Closes#1830.
* origin/topic/johanna/ocsp-sct-validate: (82 commits)
Tiny script changes for SSL.
Update CT Log list
SSL: Update OCSP/SCT scripts and documentation.
Revert "add parameter 'status_type' to event ssl_stapled_ocsp"
Revert "parse multiple OCSP stapling responses"
SCT: Fix script error when mime type of file unknown.
SCT: another memory leak in SCT parsing.
SCT validation: fix small memory leak (public keys were not freed)
Change end-of-connection handling for validation
OCSP/TLS/SCT: Fix a number of test failures.
SCT Validate: make caching a bit less aggressive.
SSL: Fix type of ssl validation result
TLS-SCT: compile on old versions of OpenSSL (1.0.1...)
SCT: Add caching support for validation
SCT: Add signed certificate timestamp validation script.
SCT: Allow verification of SCTs in Certs.
SCT: only compare correct OID/NID for Cert/OCSP.
SCT: add validation of proofs for extensions and OCSP.
SCT: pass timestamp as uint64 instead of time
Add CT log information to Bro
...
log-hostcerts-only relied on old event ordering; the identifier key of
validate-certs is now shorter (no function change, just potentially a
tiny bit faster).
Move from using CCS (before: established) to just doing certificate
validation at the end of the connection.
This is (again) more robust in the case of aborted connection. I am
moving this into a hook because of the complexity of the
end-of-connection handling for SSL.
This should probably be extended to not just handle SSL validation, but
all other logging constructs that are currently called in _established.
These were caused by earlier code updates.
This commit also removes the ocsp stapling logging script; it was
defunctional and the information provided by it wnever really has been
especially interesting.
This triggers a re-validation of the SCT when the certificate validation
status changed. This means that a SCT will show as valid if the
certificate chain could be validated and can now be used to determine
the correct issuer key hash.
This also rewrites the certificate validation script (which we need for
this) slightly.
This could need a bit of caching, but should generally work very
reliably.
This is much more complex than the TLS Extension/OCSP cases. We need to
first alter the certificate and remove the extension from it, before
extracting the tbscert. Furthermore, we need the key hash of the issuing
certificate to be able to validate the proof - which means that we need
a valid certificate chain.
Missing: documentation, nice integration so that we can just add a
script and use this in Bro.
This exposes the record layer version of the fragment in addition to the
content type and the length. The ordering of the arguments in the event
is the same as the ordering in the protocol message (first type, then
version, then length).
This also includes a slight change to the analyzer, no longer calling
the generate function if the event is not used.
This allows the path for the default filter to be specified explicitly
when creating a stream and reduces the need to rely on the default path
function to magically supply the path.
The default path function is now only used if, when a filter is added to
a stream, it has neither a path nor a path function already.
Adapted the existing Log::create_stream calls to explicitly specify a
path value.
Addresses BIT-1324
* origin/topic/johanna/cert-validation:
and still use the hash for notice suppression.
add knob to revert to old validation behavior
Update certificate validation script - new version will cache valid intermediate chains that it encounters on the wire and use those to try to validate chains that might be missing intermediate certificates.
BIT-1332 #merged
intermediate chains that it encounters on the wire and use those to try
to validate chains that might be missing intermediate certificates.
This vastly improves the number of certificates that Bro can validate.
The only drawback is that now validation behavior is not entirely
predictable anymore - the certificate of a server can fail to validate
when Bro just started up (due to the intermediate missing), and succeed
later, when the intermediate can be found in the cache.
Has been tested on big-ish clusters and should not introduce any
performance problems.
* origin/topic/johanna/ssl-policy:
Extend the weak-keys policy file to also alert when encountering ssl connections with old versions as well as unsafe cipher suites.
BIT-1321 #merged
ssl connections with old versions as well as unsafe cipher suites.
Also make the notice suppression handling of other ssl policy files
a tad more robust.
Fixing one missing index adjustment (I believe ...)
BIT-757 #merged
* origin/topic/jsiwek/deprecation:
Fix typo.
Update documentation (broken links, outdated tests).
Update NEWS for deprecated/changed functions.
Deprecate split* family of BIFs.
Improve use of &deprecated on functions.
Add a new attribute: &deprecated.
