Update cipher consts.
Furthermore some past updates have been applied to scriptland, but it
was not considered that some of these also have to be applied to binpac
code, to be able to correcly parse the ServerKeyExchange message.
(As a side-note - this was discovered due to a test discrepancy with the
Spicy parser)
This commit adds a multitude of new extension types that were added in
the last few years; it also adds grease values to extensions, curves,
and ciphersuites.
Furthermore, it adds a test that contains a encrypted-client-hello
key-exchange (which uses several extension types that we do not have in
our baseline so far).
The ssl_history field may grow unbounded (e.g., ssl_alert event). Prevent this
by capping using a configurable limit (default 100) and raise a weird once reached.
DTLSv1.3 changes the DTLS record format, introducing a completely new
header - which is a first for DTLS.
We don't currently completely parse this header, as this requires a bit
more statekeeping. This will be added in a future revision. This also
also has little practical implications.
* topic/johanna/no-error-message-durning-tls-or-dtls-protocol-violations:
SSL: failing analyzer handling - address review feedback
SSL: do not try to disable failed analyzer
Also folds in minor feedback from GH-3012
It turns out that we never logged hello retry requests correctly in the
ssl_history field.
Hello retry requests are (in their final version) signaled by a specific
random value in the server random.
This commit fixes this oversight, and hello retry requests are now
correctly logged as such.
Currently, if a TLS/DTLS analyzer fails with a protocol violation, we
will still try to remove the analyzer later, which results in the
following error message:
error: connection does not have analyzer specified to disable
Now, instead we don't try removing the analyzer anymore, after a
violation occurred.
This uses the v3 json as a source for the first time. The test needed
some updating because Google removed a couple more logs - in the future
this should hopefully not be neccessary anymore because I think v3
should retain all logs.
In theory this might be neat in 5.1.
Introduce two new events for analyzer confirmation and analyzer violation
reporting. The current analyzer_confirmation and analyzer_violation
events assume connection objects and analyzer ids are available which
is not always the case. We're already passing aid=0 for packet analyzers
and there's not currently a way to report violations from file analyzers
using analyzer_violation, for example.
These new events use an extensible Info record approach so that additional
(optional) information can be added later without changing the signature.
It would allow for per analyzer extensions to the info records to pass
analyzer specific info to script land. It's not clear that this would be
a good idea, however.
The previous analyzer_confirmation and analyzer_violation events
continue to exist, but are deprecated and will be removed with Zeek 6.1.
The next patch will have a test script rely on c$ssl$analyzer_id staying
around when disable_analyzer() wasn't successful.
I was tempted to remove the `delete` completely as neither RDP nor SSH
have that and not sure why SSL is special here.
This PR changes the way in which the SSL analyzer tracks the direction
of connections. So far, the SSL analyzer assumed that the originator of
a connection would send the client hello (and other associated
client-side events), and that the responder would be the SSL servers.
In some circumstances this is not true, and the initiator of a
connection is the server, with the responder being the client. So far
this confused some of the internal statekeeping logic and could lead to
mis-parsing of extensions.
This reversal of roles can happen in DTLS, if a connection uses STUN -
and potentially in some StartTLS protocols.
This PR tracks the direction of a TLS connection using the hello
request, client hello and server hello handshake messages. Furthermore,
it changes the SSL events from providing is_orig to providing is_client,
where is_client is true for the client_side of a connection. Since the
argument positioning in the event has not changed, old scripts will
continue to work seamlessly - the new semantics are what everyone
writing SSL scripts will have expected in any case.
There is a new event that is raised when a connection is flipped. A
weird is raised if a flip happens repeatedly.
Addresses GH-2198.
This commit changes DPD matching for TLS connections. A one-sided match
is enough to enable DPD now.
This commit also removes DPD for SSLv2 connections. SSLv2 connections do
basically no longer happen in the wild. SSLv2 is also really finnicky to
identify correctly - there is very little data required to match it, and
basically all matches today will be false positives. If DPD for SSLv2 is
still desired, the optional signature in policy/protocols/ssl/dpd-v2.sig
can be loaded.
Fixes GH-1952
* origin/topic/johanna/gh-859:
Add X509/SSL changes to NEWS
X509: add check if function succeeds
GH-1634: Address feedback
Small indentation fixes in ssl-log-ext.zeek
Fix memory leak in x509_check_cert_hostname bif
Small bugfix and updates for external test hashes (SSL/X509)
Baseline updates for recent SSL changes.
Add ability to check if hostname is valid for a specific cert
Add ssl_history field to ssl.log
Add policy script suppressing certificate events
Add new ssl-log-ext policy script
Deprecate extract-certs-pem.zeek and add log-certs-base64.zeek
Implement X509 certificate log caching
Deprecate ICSI SSL notary script.
Change SSL and X.509 logging format
Enable OCSP logging by default.
Split the code that handles X509 event hashing into its own file
Closes GH-859
This commit switches to only allowing the CT logs that are currently
accepted by Google Chrome - which makes much more sense for us since
this is (potentially) used for validation.
Additional CT logs can be added in user-scripts.
This commit adds two new bifs, x509_check_hostname and
x509_check_cert_hostname. These bifs can be used to check if a given
hostname which can, e.g., be sent in a SNI is valid for a specific
certificate.
This PR furthermore modifies the ssl logs again, and adds information
about this to the log-file. Furthermore we now by default remove the
server certificate information from ssl.log - I doubt that this is often
looked at, it is not present in TLS 1.3, we do still have the SNI, and
if you need it you have the information in x509.log.
This also fixes a small potential problem in X509.cc assuming there
might be SAN-entries that contain null-bytes.
Baseline update will follow in another commit.
This is the equivalent to a connection history for SSL - and contains
information about which protocol messages were exchanged in which order.
Tests currently don't pass - I will update the ssl.log baselines after
doing another a bit invasive change that will change all the logs.
This commit changes the SSL and X.509 logging formats to something that,
hopefully, slowly approaches what they will look like in the future.
X.509 log is not yet deduplicated; this will come in the future.
This commit introduces two new options, which determine if certificate
issuers and subjects are still logged in ssl.log. The default is to have
the host subject/issuer logged, but to remove client-certificate
information. Client-certificates are not a typically used feature
nowadays.
This commit changes the logic that is used to tracks connection
establishment - and moves it from scriptland into the core.
TLS 1.3 connection establishment is much more finnicky for us than the
establishment of earlier versions - since we cannot rely on the CCS
message anymore (which is meaningless and not sent in a lot of cases).
With this commit, the ssl_encrypted_data message gets raised for
encrypted TLS 1.3 handshake messages - which is much more correct than
the behavior before that just interpreted them as plaintext messages.
I will refine this a bit more - at the moment the connection established
event happens a bit too early - earlier than TLS 1.3 connections
actually can be estasblished.
Part of GH-1323
This adds a "policy" hook into the logging framework's streams and
filters to replace the existing log filter predicates. The hook
signature is as follows:
hook(rec: any, id: Log::ID, filter: Log::Filter);
The logging manager invokes hooks on each log record. Hooks can veto
log records via a break, and modify them if necessary. Log filters
inherit the stream-level hook, but can override or remove the hook as
needed.
The distribution's existing log streams now come with pre-defined
hooks that users can add handlers to. Their name is standardized as
"log_policy" by convention, with additional suffixes when a module
provides multiple streams. The following adds a handler to the Conn
module's default log policy hook:
hook Conn::log_policy(rec: Conn::Info, id: Log::ID, filter: Log::Filter)
{
if ( some_veto_reason(rec) )
break;
}
By default, this handler will get invoked for any log filter
associated with the Conn::LOG stream.
The existing predicates are deprecated for removal in 4.1 but continue
to work.
This adds two new functions: `Conn::register_removal_hook()` and
`Conn::unregister_removal_hook()` for registering a hook function to be
called back during `connection_state_remove`. The benefit of using hook
callback approach is better scalability: the overhead of unrelated
protocols having to dispatch no-op `connection_state_remove` handlers is
avoided.
And switch Zeek's base scripts over to using it in place of
"connection_state_remove". The difference between the two is
that "connection_state_remove" is raised for all events while
"successful_connection_remove" excludes TCP connections that were never
established (just SYN packets). There can be performance benefits
to this change for some use-cases.
There's also a new event called ``connection_successful`` and a new
``connection`` record field named "successful" to help indicate this new
property of connections.
