* origin/topic/awelzel/4198-4201-quic-maintenance:
QUIC/decrypt_crypto: Rename all_data to data
QUIC: Confirm before forwarding data to SSL
QUIC: Parse all QUIC packets in a UDP datagram
QUIC: Only slurp till packet end, not till &eod
(cherry picked from commit 44304973fb)
Seem reasonable give we log the server SCID. Interestingly, the Chromium
examples actually have zero length (empty) source connection IDs. I wonder
if that's part of their "protocol ossification avoidance" effort.
The original logic stopped decrypting any INITIAL packets after the
first. The Firefox/cloudflare pcaps actually show that the server
replies with a QUIC INITAL packet containing just ACK frames and no
CRYPTO frames. Only the second QUIC INITIAL packet from the server
then contains the CRYPTO frames.
There's no good reason to stop decryption attempts, either we succeed
down the road and then stop, or we fail and raise analyzer violations.
