zeek/scripts/base/files/x509/main.zeek
Johanna Amann 0829164a3e First (sadly not completely working) approach at caching X509 certificates
This approach mostly relies on script-level changes. In scriptland, we track
which certificates should be cached - and also perform the caching and the
replaying of events there.

This actually is probably nearly functional - the problem is the fact that now
the event ordering is wrong - and file_state_remove is called before the x509
events are thrown.

The fix probably is to move to a callback from the core - which can execute
things in the right order again. (Or just write the whole event-raising inside
the core - but that is both less flexible and a lot more cumbersome).
2020-03-06 15:21:45 -08:00

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@load base/frameworks/files
@load base/files/hash
module X509;
export {
redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
option required_encounters : count = 1;
## The record type which contains the fields of the X.509 log.
type Info: record {
## Current timestamp.
ts: time &log;
## File id of this certificate.
id: string &log;
## Basic information about the certificate.
certificate: X509::Certificate &log;
## The opaque wrapping the certificate. Mainly used
## for the verify operations.
handle: opaque of x509;
## All extensions that were encountered in the certificate.
extensions: vector of X509::Extension &default=vector();
## Subject alternative name extension of the certificate.
san: X509::SubjectAlternativeName &optional &log;
## Basic constraints extension of the certificate.
basic_constraints: X509::BasicConstraints &optional &log;
## All extensions in the order they were raised.
## This is used for caching certificates that are commonly
## encountered and should not be relied on in user scripts.
extensions_cache: vector of any &default=vector();
};
## This record is used to store information about the SCTs that are
## encountered in Certificates.
type SctInfo: record {
## The version of the encountered SCT (should always be 0 for v1).
version: count;
## The ID of the log issuing this SCT.
logid: string;
## The timestamp at which this SCT was issued measured since the
## epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00), ignoring leap seconds, in
## milliseconds. Not converted to a Zeek timestamp because we need
## the exact value for validation.
timestamp: count;
## The hash algorithm used for this sct.
hash_alg: count;
## The signature algorithm used for this sct.
sig_alg: count;
## The signature of this SCT.
signature: string;
};
## Event for accessing logged records.
global log_x509: event(rec: Info);
}
# Table tracking potential certificates to cache - indexed by the SHA256 of the
# raw on-the-wire representation (DER).
global certificates_encountered: table[string] of count &create_expire=5mins;
# Table caching the output of the X509 analyzer for commonly seen certificates.
# This is indexed by SHA256 and contains the Info record of the first certificate
# encountered. We use this info record to re-play the events.
global certificate_cache: table[string] of X509::Info &read_expire=1mins;
event zeek_init() &priority=5
{
Log::create_stream(X509::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_x509, $path="x509"]);
# We use MIME types internally to distinguish between user and CA certificates.
# The first certificate in a connection always gets tagged as user-cert, all
# following certificates get tagged as CA certificates. Certificates gotten via
# other means (e.g. identified from HTTP traffic when they are transfered in plain
# text) get tagged as application/pkix-cert.
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_X509, "application/x-x509-user-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_X509, "application/x-x509-ca-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_X509, "application/pkix-cert");
# Always calculate hashes. They are not necessary for base scripts
# but very useful for identification, and required for policy scripts
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_MD5, "application/x-x509-user-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_MD5, "application/x-x509-ca-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_MD5, "application/pkix-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA1, "application/x-x509-user-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA1, "application/x-x509-ca-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA1, "application/pkix-cert");
# SHA256 is used by us to determine which certificates to cache.
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA256, "application/x-x509-user-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA256, "application/x-x509-ca-cert");
Files::register_for_mime_type(Files::ANALYZER_SHA256, "application/pkix-cert");
x509_set_certificate_cache(certificate_cache);
}
redef record Files::Info += {
## Information about X509 certificates. This is used to keep
## certificate information until all events have been received.
x509: X509::Info &optional;
};
event x509_certificate(f: fa_file, cert_ref: opaque of x509, cert: X509::Certificate) &priority=5
{
f$info$x509 = [$ts=f$info$ts, $id=f$id, $certificate=cert, $handle=cert_ref];
}
event x509_extension(f: fa_file, ext: X509::Extension) &priority=5
{
if ( f$info?$x509 )
{
f$info$x509$extensions += ext;
f$info$x509$extensions_cache += ext;
}
}
event x509_ext_basic_constraints(f: fa_file, ext: X509::BasicConstraints) &priority=5
{
if ( f$info?$x509 )
{
f$info$x509$basic_constraints = ext;
f$info$x509$extensions_cache += ext;
}
}
event x509_ext_subject_alternative_name(f: fa_file, ext: X509::SubjectAlternativeName) &priority=5
{
if ( f$info?$x509 )
{
f$info$x509$san = ext;
f$info$x509$extensions_cache += ext;
}
}
event x509_ocsp_ext_signed_certificate_timestamp(f: fa_file, version: count, logid: string, timestamp: count, hash_algorithm: count, signature_algorithm: count, signature: string) &priority=5
{
if ( f$info?$x509 )
f$info$x509$extensions_cache += SctInfo($version=version, $logid=logid, $timestamp=timestamp, $hash_alg=hash_algorithm, $sig_alg=signature_algorithm, $signature=signature);
}
event file_state_remove(f: fa_file) &priority=5
{
if ( ! f$info?$x509 )
return;
Log::write(LOG, f$info$x509);
if ( f$info?$sha256 && !certificate_cache[f$info$sha256] && certificates_encountered[f$info$sha256] >= required_encounters )
{
delete certificates_encountered[f$info$sha256];
certificate_cache[f$info$sha256] = f$info$x509;
}
}
event file_hash(f: fa_file, kind: string, hash: string)
{
if ( ! f?$info || "X509" !in f$info$analyzers || kind != "sha256" )
return;
if ( hash in certificate_cache )
{
print "Processing duplicate ", hash;
# we encountered a cached cert. The X509 analyzer will skip it. Let's raise all the events that it typically
# raises by ourselfes.
# first - let's checked if it already has an x509 record. That would mean that someone raised the file_hash event
# several times for the certificate - in which case we bail out.
if ( f$info?$x509 )
return;
local e = certificate_cache[hash];
event x509_certificate(f, e$handle, e$certificate);
for ( i in e$extensions_cache )
{
local ext = e$extensions_cache[i];
if ( ext is X509::Extension )
event x509_extension(f, (ext as X509::Extension));
else if ( ext is X509::BasicConstraints )
event x509_ext_basic_constraints(f, (ext as X509::BasicConstraints));
else if ( ext is X509::SubjectAlternativeName )
event x509_ext_subject_alternative_name(f, (ext as X509::SubjectAlternativeName));
else if ( ext is X509::SctInfo )
{
local s = ( ext as X509::SctInfo);
event x509_ocsp_ext_signed_certificate_timestamp(f, s$version, s$logid, s$timestamp, s$hash_alg, s$sig_alg, s$signature);
}
else
Reporter::error(fmt("Encountered unknown extension while replaying certificate with fuid %s", f$id));
}
}
if ( hash !in certificates_encountered )
certificates_encountered[hash] = 0;
certificates_encountered[hash] += 1;
if ( certificates_encountered[hash] < required_encounters )
return;
}