Move from using CCS (before: established) to just doing certificate
validation at the end of the connection.
This is (again) more robust in the case of aborted connection. I am
moving this into a hook because of the complexity of the
end-of-connection handling for SSL.
This should probably be extended to not just handle SSL validation, but
all other logging constructs that are currently called in _established.
This triggers a re-validation of the SCT when the certificate validation
status changed. This means that a SCT will show as valid if the
certificate chain could be validated and can now be used to determine
the correct issuer key hash.
This also rewrites the certificate validation script (which we need for
this) slightly.
This could need a bit of caching, but should generally work very
reliably.
This is much more complex than the TLS Extension/OCSP cases. We need to
first alter the certificate and remove the extension from it, before
extracting the tbscert. Furthermore, we need the key hash of the issuing
certificate to be able to validate the proof - which means that we need
a valid certificate chain.
Missing: documentation, nice integration so that we can just add a
script and use this in Bro.
This allows the path for the default filter to be specified explicitly
when creating a stream and reduces the need to rely on the default path
function to magically supply the path.
The default path function is now only used if, when a filter is added to
a stream, it has neither a path nor a path function already.
Adapted the existing Log::create_stream calls to explicitly specify a
path value.
Addresses BIT-1324
* origin/topic/johanna/cert-validation:
and still use the hash for notice suppression.
add knob to revert to old validation behavior
Update certificate validation script - new version will cache valid intermediate chains that it encounters on the wire and use those to try to validate chains that might be missing intermediate certificates.
BIT-1332 #merged
intermediate chains that it encounters on the wire and use those to try
to validate chains that might be missing intermediate certificates.
This vastly improves the number of certificates that Bro can validate.
The only drawback is that now validation behavior is not entirely
predictable anymore - the certificate of a server can fail to validate
when Bro just started up (due to the intermediate missing), and succeed
later, when the intermediate can be found in the cache.
Has been tested on big-ish clusters and should not introduce any
performance problems.
* origin/topic/johanna/ssl-policy:
Extend the weak-keys policy file to also alert when encountering ssl connections with old versions as well as unsafe cipher suites.
BIT-1321 #merged
ssl connections with old versions as well as unsafe cipher suites.
Also make the notice suppression handling of other ssl policy files
a tad more robust.
Fixing one missing index adjustment (I believe ...)
BIT-757 #merged
* origin/topic/jsiwek/deprecation:
Fix typo.
Update documentation (broken links, outdated tests).
Update NEWS for deprecated/changed functions.
Deprecate split* family of BIFs.
Improve use of &deprecated on functions.
Add a new attribute: &deprecated.
These functions are now deprecated in favor of alternative versions that
return a vector of strings rather than a table of strings.
Deprecated functions:
- split: use split_string instead.
- split1: use split_string1 instead.
- split_all: use split_string_all instead.
- split_n: use split_string_n instead.
- cat_string_array: see join_string_vec instead.
- cat_string_array_n: see join_string_vec instead.
- join_string_array: see join_string_vec instead.
- sort_string_array: use sort instead instead.
- find_ip_addresses: use extract_ip_addresses instead.
Changed functions:
- has_valid_octets: uses a string_vec parameter instead of string_array.
Addresses BIT-924, BIT-757.
* origin/fastpath:
last ssl fixes - missed three more.
and more tiny ssl script fixes
a few more small fixes for chains containing broken certs.
fix expression errors in x509 policy scrips when unparseable data is in certificate chain.
