Merge remote branch 'remotes/origin/topic/policy-scripts-new'

* remotes/origin/topic/policy-scripts-new:
  Fixed another SSL analyzer memory leak.
  Attempting to fix another SSL bug.
  Fixing a ref counting bug in the SSL analyzer that I just introduced.
  Fixing memory leaks in SSL analyzer.
  Fixed a parsing bug in the SSL analyzer thanks to tracefile from Aashish Sharma.
  Removing my fix from earlier.  This is indicating the script-land generated events priority problem.
  Updates to the DPD framework.
  Fixed a bug in the auth-addl DNS script.

Conflicts:
	src/bro.bif
This commit is contained in:
Robin Sommer 2011-07-01 18:59:34 -07:00
commit 94be787261
9 changed files with 122 additions and 96 deletions

View file

@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
@load dpd/base
@load dpd/dyn-disable
@load dpd/packet-segment-logging

View file

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
##! Activates port-independent protocol detection.
##! Activates port-independent protocol detection and selectively disables
##! analyzers if protocol violations occur.
@load functions
@load signatures
@ -6,19 +7,34 @@
module DPD;
## Add the DPD signatures to the signature framework.
redef signature_files += "dpd/dpd.sig";
redef signature_files += "frameworks/dpd/dpd.sig";
export {
redef enum Log::ID += { DPD };
type Info: record {
## Timestamp for when protocol analysis failed.
ts: time &log;
## Connection unique ID.
uid: string &log;
## Connection ID.
id: conn_id &log;
## Transport protocol for the violation.
proto: transport_proto &log;
## The analyzer that generated the violation.
analyzer: string &log;
## The textual reason for the analysis failure.
failure_reason: string &log;
## Disabled analyzer IDs. This is only for internal tracking
## so as to not attempt to disable analyzers multiple times.
# TODO: This is waiting on ticket #460 to remove the '0'.
disabled_aids: set[count] &default=set(0);
};
## Ignore violations which go this many bytes into the connection.
## Set to 0 to never ignore protocol violations.
const ignore_violations_after = 10 * 1024 &redef;
}
redef record connection += {
@ -29,6 +45,7 @@ event bro_init()
{
Log::create_stream(DPD, [$columns=Info]);
# Populate the internal DPD analysis variable.
for ( a in dpd_config )
{
for ( p in dpd_config[a]$ports )
@ -42,31 +59,53 @@ event bro_init()
event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count) &priority=10
{
if ( fmt("-%s",analyzer_name(atype)) in c$service )
delete c$service[fmt("-%s", analyzer_name(atype))];
local analyzer = analyzer_name(atype);
if ( fmt("-%s",analyzer) in c$service )
delete c$service[fmt("-%s", analyzer)];
add c$service[analyzer_name(atype)];
add c$service[analyzer];
}
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count,
reason: string) &priority=5
reason: string) &priority=10
{
if ( analyzer_name(atype) in c$service )
delete c$service[analyzer_name(atype)];
add c$service[fmt("-%s", analyzer_name(atype))];
local analyzer = analyzer_name(atype);
# If the service hasn't been confirmed yet, don't generate a log message
# for the protocol violation.
if ( analyzer !in c$service )
return;
delete c$service[analyzer];
add c$service[fmt("-%s", analyzer)];
local info: Info;
info$ts=network_time();
info$uid=c$uid;
info$id=c$id;
info$proto=get_conn_transport_proto(c$id);
info$analyzer=analyzer_name(atype);
info$analyzer=analyzer;
info$failure_reason=reason;
c$dpd = info;
}
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count, reason: string) &priority=5
{
if ( !c?$dpd || aid in c$dpd$disabled_aids )
return;
local size = c$orig$size + c$resp$size;
if ( ignore_violations_after > 0 && size > ignore_violations_after )
return;
# Disable the analyzer that raised the last core-generated event.
disable_analyzer(c$id, aid);
add c$dpd$disabled_aids[aid];
}
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count,
reason: string) &priority=-5
{
Log::write(DPD, c$dpd);
}
if ( c?$dpd )
Log::write(DPD, c$dpd);
}

View file

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
##! When this script is loaded, analyzers that raise protocol_violation events
##! are disabled for the affected connection.
@load dpd/base
@load notice
module DPD;
export {
redef enum Notice::Type += {
ProtocolViolation
};
redef record DPD::Info += {
## Disabled analyzer IDs.
# TODO: This is waiting on ticket #460 to remove the '0'.
disabled_aids: set[count] &default=set(0);
};
## Ignore violations which go this many bytes into the connection.
const max_data_volume = 10 * 1024 &redef;
}
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count,
reason: string) &priority=5
{
if ( aid in c$dpd$disabled_aids )
return;
local size = c$orig$size + c$resp$size;
if ( max_data_volume > 0 && size > max_data_volume )
return;
# Disable the analyzer that raised the last core-generated event.
disable_analyzer(c$id, aid);
add c$dpd$disabled_aids[aid];
NOTICE([$note=ProtocolViolation, $conn=c,
$msg=fmt("%s disabled due to protocol violation", analyzer_name(atype)),
$sub=reason, $n=atype]);
}

View file

@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ module DPD;
export {
redef record Info += {
## A chunk of the payload the most likely resulted in the protocol
## violation.
packet_segment: string &optional &log;
};
@ -21,5 +23,7 @@ export {
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count,
reason: string) &priority=4
{
if ( ! c?$dpd ) return;
c$dpd$packet_segment=fmt("%s", sub_bytes(get_current_packet()$data, 0, packet_segment_size));
}

View file

@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ redef dns_skip_all_addl = F;
module DNS;
redef record Info += {
auth: set[string] &log &optional;
addl: set[string] &log &optional;
};
export {
redef record Info += {
auth: set[string] &log &optional;
addl: set[string] &log &optional;
};
}
event do_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, reply: string) &priority=4
{

View file

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# Load the policy scripts where the notices are defined.
@load frameworks/notice/weird
@load dpd
# Remove these notices from logging since they can be too noisy.
redef Notice::ignored_types += {
@ -13,5 +12,4 @@ redef Notice::ignored_types += {
Weird::AckAboveHole,
Weird::RetransmissionInconsistency,
Weird::WeirdActivity, # Only allow these to go in the weird log.
DPD::ProtocolViolation,
};

View file

@ -3410,7 +3410,7 @@ function x509_verify%(der_cert: string, cert_stack: string_vec, root_certs: tabl
BroString* s = convert_index_to_string(root_certs);
if ( x509_stores.count(*s) > 0 )
ctx = x509_stores[*s];
if ( ! ctx ) // lookup to see if we have this one built already!
{
ctx = X509_STORE_new();
@ -3431,10 +3431,20 @@ function x509_verify%(der_cert: string, cert_stack: string_vec, root_certs: tabl
}
X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx, x);
}
delete idxs;
// Save the newly constructed certificate store into the cacheing map.
x509_stores[*s] = ctx;
}
delete s;
const uint8 *cert_data = der_cert->Bytes();
X509* cert = d2i_X509_(NULL, &cert_data, der_cert->Len());
if ( ! cert )
{
builtin_run_time(fmt("Certificate error: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(),NULL)));
return new Val((uint64) ERR_get_error(), TYPE_COUNT);
}
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if ( ! untrusted_certs )
@ -3451,15 +3461,16 @@ function x509_verify%(der_cert: string, cert_stack: string_vec, root_certs: tabl
X509* x = d2i_X509_(NULL, &data, sv->Len());
if ( ! x )
{
builtin_error(fmt("Untrusted certificate stack creation error: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(),NULL)));
X509_free(cert);
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted_certs, X509_free);
builtin_run_time(fmt("Untrusted certificate stack creation error: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(),NULL)));
return new Val((uint64) ERR_get_error(), TYPE_COUNT);
}
sk_X509_push(untrusted_certs, x);
}
const uint8 *cert_data = der_cert->Bytes();
X509_STORE_CTX csc;
<<<<<<< HEAD
X509* cert = d2i_X509_(NULL, &cert_data, der_cert->Len());
if ( ! cert )
{
@ -3467,6 +3478,8 @@ function x509_verify%(der_cert: string, cert_stack: string_vec, root_certs: tabl
return new Val((uint64) ERR_get_error(), TYPE_COUNT);
}
=======
>>>>>>> remotes/origin/topic/policy-scripts-new
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&csc, ctx, cert, untrusted_certs);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(&csc, 0, (time_t) network_time);
@ -3475,6 +3488,7 @@ function x509_verify%(der_cert: string, cert_stack: string_vec, root_certs: tabl
if ( untrusted_certs )
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted_certs, X509_free);
X509_free(cert);
return new Val((uint64) csc.error, TYPE_COUNT);
%}

View file

@ -72,22 +72,12 @@ function version_ok(vers : uint16) : bool
}
%}
function convert_ciphers_uint24(ciph : uint24[]) : int[]
%{
vector<int>* newciph = new vector<int>();
std::transform(ciph->begin(), ciph->end(),
std::back_inserter(*newciph), to_int());
return newciph;
%}
function convert_ciphers_uint16(ciph : uint16[]) : int[]
%{
vector<int>* newciph = new vector<int>();
std::copy(ciph->begin(), ciph->end(),
std::back_inserter(*newciph));
std::copy(ciph->begin(), ciph->end(), std::back_inserter(*newciph));
return newciph;
%}
@ -140,7 +130,8 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
function proc_client_hello(rec: SSLRecord,
version : uint16, ts : double,
session_id : uint8[],
cipher_suites : int[]) : bool
cipher_suites16 : uint16[],
cipher_suites24 : uint24[]) : bool
%{
if ( state_ == STATE_TRACK_LOST )
bro_analyzer()->ProtocolViolation(fmt("unexpected client hello message from %s in state %s",
@ -150,13 +141,15 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
if ( ! version_ok(version) )
bro_analyzer()->ProtocolViolation(fmt("unsupported client SSL version 0x%04x", version));
vector<int>* cipher_suites = new vector<int>();
if ( cipher_suites16 )
std::copy(cipher_suites16->begin(), cipher_suites16->end(), std::back_inserter(*cipher_suites));
else
std::transform(cipher_suites24->begin(), cipher_suites24->end(), std::back_inserter(*cipher_suites), to_int());
if ( ssl_client_hello )
{
BroType* count_t = base_type(TYPE_COUNT);
TypeList* set_index = new TypeList(count_t);
set_index->Append(count_t);
SetType* s = new SetType(set_index, 0);
TableVal* cipher_set = new TableVal(s);
TableVal* cipher_set = new TableVal(internal_type("count_set")->AsTableType());
for ( unsigned int i = 0; i < cipher_suites->size(); ++i )
{
Val* ciph = new Val((*cipher_suites)[i], TYPE_COUNT);
@ -168,6 +161,8 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
version, ts,
to_string_val(session_id),
cipher_set);
delete cipher_suites;
}
return true;
@ -176,7 +171,8 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
function proc_server_hello(rec: SSLRecord,
version : uint16, ts : double,
session_id : uint8[],
cipher_suite : uint16,
cipher_suites16 : uint16[],
cipher_suites24 : uint24[],
comp_method : uint8) : bool
%{
if ( state_ == STATE_TRACK_LOST )
@ -184,6 +180,13 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
orig_label(${rec.is_orig}).c_str(),
state_label(old_state_).c_str()));
vector<int>* ciphers = new vector<int>();
if ( cipher_suites16 )
std::copy(cipher_suites16->begin(), cipher_suites16->end(), std::back_inserter(*ciphers));
else
std::transform(cipher_suites24->begin(), cipher_suites24->end(), std::back_inserter(*ciphers), to_int());
if ( ! version_ok(version) )
bro_analyzer()->ProtocolViolation(fmt("unsupported server SSL version 0x%04x", version));
@ -193,9 +196,10 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
bro_analyzer()->Conn(),
version, ts,
to_string_val(session_id),
cipher_suite, comp_method);
ciphers->size()==0 ? 0 : ciphers->at(0), comp_method);
}
delete ciphers;
bro_analyzer()->ProtocolConfirmation();
return true;
%}
@ -223,7 +227,6 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
if ( x509_certificate )
{
X509* pCert = 0;
for ( unsigned int i = 0; i < certificates->size(); ++i )
{
const bytestring& cert = (*certificates)[i];
@ -266,11 +269,6 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
// Are there any X509 extensions?
if ( x509_extension && X509_get_ext_count(pTemp) > 0 )
{
BroType* count_t = base_type(TYPE_COUNT);
TypeList* set_index = new TypeList(count_t);
set_index->Append(count_t);
SetType* s = new SetType(set_index, 0);
TableVal* x509ex = new TableVal(s);
int num_ext = X509_get_ext_count(pTemp);
for ( int k = 0; k < num_ext; ++k )
{
@ -295,6 +293,7 @@ refine connection SSL_Conn += {
}
}
}
X509_free(pTemp);
}
}
return true;
@ -396,26 +395,26 @@ refine typeattr ApplicationData += &let {
refine typeattr ClientHello += &let {
proc : bool = $context.connection.proc_client_hello(rec, client_version,
gmt_unix_time,
session_id, convert_ciphers_uint16(csuits))
session_id, csuits, 0)
&requires(state_changed);
};
refine typeattr V2ClientHello += &let {
proc : bool = $context.connection.proc_client_hello(rec, client_version, 0,
session_id, convert_ciphers_uint24(ciphers))
session_id, 0, ciphers)
&requires(state_changed);
};
refine typeattr ServerHello += &let {
proc : bool = $context.connection.proc_server_hello(rec, server_version,
gmt_unix_time, session_id, cipher_suite,
gmt_unix_time, session_id, cipher_suite, 0,
compression_method)
&requires(state_changed);
};
refine typeattr V2ServerHello += &let {
proc : bool = $context.connection.proc_server_hello(rec, server_version, 0, 0,
convert_ciphers_uint24(ciphers)[0], 0)
0, ciphers, 0)
&requires(state_changed);
cert : bool = $context.connection.proc_v2_certificate(rec, cert_data)

View file

@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ type ServerHello(rec: SSLRecord) = record {
random_bytes : bytestring &length = 28 &transient;
session_len : uint8;
session_id : uint8[session_len];
cipher_suite : uint16;
cipher_suite : uint16[1];
compression_method : uint8;
} &let {
state_changed : bool =
@ -609,6 +609,16 @@ type CertificateVerify(rec: SSLRecord) = record {
# The finished messages are always sent after encryption is in effect,
# so we will not be able to read those message.
type Finished(rec: SSLRecord) = record {
cont : bytestring &restofdata &transient;
} &let {
state_changed : bool =
$context.connection.transition(STATE_SERVER_HELLO_DONE,
STATE_COMM_ENCRYPTED, rec.is_orig, true) ||
$context.connection.transition(STATE_CLIENT_FINISHED,
STATE_COMM_ENCRYPTED, rec.is_orig, false) ||
$context.connection.lost_track();
};
######################################################################
@ -635,6 +645,9 @@ type Handshake(rec: SSLRecord) = record {
SERVER_HELLO_DONE -> server_hello_done : ServerHelloDone(rec);
CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -> certificate_verify : CertificateVerify(rec);
CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -> client_key_exchange : ClientKeyExchange(rec);
FINISHED -> finished : Finished(rec);
CERTIFICATE_URL -> certificate_url : bytestring &restofdata &transient;
CERTIFICATE_STATUS -> certificate_status : bytestring &restofdata &transient;
default -> unknown_handshake : UnknownHandshake(this, rec.is_orig);
} &length = to_int()(length);
};
@ -679,7 +692,7 @@ type CiphertextRecord(rec: SSLRecord, is_orig: bool) = record {
######################################################################
type SSLPDU(is_orig: bool) = record {
records : SSLRecord(is_orig)[] &until($element == 0);
records : SSLRecord(is_orig)[] &until($element <= 0);
} &byteorder = bigendian;