BinPAC SSH analyzer basic functionality.

This commit is contained in:
Vlad Grigorescu 2014-04-02 23:03:24 -04:00
parent 9d6c8769ea
commit 78b5f6b94b
12 changed files with 465 additions and 301 deletions

View file

@ -1,105 +1,135 @@
// See the file "COPYING" in the main distribution directory for copyright.
// Generated by binpac_quickstart
#include "config.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include "NetVar.h"
#include "SSH.h"
#include "Event.h"
#include "analyzer/protocol/tcp/ContentLine.h"
#include "analyzer/protocol/tcp/TCP_Reassembler.h"
#include "Reporter.h"
#include "events.bif.h"
using namespace analyzer::ssh;
using namespace analyzer::SSH;
SSH_Analyzer::SSH_Analyzer(Connection* c)
: tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer("SSH", c)
{
orig = new tcp::ContentLine_Analyzer(c, true);
orig->SetSkipPartial(true);
orig->SetCRLFAsEOL(LF_as_EOL);
AddSupportAnalyzer(orig);
resp = new tcp::ContentLine_Analyzer(c, false);
resp->SetSkipPartial(true);
resp->SetCRLFAsEOL(LF_as_EOL);
AddSupportAnalyzer(resp);
{
interp = new binpac::SSH::SSH_Conn(this);
had_gap = false;
num_encrypted_packets_seen = 0;
}
SSH_Analyzer::~SSH_Analyzer()
{
delete interp;
}
void SSH_Analyzer::DeliverStream(int length, const u_char* data, bool is_orig)
void SSH_Analyzer::Done()
{
tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer::DeliverStream(length, data, is_orig);
tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer::Done();
// We're all done processing this endpoint - flag it as such,
// before we even determine whether we have any event generation
// work to do, to make sure we don't do any further work on it.
if ( is_orig )
orig->SetSkipDeliveries(true);
else
resp->SetSkipDeliveries(true);
interp->FlowEOF(true);
interp->FlowEOF(false);
}
if ( TCP() )
void SSH_Analyzer::EndpointEOF(bool is_orig)
{
tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer::EndpointEOF(is_orig);
interp->FlowEOF(is_orig);
}
void SSH_Analyzer::DeliverStream(int len, const u_char* data, bool orig)
{
tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer::DeliverStream(len, data, orig);
assert(TCP());
if ( TCP()->IsPartial() )
return;
if ( had_gap )
// If only one side had a content gap, we could still try to
// deliver data to the other side if the script layer can handle this.
return;
if ( num_encrypted_packets_seen || interp->get_state(orig) == binpac::SSH::ENCRYPTED )
{
// Don't try to parse version if there has already been a gap.
tcp::TCP_Endpoint* endp = is_orig ? TCP()->Orig() : TCP()->Resp();
if ( endp->HadGap() )
return;
}
const char* line = (const char*) data;
// The SSH identification looks like this:
//
// SSH-<protocolmajor>.<protocolminor>-<version>\n
//
// We're interested in the "version" part here.
if ( length < 4 || memcmp(line, "SSH-", 4) != 0 )
{
Weird("malformed_ssh_identification");
ProtocolViolation("malformed ssh identification", line, length);
ProcessEncrypted(len, orig);
return;
}
int i;
for ( i = 4; i < length && line[i] != '-'; ++i )
;
if ( TCP() )
try
{
if ( length >= i )
{
IPAddr dst;
if ( is_orig )
dst = TCP()->Orig()->dst_addr;
else
dst = TCP()->Resp()->dst_addr;
if ( Conn()->VersionFoundEvent(dst, line + i,
length - i) )
ProtocolConfirmation();
else
ProtocolViolation("malformed ssh version",
line, length);
}
else
{
Weird("malformed_ssh_version");
ProtocolViolation("malformed ssh version", line, length);
}
interp->NewData(orig, data, data + len);
}
catch ( const binpac::Exception& e )
{
printf(" **** %s\n", e.c_msg());
ProtocolViolation(fmt("Binpac exception: %s", e.c_msg()));
}
// Generate SSH events.
EventHandlerPtr event = is_orig ?
ssh_client_version : ssh_server_version;
if ( ! event )
return;
val_list* vl = new val_list;
vl->append(BuildConnVal());
vl->append(new StringVal(length, line));
ConnectionEvent(event, vl);
}
void SSH_Analyzer::Undelivered(int seq, int len, bool orig)
{
tcp::TCP_ApplicationAnalyzer::Undelivered(seq, len, orig);
had_gap = true;
interp->NewGap(orig, len);
}
void SSH_Analyzer::ProcessEncrypted(int len, bool orig)
{
if (!num_encrypted_packets_seen)
{
initial_encrypted_packet_size = len;
}
// printf("Encrypted packet of size %d from %s.\n", len, orig?"client":"server");
int relative_len = len - initial_encrypted_packet_size;
if ( num_encrypted_packets_seen >= 2 )
{
int auth_result = AuthResult(relative_len, orig);
if ( auth_result > 0 )
{
StringVal* method = new StringVal(AuthMethod(relative_len, orig));
if ( auth_result == 1 )
BifEvent::generate_ssh_auth_successful(interp->bro_analyzer(), interp->bro_analyzer()->Conn(), method);
if ( auth_result == 2 )
BifEvent::generate_ssh_auth_failed(interp->bro_analyzer(), interp->bro_analyzer()->Conn(), method);
}
packet_n_2_is_orig = packet_n_1_is_orig;
packet_n_2_size = packet_n_1_size;
}
packet_n_1_is_orig = orig;
packet_n_1_size = relative_len;
num_encrypted_packets_seen++;
}
int SSH_Analyzer::AuthResult(int len, bool orig)
{
if ( orig && !packet_n_1_is_orig && packet_n_2_is_orig )
{
if ( len == -16 )
return 1;
else if ( len >= 16 &&
len <= 32 )
return 2;
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
const char* SSH_Analyzer::AuthMethod(int len, bool orig)
{
if ( packet_n_1_size == 96 ) // Password auth
return "keyboard-interactive";
if ( packet_n_1_size == 32 ) // Challenge-response auth
return "challenge-response";
if ( packet_n_2_size >= 112 &&
packet_n_2_size <= 432 ) // Public key auth
return "pubkey";
if ( packet_n_2_size == 16 ) // Host-based auth
return "host-based";
return fmt("unknown auth method: n-1=%d n-2=%d", packet_n_1_size, packet_n_2_size);
}