_ALLOWED_BY_SERVER",
+		[0x03] = "SSL_CERT_NOT_ON_SERVER",
+		[0x04] = "INCONSISTENT_FLAGS",
+		[0x05] = "HYBRID_REQUIRED_BY_SERVER",
+		[0x06] = "SSL_WITH_USER_AUTH_REQUIRED_BY_SERVER"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("failure_code-%d", n); };
+
+	const cert_types = {
+		[1] = "RSA",
+		[2] = "X.509"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("cert_type-%d", n); };
+
+	const encryption_methods = {
+		[0] = "None",
+		[1] = "40bit",
+		[2] = "128bit",
+		[8] = "56bit",
+		[10] = "FIPS"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("encryption_method-%d", n); };
+
+	const encryption_levels = {
+		[0] = "None",
+		[1] = "Low",
+		[2] = "Client compatible",
+		[3] = "High",
+		[4] = "FIPS"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("encryption_level-%d", n); };
+
+	const high_color_depths = {
+		[0x0004] = "4bit",
+		[0x0008] = "8bit",
+		[0x000F] = "15bit",
+		[0x0010] = "16bit",
+		[0x0018] = "24bit"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("high_color_depth-%d", n); };
+
+	const color_depths = {
+		[0x0001] = "24bit",
+		[0x0002] = "16bit",
+		[0x0004] = "15bit",
+		[0x0008] = "32bit"
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("color_depth-%d", n); };
+
+	const results = {
+		[0] = "Success",
+		[1] = "User rejected",
+		[2] = "Resources not available",
+		[3] = "Rejected for symmetry breaking",
+		[4] = "Locked conference",
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("result-%d", n); };
+
+	# http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/goglobal/bb964664.aspx
+	const languages = {
+		[1078] = "Afrikaans - South Africa",
+		[1052] = "Albanian - Albania",
+		[1156] = "Alsatian",
+		[1118] = "Amharic - Ethiopia",
+		[1025] = "Arabic - Saudi Arabia",
+		[5121] = "Arabic - Algeria",
+		[15361] = "Arabic - Bahrain",
+		[3073] = "Arabic - Egypt",
+		[2049] = "Arabic - Iraq",
+		[11265] = "Arabic - Jordan",
+		[13313] = "Arabic - Kuwait",
+		[12289] = "Arabic - Lebanon",
+		[4097] = "Arabic - Libya",
+		[6145] = "Arabic - Morocco",
+		[8193] = "Arabic - Oman",
+		[16385] = "Arabic - Qatar",
+		[10241] = "Arabic - Syria",
+		[7169] = "Arabic - Tunisia",
+		[14337] = "Arabic - U.A.E.",
+		[9217] = "Arabic - Yemen",
+		[1067] = "Armenian - Armenia",
+		[1101] = "Assamese",
+		[2092] = "Azeri (Cyrillic)",
+		[1068] = "Azeri (Latin)",
+		[1133] = "Bashkir",
+		[1069] = "Basque",
+		[1059] = "Belarusian",
+		[1093] = "Bengali (India)",
+		[2117] = "Bengali (Bangladesh)",
+		[5146] = "Bosnian (Bosnia/Herzegovina)",
+		[1150] = "Breton",
+		[1026] = "Bulgarian",
+		[1109] = "Burmese",
+		[1027] = "Catalan",
+		[1116] = "Cherokee - United States",
+		[2052] = "Chinese - People's Republic of China",
+		[4100] = "Chinese - Singapore",
+		[1028] = "Chinese - Taiwan",
+		[3076] = "Chinese - Hong Kong SAR",
+		[5124] = "Chinese - Macao SAR",
+		[1155] = "Corsican",
+		[1050] = "Croatian",
+		[4122] = "Croatian (Bosnia/Herzegovina)",
+		[1029] = "Czech",
+		[1030] = "Danish",
+		[1164] = "Dari",
+		[1125] = "Divehi",
+		[1043] = "Dutch - Netherlands",
+		[2067] = "Dutch - Belgium",
+		[1126] = "Edo",
+		[1033] = "English - United States",
+		[2057] = "English - United Kingdom",
+		[3081] = "English - Australia",
+		[10249] = "English - Belize",
+		[4105] = "English - Canada",
+		[9225] = "English - Caribbean",
+		[15369] = "English - Hong Kong SAR",
+		[16393] = "English - India",
+		[14345] = "English - Indonesia",
+		[6153] = "English - Ireland",
+		[8201] = "English - Jamaica",
+		[17417] = "English - Malaysia",
+		[5129] = "English - New Zealand",
+		[13321] = "English - Philippines",
+		[18441] = "English - Singapore",
+		[7177] = "English - South Africa",
+		[11273] = "English - Trinidad",
+		[12297] = "English - Zimbabwe",
+		[1061] = "Estonian",
+		[1080] = "Faroese",
+		[1065] = "Farsi",
+		[1124] = "Filipino",
+		[1035] = "Finnish",
+		[1036] = "French - France",
+		[2060] = "French - Belgium",
+		[11276] = "French - Cameroon",
+		[3084] = "French - Canada",
+		[9228] = "French - Democratic Rep. of Congo",
+		[12300] = "French - Cote d'Ivoire",
+		[15372] = "French - Haiti",
+		[5132] = "French - Luxembourg",
+		[13324] = "French - Mali",
+		[6156] = "French - Monaco",
+		[14348] = "French - Morocco",
+		[58380] = "French - North Africa",
+		[8204] = "French - Reunion",
+		[10252] = "French - Senegal",
+		[4108] = "French - Switzerland",
+		[7180] = "French - West Indies",
+		[1122] = "French - West Indies",
+		[1127] = "Fulfulde - Nigeria",
+		[1071] = "FYRO Macedonian",
+		[1110] = "Galician",
+		[1079] = "Georgian",
+		[1031] = "German - Germany",
+		[3079] = "German - Austria",
+		[5127] = "German - Liechtenstein",
+		[4103] = "German - Luxembourg",
+		[2055] = "German - Switzerland",
+		[1032] = "Greek",
+		[1135] = "Greenlandic",
+		[1140] = "Guarani - Paraguay",
+		[1095] = "Gujarati",
+		[1128] = "Hausa - Nigeria",
+		[1141] = "Hawaiian - United States",
+		[1037] = "Hebrew",
+		[1081] = "Hindi",
+		[1038] = "Hungarian",
+		[1129] = "Ibibio - Nigeria",
+		[1039] = "Icelandic",
+		[1136] = "Igbo - Nigeria",
+		[1057] = "Indonesian",
+		[1117] = "Inuktitut",
+		[2108] = "Irish",
+		[1040] = "Italian - Italy",
+		[2064] = "Italian - Switzerland",
+		[1041] = "Japanese",
+		[1158] = "K'iche",
+		[1099] = "Kannada",
+		[1137] = "Kanuri - Nigeria",
+		[2144] = "Kashmiri",
+		[1120] = "Kashmiri (Arabic)",
+		[1087] = "Kazakh",
+		[1107] = "Khmer",
+		[1159] = "Kinyarwanda",
+		[1111] = "Konkani",
+		[1042] = "Korean",
+		[1088] = "Kyrgyz (Cyrillic)",
+		[1108] = "Lao",
+		[1142] = "Latin",
+		[1062] = "Latvian",
+		[1063] = "Lithuanian",
+		[1134] = "Luxembourgish",
+		[1086] = "Malay - Malaysia",
+		[2110] = "Malay - Brunei Darussalam",
+		[1100] = "Malayalam",
+		[1082] = "Maltese",
+		[1112] = "Manipuri",
+		[1153] = "Maori - New Zealand",
+		[1146] = "Mapudungun",
+		[1102] = "Marathi",
+		[1148] = "Mohawk",
+		[1104] = "Mongolian (Cyrillic)",
+		[2128] = "Mongolian (Mongolian)",
+		[1121] = "Nepali",
+		[2145] = "Nepali - India",
+		[1044] = "Norwegian (Bokmål)",
+		[2068] = "Norwegian (Nynorsk)",
+		[1154] = "Occitan",
+		[1096] = "Oriya",
+		[1138] = "Oromo",
+		[1145] = "Papiamentu",
+		[1123] = "Pashto",
+		[1045] = "Polish",
+		[1046] = "Portuguese - Brazil",
+		[2070] = "Portuguese - Portugal",
+		[1094] = "Punjabi",
+		[2118] = "Punjabi (Pakistan)",
+		[1131] = "Quecha - Bolivia",
+		[2155] = "Quecha - Ecuador",
+		[3179] = "Quecha - Peru	CB",
+		[1047] = "Rhaeto-Romanic",
+		[1048] = "Romanian",
+		[2072] = "Romanian - Moldava",
+		[1049] = "Russian",
+		[2073] = "Russian - Moldava",
+		[1083] = "Sami (Lappish)",
+		[1103] = "Sanskrit",
+		[1084] = "Scottish Gaelic",
+		[1132] = "Sepedi",
+		[3098] = "Serbian (Cyrillic)",
+		[2074] = "Serbian (Latin)",
+		[1113] = "Sindhi - India",
+		[2137] = "Sindhi - Pakistan",
+		[1115] = "Sinhalese - Sri Lanka",
+		[1051] = "Slovak",
+		[1060] = "Slovenian",
+		[1143] = "Somali",
+		[1070] = "Sorbian",
+		[3082] = "Spanish - Spain (Modern Sort)",
+		[1034] = "Spanish - Spain (Traditional Sort)",
+		[11274] = "Spanish - Argentina",
+		[16394] = "Spanish - Bolivia",
+		[13322] = "Spanish - Chile",
+		[9226] = "Spanish - Colombia",
+		[5130] = "Spanish - Costa Rica",
+		[7178] = "Spanish - Dominican Republic",
+		[12298] = "Spanish - Ecuador",
+		[17418] = "Spanish - El Salvador",
+		[4106] = "Spanish - Guatemala",
+		[18442] = "Spanish - Honduras",
+		[22538] = "Spanish - Latin America",
+		[2058] = "Spanish - Mexico",
+		[19466] = "Spanish - Nicaragua",
+		[6154] = "Spanish - Panama",
+		[15370] = "Spanish - Paraguay",
+		[10250] = "Spanish - Peru",
+		[20490] = "Spanish - Puerto Rico",
+		[21514] = "Spanish - United States",
+		[14346] = "Spanish - Uruguay",
+		[8202] = "Spanish - Venezuela",
+		[1072] = "Sutu",
+		[1089] = "Swahili",
+		[1053] = "Swedish",
+		[2077] = "Swedish - Finland",
+		[1114] = "Syriac",
+		[1064] = "Tajik",
+		[1119] = "Tamazight (Arabic)",
+		[2143] = "Tamazight (Latin)",
+		[1097] = "Tamil",
+		[1092] = "Tatar",
+		[1098] = "Telugu",
+		[1054] = "Thai",
+		[2129] = "Tibetan - Bhutan",
+		[1105] = "Tibetan - People's Republic of China",
+		[2163] = "Tigrigna - Eritrea",
+		[1139] = "Tigrigna - Ethiopia",
+		[1073] = "Tsonga",
+		[1074] = "Tswana",
+		[1055] = "Turkish",
+		[1090] = "Turkmen",
+		[1152] = "Uighur - China",
+		[1058] = "Ukrainian",
+		[1056] = "Urdu",
+		[2080] = "Urdu - India",
+		[2115] = "Uzbek (Cyrillic)",
+		[1091] = "Uzbek (Latin)",
+		[1075] = "Venda",
+		[1066] = "Vietnamese",
+		[1106] = "Welsh",
+		[1160] = "Wolof",
+		[1076] = "Xhosa",
+		[1157] = "Yakut",
+		[1144] = "Yi",
+		[1085] = "Yiddish",
+		[1130] = "Yoruba",
+		[1077] = "Zulu",
+		[1279] = "HID (Human Interface Device)",
+	} &default = function(n: count): string { return fmt("keyboard-%d", n); };
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/dpd.sig
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+signature dpd_rdp_client {
+	ip-proto == tcp
+	# Client request
+	payload /.*(Cookie: mstshash\=|Duca.*(rdpdr|rdpsnd|drdynvc|cliprdr))/
+	requires-reverse-signature dpd_rdp_server
+	enable "rdp"
+}
+
+signature dpd_rdp_server {
+	ip-proto == tcp
+	payload /(.{5}\xd0|.*McDn)/
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/rdp/main.bro
@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+##! Implements base functionality for RDP analysis. Generates the rdp.log file.
+
+@load ./consts
+
+module RDP;
+
+export {
+	redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
+
+	type Info: record {
+		## Timestamp for when the event happened.
+		ts:                    time    &log;
+		## Unique ID for the connection.
+		uid:                   string  &log;
+		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
+		id:                    conn_id &log;
+		## Cookie value used by the client machine.
+		## This is typically a username.
+		cookie:                string  &log &optional;
+		## Status result for the connection.  It's a mix between
+		## RDP negotation failure messages and GCC server create
+		## response messages.
+		result:                string  &log &optional;
+		## Security protocol chosen by the server.
+		security_protocol:     string &log &optional;
+
+		## Keyboard layout (language) of the client machine.
+		keyboard_layout:       string  &log &optional;
+		## RDP client version used by the client machine.
+		client_build:          string  &log &optional;
+		## Name of the client machine.
+		client_name:           string  &log &optional;
+		## Product ID of the client machine.
+		client_dig_product_id: string  &log &optional;
+		## Desktop width of the client machine.
+		desktop_width:         count   &log &optional;
+		## Desktop height of the client machine.
+		desktop_height:        count   &log &optional;
+		## The color depth requested by the client in 
+		## the high_color_depth field.
+		requested_color_depth: string  &log &optional;
+
+		## If the connection is being encrypted with native
+		## RDP encryption, this is the type of cert 
+		## being used.
+		cert_type:             string  &log &optional;
+		## The number of certs seen.  X.509 can transfer an 
+		## entire certificate chain.
+		cert_count:            count   &log &default=0;
+		## Indicates if the provided certificate or certificate
+		## chain is permanent or temporary.
+		cert_permanent:        bool    &log &optional;
+		## Encryption level of the connection.
+		encryption_level:      string  &log &optional;
+		## Encryption method of the connection. 
+		encryption_method:     string  &log &optional;
+		};
+
+	## If true, detach the RDP analyzer from the connection to prevent
+	## continuing to process encrypted traffic.
+	const disable_analyzer_after_detection = F &redef;
+
+	## The amount of time to monitor an RDP session from when it is first 
+	## identified. When this interval is reached, the session is logged.
+	const rdp_check_interval = 10secs &redef;
+
+	## Event that can be handled to access the rdp record as it is sent on
+	## to the logging framework.
+	global log_rdp: event(rec: Info);
+}
+
+# Internal fields that aren't useful externally
+redef record Info += {
+	## The analyzer ID used for the analyzer instance attached
+	## to each connection.  It is not used for logging since it's a
+	## meaningless arbitrary number.
+	analyzer_id: count &optional;
+	## Track status of logging RDP connections.
+	done:        bool  &default=F;
+};
+
+redef record connection += {
+	rdp: Info &optional;
+};
+
+const ports = { 3389/tcp };
+redef likely_server_ports += { ports };
+
+event bro_init() &priority=5
+	{
+	Log::create_stream(RDP::LOG, [$columns=RDP::Info, $ev=log_rdp, $path="rdp"]);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_RDP, ports);
+	}
+
+function write_log(c: connection)
+	{
+	local info = c$rdp;
+
+	if ( info$done )
+		return;
+
+	# Mark this record as fully logged and finished.
+	info$done = T;
+
+	# Verify that the RDP session contains
+	# RDP data before writing it to the log. 
+	if ( info?$cookie || info?$keyboard_layout || info?$result )
+		Log::write(RDP::LOG, info);
+	}
+
+event check_record(c: connection)
+	{
+	# If the record was logged, then stop processing.
+	if ( c$rdp$done )
+		return;
+
+	# If the value rdp_check_interval has passed since the 
+	# RDP session was started, then log the record. 
+	local diff = network_time() - c$rdp$ts;
+	if ( diff > rdp_check_interval )
+		{
+		write_log(c);
+
+		# Remove the analyzer if it is still attached.
+		if ( disable_analyzer_after_detection && 
+		     connection_exists(c$id) && 
+		     c$rdp?$analyzer_id )
+			{
+			disable_analyzer(c$id, c$rdp$analyzer_id);
+			}
+
+		return;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		# If the analyzer is attached and the duration
+		# to monitor the RDP session was not met, then
+		# reschedule the logging event.
+		schedule rdp_check_interval { check_record(c) };
+		}
+	}
+
+function set_session(c: connection)
+	{
+	if ( ! c?$rdp )
+		{
+		c$rdp = [$ts=network_time(),$id=c$id,$uid=c$uid];
+		# The RDP session is scheduled to be logged from
+		# the time it is first initiated.
+		schedule rdp_check_interval { check_record(c) };
+		}
+	}
+
+event rdp_connect_request(c: connection, cookie: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$cookie = cookie;
+	}
+
+event rdp_negotiation_response(c: connection, security_protocol: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$security_protocol = security_protocols[security_protocol];
+	}
+
+event rdp_negotiation_failure(c: connection, failure_code: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$result = failure_codes[failure_code];
+	}
+
+event rdp_client_core_data(c: connection, data: RDP::ClientCoreData) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$keyboard_layout       = RDP::languages[data$keyboard_layout];
+	c$rdp$client_build          = RDP::builds[data$client_build];
+	c$rdp$client_name           = data$client_name;
+	c$rdp$client_dig_product_id = data$dig_product_id;
+	c$rdp$desktop_width         = data$desktop_width;
+	c$rdp$desktop_height        = data$desktop_height;
+
+	if ( data?$ec_flags && data$ec_flags$want_32bpp_session )
+		c$rdp$requested_color_depth = "32bit";
+	else
+		c$rdp$requested_color_depth = RDP::high_color_depths[data$high_color_depth];
+	}
+
+event rdp_gcc_server_create_response(c: connection, result: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$result = RDP::results[result];
+	}
+
+event rdp_server_security(c: connection, encryption_method: count, encryption_level: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$encryption_method = RDP::encryption_methods[encryption_method];
+	c$rdp$encryption_level = RDP::encryption_levels[encryption_level];
+	}
+
+event rdp_server_certificate(c: connection, cert_type: count, permanently_issued: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	c$rdp$cert_type = RDP::cert_types[cert_type];
+
+	# There are no events for proprietary/RSA certs right
+	# now so we manually count this one.
+	if ( c$rdp$cert_type == "RSA" )
+		++c$rdp$cert_count;
+	
+	c$rdp$cert_permanent = permanently_issued;
+	}
+
+event rdp_begin_encryption(c: connection, security_protocol: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	if ( ! c$rdp?$result )
+		{
+		c$rdp$result = "encrypted";
+		}
+
+	c$rdp$security_protocol = security_protocols[security_protocol];
+	}
+
+event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( c?$rdp && f$source == "RDP" )
+		{
+		# Count up X509 certs.
+		++c$rdp$cert_count;
+
+		Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_X509);
+		Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_MD5);
+		Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_SHA1);
+		}
+	}
+
+event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_RDP )
+		{
+		set_session(c);
+		c$rdp$analyzer_id = aid;
+		}
+	}
+
+event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count, reason: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	# If a protocol violation occurs, then log the record immediately.
+	if ( c?$rdp )
+		write_log(c);
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
+	{
+	# If the connection is removed, then log the record immediately.
+	if ( c?$rdp )
+		{
+		write_log(c);
+		}
+	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/sip/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/sip/README
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Support for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/sip/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/sip/load.bro
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+@load ./main
+
+@load-sigs ./dpd.sig
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/sip/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/sip/dpd.sig
@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+signature dpd_sip_udp_req {
+  ip-proto == udp
+  payload /.* SIP\/[0-9]\.[0-9]\x0d\x0a/
+  enable "sip"
+}
+
+signature dpd_sip_udp_resp {
+  ip-proto == udp
+  payload /^ ?SIP\/[0-9]\.[0-9](\x0d\x0a| [0-9][0-9][0-9] )/
+  enable "sip"
+}
+
+# We don't support SIP-over-TCP yet.
+#
+# signature dpd_sip_tcp {
+#   ip-proto == tcp
+#   payload /^( SIP\/[0-9]\.[0-9]\x0d\x0a|SIP\/[0-9]\.[0-9] [0-9][0-9][0-9] )/
+#   enable "sip_tcp"
+# }
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/sip/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/sip/main.bro
@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+##! Implements base functionality for SIP analysis.  The logging model is
+##! to log request/response pairs and all relevant metadata together in
+##! a single record.
+
+@load base/utils/numbers
+@load base/utils/files
+
+module SIP;
+
+export {
+	redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
+
+	type Info: record {
+		## Timestamp for when the request happened.
+		ts:                      time              &log;
+		## Unique ID for the connection.
+		uid:                     string            &log;
+		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
+		id:                      conn_id           &log;
+		## Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of this
+		## request/response transaction.
+		trans_depth:             count             &log;
+		## Verb used in the SIP request (INVITE, REGISTER etc.).
+		method:                  string            &log &optional;
+		## URI used in the request.
+		uri:                     string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Date: header from the client
+		date:                    string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the request From: header
+		## Note: The tag= value that's usually appended to the sender
+		## is stripped off and not logged.
+		request_from:            string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the To: header
+		request_to:              string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the response From: header
+		## Note: The ``tag=`` value that's usually appended to the sender
+		## is stripped off and not logged.
+		response_from:            string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the response To: header
+		response_to:              string            &log &optional;
+
+		## Contents of the Reply-To: header
+		reply_to:                string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Call-ID: header from the client
+		call_id:                 string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the CSeq: header from the client
+		seq:                     string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Subject: header from the client
+		subject:                 string            &log &optional;
+		## The client message transmission path, as extracted from the headers.
+		request_path:            vector of string  &log &optional;
+		## The server message transmission path, as extracted from the headers.
+		response_path:           vector of string  &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the User-Agent: header from the client
+		user_agent:              string            &log &optional;
+		## Status code returned by the server.
+		status_code:             count             &log &optional;
+		## Status message returned by the server.
+		status_msg:              string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Warning: header
+		warning:                 string            &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Content-Length: header from the client
+		request_body_len:        count             &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Content-Length: header from the server
+		response_body_len:       count             &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the Content-Type: header from the server
+		content_type:            string            &log &optional;
+	};
+
+	type State: record {
+		## Pending requests.
+		pending:          table[count] of Info;
+		## Current request in the pending queue.
+		current_request:  count                &default=0;
+		## Current response in the pending queue.
+		current_response: count                &default=0;
+	};
+
+	## A list of SIP methods. Other methods will generate a weird. Note
+	## that the SIP analyzer will only accept methods consisting solely
+	## of letters ``[A-Za-z]``.
+	const sip_methods: set[string] = {
+		"REGISTER", "INVITE", "ACK", "CANCEL", "BYE", "OPTIONS"
+	} &redef;
+
+	## Event that can be handled to access the SIP record as it is sent on
+	## to the logging framework.
+	global log_sip: event(rec: Info);
+}
+
+# Add the sip state tracking fields to the connection record.
+redef record connection += {
+	sip:        Info  &optional;
+	sip_state:  State &optional;
+};
+
+const ports = { 5060/udp };
+redef likely_server_ports += { ports };
+
+event bro_init() &priority=5
+	{
+	Log::create_stream(SIP::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_sip, $path="sip"]);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SIP, ports);
+	}
+
+function new_sip_session(c: connection): Info
+	{
+	local tmp: Info;
+	tmp$ts=network_time();
+	tmp$uid=c$uid;
+	tmp$id=c$id;
+	# $current_request is set prior to the Info record creation so we
+	# can use the value directly here.
+	tmp$trans_depth = c$sip_state$current_request;
+
+	tmp$request_path = vector();
+	tmp$response_path = vector();
+
+	return tmp;
+	}
+
+function set_state(c: connection, is_request: bool)
+	{
+	if ( ! c?$sip_state )
+		{
+		local s: State;
+		c$sip_state = s;
+		}
+
+	if ( is_request )
+		{
+		if ( c$sip_state$current_request !in c$sip_state$pending )
+			c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_request] = new_sip_session(c);
+
+		c$sip = c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_request];
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if ( c$sip_state$current_response !in c$sip_state$pending )
+			c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_response] = new_sip_session(c);
+
+		c$sip = c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_response];
+		}
+	}
+
+function flush_pending(c: connection)
+	{
+	# Flush all pending but incomplete request/response pairs.
+	if ( c?$sip_state )
+		{
+		for ( r in c$sip_state$pending )
+			{
+			# We don't use pending elements at index 0.
+			if ( r == 0 )
+				next;
+			
+			Log::write(SIP::LOG, c$sip_state$pending[r]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+event sip_request(c: connection, method: string, original_URI: string, version: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_state(c, T);
+
+	c$sip$method = method;
+	c$sip$uri = original_URI;
+
+	if ( method !in sip_methods )
+		event conn_weird("unknown_SIP_method", c, method);
+	}
+
+event sip_reply(c: connection, version: string, code: count, reason: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_state(c, F);
+
+	if ( c$sip_state$current_response !in c$sip_state$pending &&
+	     (code < 100 && 200 <= code) )
+		++c$sip_state$current_response;
+
+	c$sip$status_code = code;
+	c$sip$status_msg = reason;
+	}
+
+event sip_header(c: connection, is_request: bool, name: string, value: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( ! c?$sip_state )
+		{
+		local s: State;
+		c$sip_state = s;
+		}
+
+	if ( is_request ) # from client
+		{
+		if ( c$sip_state$current_request !in c$sip_state$pending )
+			++c$sip_state$current_request;
+		set_state(c, is_request);
+		switch ( name )
+			{
+			case "CALL-ID":
+				c$sip$call_id = value;
+				break;
+			case "CONTENT-LENGTH", "L":
+				c$sip$request_body_len = to_count(value);
+				break;
+			case "CSEQ":
+				c$sip$seq = value;
+				break;
+			case "DATE":
+				c$sip$date = value;
+				break;
+			case "FROM", "F":
+				c$sip$request_from = split_string1(value, /;[ ]?tag=/)[0];
+				break;
+			case "REPLY-TO":
+				c$sip$reply_to = value;
+				break;
+			case "SUBJECT", "S":
+				c$sip$subject = value;
+				break;
+			case "TO", "T":
+				c$sip$request_to = value;
+				break;
+			case "USER-AGENT":
+				c$sip$user_agent = value;
+				break;
+			case "VIA", "V":
+				c$sip$request_path[|c$sip$request_path|] = split_string1(value, /;[ ]?branch/)[0];
+				break;
+			}
+
+		c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_request] = c$sip;
+		}
+	else # from server
+		{
+		if ( c$sip_state$current_response !in c$sip_state$pending )
+			++c$sip_state$current_response;
+
+		set_state(c, is_request);
+		switch ( name )
+			{
+			case "CONTENT-LENGTH", "L":
+				c$sip$response_body_len = to_count(value);
+				break;
+			case "CONTENT-TYPE", "C":
+				c$sip$content_type = value;
+				break;
+			case "WARNING":
+				c$sip$warning = value;
+				break;
+			case "FROM", "F":
+				c$sip$response_from = split_string1(value, /;[ ]?tag=/)[0];
+				break;
+			case "TO", "T":
+				c$sip$response_to = value;
+				break;
+			case "VIA", "V":
+				c$sip$response_path[|c$sip$response_path|] = split_string1(value, /;[ ]?branch/)[0];
+				break;
+			}
+
+		c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_response] = c$sip;
+		}
+	}
+
+event sip_end_entity(c: connection, is_request: bool) &priority = 5
+	{
+	set_state(c, is_request);
+	}
+
+event sip_end_entity(c: connection, is_request: bool) &priority = -5
+	{
+	# The reply body is done so we're ready to log.
+	if ( ! is_request )
+		{
+		Log::write(SIP::LOG, c$sip);
+
+		if ( c$sip$status_code < 100 || 200 <= c$sip$status_code )
+			delete c$sip_state$pending[c$sip_state$current_response];
+
+		if ( ! c$sip?$method || ( c$sip$method == "BYE" &&
+		     c$sip$status_code >= 200 && c$sip$status_code < 300 ) )
+			{
+			flush_pending(c);
+			delete c$sip;
+			delete c$sip_state;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$sip_state )
+		{
+		for ( r in c$sip_state$pending )
+			{
+			Log::write(SIP::LOG, c$sip_state$pending[r]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/smtp/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/smtp/main.bro
@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ export {
 		from:              string          &log &optional;
 		## Contents of the To header.
 		to:                set[string]     &log &optional;
+		## Contents of the CC header.
+		cc:                set[string]     &log &optional;
 		## Contents of the ReplyTo header.
 		reply_to:          string          &log &optional;
 		## Contents of the MsgID header.
@ -92,13 +94,13 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(SMTP::LOG, [$columns=SMTP::Info, $ev=log_smtp]);
+	Log::create_stream(SMTP::LOG, [$columns=SMTP::Info, $ev=log_smtp, $path="smtp"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SMTP, ports);
 	}

 function find_address_in_smtp_header(header: string): string
 {
-	local ips = find_ip_addresses(header);
+	local ips = extract_ip_addresses(header);
 	# If there are more than one IP address found, return the second.
 	if ( |ips| > 1 )
 		return ips[1];
@ -163,7 +165,7 @@ event smtp_request(c: connection, is_orig: bool, command: string, arg: string) &
 		{
 		if ( ! c$smtp?$rcptto )
 			c$smtp$rcptto = set();
-		add c$smtp$rcptto[split1(arg, /:[[:blank:]]*/)[2]];
+		add c$smtp$rcptto[split_string1(arg, /:[[:blank:]]*/)[1]];
 		c$smtp$has_client_activity = T;
 		}

@ -172,8 +174,8 @@ event smtp_request(c: connection, is_orig: bool, command: string, arg: string) &
 		# Flush last message in case we didn't see the server's acknowledgement.
 		smtp_message(c);

-		local partially_done = split1(arg, /:[[:blank:]]*/)[2];
-		c$smtp$mailfrom = split1(partially_done, /[[:blank:]]?/)[1];
+		local partially_done = split_string1(arg, /:[[:blank:]]*/)[1];
+		c$smtp$mailfrom = split_string1(partially_done, /[[:blank:]]?/)[0];
 		c$smtp$has_client_activity = T;
 		}
 	}
@ -234,14 +236,24 @@ event mime_one_header(c: connection, h: mime_header_rec) &priority=5
 		if ( ! c$smtp?$to )
 			c$smtp$to = set();

-		local to_parts = split(h$value, /[[:blank:]]*,[[:blank:]]*/);
+		local to_parts = split_string(h$value, /[[:blank:]]*,[[:blank:]]*/);
 		for ( i in to_parts )
 			add c$smtp$to[to_parts[i]];
 		}

+	else if ( h$name == "CC" )
+		{
+		if ( ! c$smtp?$cc )
+			c$smtp$cc = set();
+
+		local cc_parts = split_string(h$value, /[[:blank:]]*,[[:blank:]]*/);
+		for ( i in cc_parts )
+			add c$smtp$cc[cc_parts[i]];
+		}
+
 	else if ( h$name == "X-ORIGINATING-IP" )
 		{
-		local addresses = find_ip_addresses(h$value);
+		local addresses = extract_ip_addresses(h$value);
 		if ( 1 in addresses )
 			c$smtp$x_originating_ip = to_addr(addresses[1]);
 		}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/snmp/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/snmp/main.bro
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };
 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SNMP, ports);
-	Log::create_stream(SNMP::LOG, [$columns=SNMP::Info, $ev=log_snmp]);
+	Log::create_stream(SNMP::LOG, [$columns=SNMP::Info, $ev=log_snmp, $path="snmp"]);
 	}

 function init_state(c: connection, h: SNMP::Header): Info
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/socks/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/socks/main.bro
@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ export {
 		id:          conn_id         &log;
 		## Protocol version of SOCKS.
 		version:     count           &log;
-		## Username for the proxy if extracted from the network.
+		## Username used to request a login to the proxy.
 		user:        string          &log &optional;
+		## Password used to request a login to the proxy.
+		password:    string          &log &optional;
 		## Server status for the attempt at using the proxy.
 		status:      string          &log &optional;
 		## Client requested SOCKS address. Could be an address, a name
@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(SOCKS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_socks]);
+	Log::create_stream(SOCKS::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_socks, $path="socks"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SOCKS, ports);
 	}

@ -91,3 +93,21 @@ event socks_reply(c: connection, version: count, reply: count, sa: SOCKS::Addres
 	if ( "SOCKS" in c$service )
 		Log::write(SOCKS::LOG, c$socks);
 	}
+
+event socks_login_userpass_request(c: connection, user: string, password: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	# Authentication only possible with the version 5.
+	set_session(c, 5); 
+
+	c$socks$user = user;
+	c$socks$password = password;
+	}
+
+event socks_login_userpass_reply(c: connection, code: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	# Authentication only possible with the version 5.
+	set_session(c, 5);
+
+	c$socks$status = v5_status[code];
+	}
+
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/README
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/README
@ -1 +1 @@
-Support for Secure Shell (SSH) protocol analysis.
+Support for SSH protocol analysis.
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/load.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/load.bro
@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
@load ./main
-
-@load-sigs ./dpd.sig
+@load-sigs ./dpd.sig
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/dpd.sig
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 signature dpd_ssh_client {
  ip-proto == tcp
-  payload /^[sS][sS][hH]-/
+  payload /^[sS][sS][hH]-[12]\./
  requires-reverse-signature dpd_ssh_server
  enable "ssh"
  tcp-state originator
@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ signature dpd_ssh_client {

 signature dpd_ssh_server {
  ip-proto == tcp
-  payload /^[sS][sS][hH]-/
+  payload /^[sS][sS][hH]-[12]\./
  tcp-state responder
-}
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssh/main.bro
@ -1,15 +1,5 @@
-##! Base SSH analysis script.  The heuristic to blindly determine success or
-##! failure for SSH connections is implemented here.  At this time, it only
-##! uses the size of the data being returned from the server to make the
-##! heuristic determination about success of the connection.
-##! Requires that :bro:id:`use_conn_size_analyzer` is set to T!  The heuristic
-##! is not attempted if the connection size analyzer isn't enabled.
+##! Implements base functionality for SSH analysis. Generates the ssh.log file.

-@load base/protocols/conn
-@load base/frameworks/notice
-@load base/utils/site
-@load base/utils/thresholds
-@load base/utils/conn-ids
@load base/utils/directions-and-hosts

 module SSH;
@ -25,45 +15,63 @@ export {
 		uid:             string       &log;
 		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
 		id:              conn_id      &log;
-		## Indicates if the login was heuristically guessed to be
-		## "success", "failure", or "undetermined".
-		status:          string       &log &default="undetermined";
-		## Direction of the connection.  If the client was a local host
+		## SSH major version (1 or 2)
+		version:         count        &log;
+		## Authentication result (T=success, F=failure, unset=unknown)
+		auth_success:    bool         &log &optional;
+		## Direction of the connection. If the client was a local host
 		## logging into an external host, this would be OUTBOUND. INBOUND
 		## would be set for the opposite situation.
-		# TODO: handle local-local and remote-remote better.
+		# TODO - handle local-local and remote-remote better.
 		direction:       Direction    &log &optional;
-		## Software string from the client.
+		## The client's version string
 		client:          string       &log &optional;
-		## Software string from the server.
+		## The server's version string
 		server:          string       &log &optional;
-		## Indicate if the SSH session is done being watched.
-		done:            bool         &default=F;
+		## The encryption algorithm in use
+		cipher_alg:      string       &log &optional;
+		## The signing (MAC) algorithm in use
+		mac_alg:         string       &log &optional;
+		## The compression algorithm in use
+		compression_alg: string       &log &optional;
+		## The key exchange algorithm in use
+		kex_alg:         string       &log &optional;
+		## The server host key's algorithm
+		host_key_alg:    string       &log &optional;
+		## The server's key fingerprint
+		host_key:        string       &log &optional;
 	};

-	## The size in bytes of data sent by the server at which the SSH
-	## connection is presumed to be successful.
-	const authentication_data_size = 4000 &redef;
+	## The set of compression algorithms. We can't accurately determine
+	## authentication success or failure when compression is enabled.
+	const compression_algorithms = set("zlib", "zlib@openssh.com") &redef;

 	## If true, we tell the event engine to not look at further data
 	## packets after the initial SSH handshake. Helps with performance
 	## (especially with large file transfers) but precludes some
-	## kinds of analyses.
-	const skip_processing_after_detection = F &redef;
+	## kinds of analyses. Defaults to T.
+	const skip_processing_after_detection = T &redef;

-	## Event that is generated when the heuristic thinks that a login
-	## was successful.
-	global heuristic_successful_login: event(c: connection);
-
-	## Event that is generated when the heuristic thinks that a login
-	## failed.
-	global heuristic_failed_login: event(c: connection);
-
-	## Event that can be handled to access the :bro:type:`SSH::Info`
-	## record as it is sent on to the logging framework.
+	## Event that can be handled to access the SSH record as it is sent on
+	## to the logging framework.
 	global log_ssh: event(rec: Info);
+
+	## Event that can be handled when the analyzer sees an SSH server host
+	## key. This abstracts :bro:id:`ssh1_server_host_key` and
+	## :bro:id:`ssh2_server_host_key`.
+	global ssh_server_host_key: event(c: connection, hash: string);
 }

+redef record Info += {
+	# This connection has been logged (internal use)
+	logged:       bool         &default=F;
+	# Number of failures seen (internal use)
+	num_failures: count        &default=0;
+	# Store capabilities from the first host for
+	# comparison with the second (internal use)
+	capabilities: Capabilities &optional;
+};
+
 redef record connection += {
 	ssh: Info &optional;
 };
@ -72,133 +80,156 @@ const ports = { 22/tcp };
 redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
-{
-	Log::create_stream(SSH::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ssh]);
+	{
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSH, ports);
-}
+	Log::create_stream(SSH::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ssh, $path="ssh"]);
+	}

 function set_session(c: connection)
 	{
 	if ( ! c?$ssh )
 		{
-		local info: Info;
-		info$ts=network_time();
-		info$uid=c$uid;
-		info$id=c$id;
+		local info: SSH::Info;
+		info$ts  = network_time();
+		info$uid = c$uid;
+		info$id  = c$id;
+
+		# If both hosts are local or non-local, we can't reliably set a direction.
+		if ( Site::is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h) != Site::is_local_addr(c$id$resp_h) )
+			info$direction = Site::is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h) ? OUTBOUND: INBOUND;
 		c$ssh = info;
 		}
 	}

-function check_ssh_connection(c: connection, done: bool)
-	{
-	# If already done watching this connection, just return.
-	if ( c$ssh$done )
-		return;
-
-	if ( done )
-		{
-		# If this connection is done, then we can look to see if
-		# this matches the conditions for a failed login.  Failed
-		# logins are only detected at connection state removal.
-
-		if ( # Require originators and responders to have sent at least 50 bytes.
-		     c$orig$size > 50 && c$resp$size > 50 &&
-		     # Responders must be below 4000 bytes.
-		     c$resp$size < authentication_data_size &&
-		     # Responder must have sent fewer than 40 packets.
-		     c$resp$num_pkts < 40 &&
-		     # If there was a content gap we can't reliably do this heuristic.
-		     c?$conn && c$conn$missed_bytes == 0 )# &&
-		     # Only "normal" connections can count.
-		     #c$conn?$conn_state && c$conn$conn_state in valid_states )
-			{
-			c$ssh$status = "failure";
-			event SSH::heuristic_failed_login(c);
-			}
-
-		if ( c$resp$size >= authentication_data_size )
-			{
-			c$ssh$status = "success";
-			event SSH::heuristic_successful_login(c);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		# If this connection is still being tracked, then it's possible
-		# to watch for it to be a successful connection.
-		if ( c$resp$size >= authentication_data_size )
-			{
-			c$ssh$status = "success";
-			event SSH::heuristic_successful_login(c);
-			}
-		else
-			# This connection must be tracked longer.  Let the scheduled
-			# check happen again.
-			return;
-		}
-
-	# Set the direction for the log.
-	c$ssh$direction = Site::is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h) ? OUTBOUND : INBOUND;
-
-	# Set the "done" flag to prevent the watching event from rescheduling
-	# after detection is done.
-	c$ssh$done=T;
-
-	if ( skip_processing_after_detection )
-		{
-		# Stop watching this connection, we don't care about it anymore.
-		skip_further_processing(c$id);
-		set_record_packets(c$id, F);
-		}
-	}
-
-
-event heuristic_successful_login(c: connection) &priority=-5
-	{
-	Log::write(SSH::LOG, c$ssh);
-	}
-
-event heuristic_failed_login(c: connection) &priority=-5
-	{
-	Log::write(SSH::LOG, c$ssh);
-	}
-
-event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
-	{
-	if ( c?$ssh )
-		{
-		check_ssh_connection(c, T);
-		if ( c$ssh$status == "undetermined" )
-			Log::write(SSH::LOG, c$ssh);
-		}
-	}
-
-event ssh_watcher(c: connection)
-	{
-	local id = c$id;
-	# don't go any further if this connection is gone already!
-	if ( ! connection_exists(id) )
-		return;
-
-	lookup_connection(c$id);
-	check_ssh_connection(c, F);
-	if ( ! c$ssh$done )
-		schedule +15secs { ssh_watcher(c) };
-	}
-
-event ssh_server_version(c: connection, version: string) &priority=5
+event ssh_server_version(c: connection, version: string)
 	{
 	set_session(c);
 	c$ssh$server = version;
 	}

-event ssh_client_version(c: connection, version: string) &priority=5
+event ssh_client_version(c: connection, version: string)
 	{
 	set_session(c);
 	c$ssh$client = version;

-	# The heuristic detection for SSH relies on the ConnSize analyzer.
-	# Don't do the heuristics if it's disabled.
-	if ( use_conn_size_analyzer )
-		schedule +15secs { ssh_watcher(c) };
+	if ( ( |version| > 3 ) && ( version[4] == "1" ) )
+		c$ssh$version = 1;
+	if ( ( |version| > 3 ) && ( version[4] == "2" ) )
+		c$ssh$version = 2;
+	}
+
+event ssh_auth_successful(c: connection, auth_method_none: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	# TODO - what to do here?
+	if ( !c?$ssh || ( c$ssh?$auth_success && c$ssh$auth_success ) )
+		return;
+
+	# We can't accurately tell for compressed streams
+	if ( c$ssh?$compression_alg && ( c$ssh$compression_alg in compression_algorithms ) )
+		return;
+
+	c$ssh$auth_success = T;
+
+	if ( skip_processing_after_detection)
+		{
+		skip_further_processing(c$id);
+		set_record_packets(c$id, F);
+		}
+	}
+
+event ssh_auth_successful(c: connection, auth_method_none: bool) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$ssh && !c$ssh$logged )
+		{
+		c$ssh$logged = T;
+		Log::write(SSH::LOG, c$ssh);
+		}
+	}
+
+event ssh_auth_failed(c: connection) &priority=5
+	{
+	if ( !c?$ssh || ( c$ssh?$auth_success && !c$ssh$auth_success ) )
+		return;
+
+	# We can't accurately tell for compressed streams
+	if ( c$ssh?$compression_alg && ( c$ssh$compression_alg in compression_algorithms ) )
+		return;
+
+	c$ssh$auth_success = F;
+	c$ssh$num_failures += 1;
+	}
+
+# Determine the negotiated algorithm
+function find_alg(client_algorithms: vector of string, server_algorithms: vector of string): string
+	{
+	for ( i in client_algorithms )
+		for ( j in server_algorithms )
+			if ( client_algorithms[i] == server_algorithms[j] )
+				return client_algorithms[i];
+	return "Algorithm negotiation failed";
+	}
+
+# This is a simple wrapper around find_alg for cases where client to server and server to client
+# negotiate different algorithms. This is rare, but provided for completeness.
+function find_bidirectional_alg(client_prefs: Algorithm_Prefs, server_prefs: Algorithm_Prefs): string
+	{
+	local c_to_s = find_alg(client_prefs$client_to_server, server_prefs$client_to_server);
+	local s_to_c = find_alg(client_prefs$server_to_client, server_prefs$server_to_client);
+
+	# Usually these are the same, but if they're not, return the details
+	return c_to_s == s_to_c ? c_to_s : fmt("To server: %s, to client: %s", c_to_s, s_to_c);
+	}
+	
+event ssh_capabilities(c: connection, cookie: string, capabilities: Capabilities)
+	{
+	if ( !c?$ssh || ( c$ssh?$capabilities && c$ssh$capabilities$is_server == capabilities$is_server ) )
+		return;
+
+	if ( !c$ssh?$capabilities )
+		{
+		c$ssh$capabilities = capabilities;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	local client_caps = capabilities$is_server ? c$ssh$capabilities : capabilities;
+	local server_caps = capabilities$is_server ? capabilities : c$ssh$capabilities;
+
+	c$ssh$cipher_alg      = find_bidirectional_alg(client_caps$encryption_algorithms,
+	                                               server_caps$encryption_algorithms);
+	c$ssh$mac_alg         = find_bidirectional_alg(client_caps$mac_algorithms,
+	                                               server_caps$mac_algorithms);
+	c$ssh$compression_alg = find_bidirectional_alg(client_caps$compression_algorithms,
+	                                               server_caps$compression_algorithms);
+	c$ssh$kex_alg         = find_alg(client_caps$kex_algorithms, server_caps$kex_algorithms);	
+	c$ssh$host_key_alg    = find_alg(client_caps$server_host_key_algorithms,
+	                                 server_caps$server_host_key_algorithms);
+	}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5
+	{
+	if ( c?$ssh && !c$ssh$logged && c$ssh?$client && c$ssh?$server )
+		{
+		c$ssh$logged = T;
+		Log::write(SSH::LOG, c$ssh);
+		}
+	}
+
+function generate_fingerprint(c: connection, key: string)
+	{
+	if ( !c?$ssh )
+		return;
+
+	local lx = str_split(md5_hash(key), vector(2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30));
+	lx[0] = "";
+	c$ssh$host_key = sub(join_string_vec(lx, ":"), /:/, "");
+	}
+
+event ssh1_server_host_key(c: connection, p: string, e: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	generate_fingerprint(c, e + p);
+	}
+
+event ssh2_server_host_key(c: connection, key: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	generate_fingerprint(c, key);
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/consts.bro
@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ export {
 	const TLSv10 = 0x0301;
 	const TLSv11 = 0x0302;
 	const TLSv12 = 0x0303;
+
+	const DTLSv10 = 0xFEFF;
+	# DTLSv11 does not exist
+	const DTLSv12 = 0xFEFD;
+
 	## Mapping between the constants and string values for SSL/TLS versions.
 	const version_strings: table[count] of string = {
 		[SSLv2] = "SSLv2",
@ -13,6 +18,8 @@ export {
 		[TLSv10] = "TLSv10",
 		[TLSv11] = "TLSv11",
 		[TLSv12] = "TLSv12",
+		[DTLSv10] = "DTLSv10",
+		[DTLSv12] = "DTLSv12"
 	} &default=function(i: count):string { return fmt("unknown-%d", i); };

 	## TLS content types:
@ -30,6 +37,7 @@ export {
 	const HELLO_REQUEST       = 0;
 	const CLIENT_HELLO        = 1;
 	const SERVER_HELLO        = 2;
+	const HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST = 3; # RFC 6347
 	const SESSION_TICKET      = 4; # RFC 5077
 	const CERTIFICATE         = 11;
 	const SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE = 12;
@ -40,6 +48,7 @@ export {
 	const FINISHED            = 20;
 	const CERTIFICATE_URL     = 21; # RFC 3546
 	const CERTIFICATE_STATUS  = 22; # RFC 3546
+	const SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA   = 23; # RFC 4680

 	## Mapping between numeric codes and human readable strings for alert
 	## levels.
@ -111,8 +120,9 @@ export {
 		[18] = "signed_certificate_timestamp",
 		[19] = "client_certificate_type",
 		[20] = "server_certificate_type",
-		[21] = "padding", # temporary till 2015-03-12
-		[22] = "encrypt_then_mac", # temporary till 2015-06-05
+		[21] = "padding", # temporary till 2016-03-12
+		[22] = "encrypt_then_mac",
+		[23] = "extended_master_secret",
 		[35] = "SessionTicket TLS",
 		[40] = "extended_random",
 		[13172] = "next_protocol_negotiation",
@ -155,6 +165,12 @@ export {
 		[26] = "brainpoolP256r1",
 		[27] = "brainpoolP384r1",
 		[28] = "brainpoolP512r1",
+		# draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-05
+		[256] = "ffdhe2048",
+		[257] = "ffdhe3072",
+		[258] = "ffdhe4096",
+		[259] = "ffdhe6144",
+		[260] = "ffdhe8192",
 		[0xFF01] = "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves",
 		[0xFF02] = "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves"
 	} &default=function(i: count):string { return fmt("unknown-%d", i); };
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/dpd.sig
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 signature dpd_ssl_server {
  ip-proto == tcp
  # Server hello.
-  payload /^(\x16\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]..\x02...\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]|...?\x04..\x00\x02).*/
+  payload /^((\x15\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]....)?\x16\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]..\x02...\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]|...?\x04..\x00\x02).*/
  requires-reverse-signature dpd_ssl_client
  enable "ssl"
  tcp-state responder
@ -13,3 +13,10 @@ signature dpd_ssl_client {
  payload /^(\x16\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]..\x01...\x03[\x00\x01\x02\x03]|...?\x01[\x00\x03][\x00\x01\x02\x03]).*/
  tcp-state originator
 }
+
+signature dpd_dtls_client {
+  ip-proto == udp
+	# Client hello.
+	payload /^\x16\xfe[\xff\xfd]\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00...\x01...........\xfe[\xff\xfd].*/
+	enable "dtls"
+}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/files.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/files.bro
@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ event bro_init() &priority=5
 	Files::register_protocol(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL,
 	                         [$get_file_handle = SSL::get_file_handle,
 	                          $describe        = SSL::describe_file]);
+
+	Files::register_protocol(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS,
+	                         [$get_file_handle = SSL::get_file_handle,
+	                          $describe        = SSL::describe_file]);
 	}

 event file_over_new_connection(f: fa_file, c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/main.bro
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export {
 		## Time when the SSL connection was first detected.
 		ts:               time             &log;
 		## Unique ID for the connection.
-		uid:         string          &log;
+		uid:              string           &log;
 		## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
 		id:               conn_id          &log;
 		## SSL/TLS version that the server offered.
@ -25,9 +25,25 @@ export {
 		## indicates the server name that the client was requesting.
 		server_name:      string           &log &optional;
 		## Session ID offered by the client for session resumption.
-		session_id:       string           &log &optional;
+		## Not used for logging.
+		session_id:       string           &optional;
+		## Flag to indicate if the session was resumed reusing
+		## the key material exchanged in an earlier connection.
+		resumed:          bool             &log &default=F;
+		## Flag to indicate if we saw a non-empty session ticket being
+		## sent by the client using an empty session ID. This value
+		## is used to determine if a session is being resumed. It's
+		## not logged.
+		client_ticket_empty_session_seen: bool &default=F;
+		## Flag to indicate if we saw a client key exchange message sent
+		## by the client. This value is used to determine if a session
+		## is being resumed. It's not logged.
+		client_key_exchange_seen: bool     &default=F;
 		## Last alert that was seen during the connection.
 		last_alert:       string           &log &optional;
+		## Next protocol the server chose using the application layer
+		## next protocol extension, if present.
+		next_protocol:    string           &log &optional;

 		## The analyzer ID used for the analyzer instance attached
 		## to each connection.  It is not used for logging since it's a
@ -36,11 +52,11 @@ export {

 		## Flag to indicate if this ssl session has been established
 		## succesfully, or if it was aborted during the handshake.
-		established:  bool &log &default=F;
+		established:      bool             &log &default=F;

 		## Flag to indicate if this record already has been logged, to
 		## prevent duplicates.
-		logged:  bool  &default=F;
+		logged:           bool             &default=F;
 	};

 	## The default root CA bundle.  By default, the mozilla-ca-list.bro
@ -76,16 +92,22 @@ redef record Info += {
 		delay_tokens: set[string] &optional;
 };

-const ports = {
+const ssl_ports = {
 	443/tcp, 563/tcp, 585/tcp, 614/tcp, 636/tcp,
 	989/tcp, 990/tcp, 992/tcp, 993/tcp, 995/tcp, 5223/tcp
 };
-redef likely_server_ports += { ports };
+
+# There are no well known DTLS ports at the moment. Let's
+# just add 443 for now for good measure - who knows :)
+const dtls_ports = { 443/udp };
+
+redef likely_server_ports += { ssl_ports, dtls_ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(SSL::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ssl]);
-	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL, ports);
+	Log::create_stream(SSL::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ssl, $path="ssl"]);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL, ssl_ports);
+	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS, dtls_ports);
 	}

 function set_session(c: connection)
@ -149,8 +171,11 @@ event ssl_client_hello(c: connection, version: count, possible_ts: time, client_
 	set_session(c);

 	# Save the session_id if there is one set.
-	if ( session_id != /^\x00{32}$/ )
+	if ( |session_id| > 0 && session_id != /^\x00{32}$/ )
+		{
 		c$ssl$session_id = bytestring_to_hexstr(session_id);
+		c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen = F;
+		}
 	}

 event ssl_server_hello(c: connection, version: count, possible_ts: time, server_random: string, session_id: string, cipher: count, comp_method: count) &priority=5
@ -159,6 +184,9 @@ event ssl_server_hello(c: connection, version: count, possible_ts: time, server_

 	c$ssl$version = version_strings[version];
 	c$ssl$cipher = cipher_desc[cipher];
+
+	if ( c$ssl?$session_id && c$ssl$session_id == bytestring_to_hexstr(session_id) )
+		c$ssl$resumed = T;
 	}

 event ssl_server_curve(c: connection, curve: count) &priority=5
@ -180,6 +208,45 @@ event ssl_extension_server_name(c: connection, is_orig: bool, names: string_vec)
 		}
 	}

+event ssl_extension_application_layer_protocol_negotiation(c: connection, is_orig: bool, protocols: string_vec)
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig )
+		return;
+
+	if ( |protocols| > 0 )
+		c$ssl$next_protocol = protocols[0];
+	}
+
+event ssl_handshake_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, msg_type: count, length: count) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig && msg_type == SSL::CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE )
+		c$ssl$client_key_exchange_seen = T;
+	}
+
+# Extension event is fired _before_ the respective client or server hello.
+# Important for client_ticket_empty_session_seen.
+event ssl_extension(c: connection, is_orig: bool, code: count, val: string) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig && SSL::extensions[code] == "SessionTicket TLS" && |val| > 0 )
+		# In this case, we might have an empty ID. Set back to F in client_hello event
+		# if it is not empty after all.
+		c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen = T;
+	}
+
+event ssl_change_cipher_spec(c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
+	{
+	set_session(c);
+
+	if ( is_orig && c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen && ! c$ssl$client_key_exchange_seen )
+		c$ssl$resumed = T;
+	}
+
 event ssl_alert(c: connection, is_orig: bool, level: count, desc: count) &priority=5
 	{
 	set_session(c);
@ -207,7 +274,7 @@ event connection_state_remove(c: connection) &priority=-5

 event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count) &priority=5
 	{
-	if ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL )
+	if ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL || atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS )
 		{
 		set_session(c);
 		c$ssl$analyzer_id = aid;
@ -217,6 +284,6 @@ event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count) &pr
 event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count,
                         reason: string) &priority=5
 	{
-	if ( c?$ssl )
+	if ( c?$ssl && ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL || atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS ) )
 		finish(c, T);
 	}
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/mozilla-ca-list.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/mozilla-ca-list.bro
--- a/scripts/base/protocols/syslog/main.bro
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/syslog/main.bro
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ redef likely_server_ports += { ports };

 event bro_init() &priority=5
 	{
-	Log::create_stream(Syslog::LOG, [$columns=Info]);
+	Log::create_stream(Syslog::LOG, [$columns=Info, $path="syslog"]);
 	Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SYSLOG, ports);
 	}

--- a/scripts/base/protocols/tunnels/dpd.sig
+++ b/scripts/base/protocols/tunnels/dpd.sig
@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ signature dpd_ayiya {

 signature dpd_teredo {
  ip-proto = udp
-  payload /^(\x00\x00)|(\x00\x01)|([\x60-\x6f])/
+  payload /^(\x00\x00)|(\x00\x01)|([\x60-\x6f].{7}((\x20\x01\x00\x00)).{28})|([\x60-\x6f].{23}((\x20\x01\x00\x00))).{12}/
  enable "teredo"
 }
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Support for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) analysis.`
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Support for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) analysis.`