zeek/scripts/policy/protocols/ssl/weak-keys.bro
Robin Sommer 07222bb107 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/topic/johanna/ssl-policy'
* origin/topic/johanna/ssl-policy:
  Extend the weak-keys policy file to also alert when encountering ssl connections with old versions as well as unsafe cipher suites.

BIT-1321 #merged
2015-03-02 17:19:00 -08:00

132 lines
5 KiB
Text

##! Generate notices when SSL/TLS connections use certificates, DH parameters,
##! or cipher suites that are deemed to be insecure.
@load base/protocols/ssl
@load base/frameworks/notice
@load base/utils/directions-and-hosts
module SSL;
export {
redef enum Notice::Type += {
## Indicates that a server is using a potentially unsafe key.
Weak_Key,
## Indicates that a server is using a potentially unsafe version
Old_Version,
## Indicates that a server is using a potentially unsafe cipher
Weak_Cipher
};
## The category of hosts you would like to be notified about which are using weak
## keys/ciphers/protocol_versions. By default, these notices will be suppressed
## by the notice framework for 1 day after a particular host has had a notice
## generated. Choices are: LOCAL_HOSTS, REMOTE_HOSTS, ALL_HOSTS, NO_HOSTS
const notify_weak_keys = LOCAL_HOSTS &redef;
## The minimal key length in bits that is considered to be safe. Any shorter
## (non-EC) key lengths will trigger a notice.
const notify_minimal_key_length = 2048 &redef;
## Warn if the DH key length is smaller than the certificate key length. This is
## potentially unsafe because it gives a wrong impression of safety due to the
## certificate key length. However, it is very common and cannot be avoided in some
## settings (e.g. with old jave clients).
const notify_dh_length_shorter_cert_length = T &redef;
## Warn if a server negotiates a SSL session with a protocol version smaller than
## the specified version. By default, the minimal version is TLSv10 because SSLv2
## and v3 have serious security issued.
## See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-sslv3-diediedie-00
## To disable, set to SSLv20
const tls_minimum_version = TLSv10 &redef;
## Warn if a server negotiates an unsafe cipher suite. By default, we only warn when
## encountering old export cipher suites, or RC4 (see RFC7465).
const unsafe_ciphers_regex = /(_EXPORT_)|(_RC4_)/ &redef;
}
# We check key lengths only for DSA or RSA certificates. For others, we do
# not know what is safe (e.g. EC is safe even with very short key lengths).
event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=3
{
# If there are no certificates or we are not interested in the server, just return.
if ( ! c$ssl?$cert_chain || |c$ssl$cert_chain| == 0 ||
! addr_matches_host(c$id$resp_h, notify_weak_keys) ||
! c$ssl$cert_chain[0]?$x509 )
return;
local fuid = c$ssl$cert_chain_fuids[0];
local cert = c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate;
local hash = c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$sha1;
if ( !cert?$key_type || !cert?$key_length )
return;
if ( cert$key_type != "dsa" && cert$key_type != "rsa" )
return;
local key_length = cert$key_length;
if ( key_length < notify_minimal_key_length )
NOTICE([$note=Weak_Key,
$msg=fmt("Host uses weak certificate with %d bit key", key_length),
$conn=c, $suppress_for=1day,
$identifier=cat(c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_h, hash, key_length)
]);
}
# Check for old SSL versions and weak connection keys
event ssl_server_hello(c: connection, version: count, possible_ts: time, server_random: string, session_id: string, cipher: count, comp_method: count) &priority=3
{
if ( ! addr_matches_host(c$id$resp_h, notify_weak_keys) )
return;
if ( version < tls_minimum_version )
{
local minimum_string = version_strings[tls_minimum_version];
local host_string = version_strings[version];
NOTICE([$note=Old_Version,
$msg=fmt("Host uses protocol version %s which is lower than the safe minimum %s", host_string, minimum_string),
$conn=c, $suppress_for=1day,
$identifier=cat(c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_h)
]);
}
if ( unsafe_ciphers_regex in c$ssl$cipher )
NOTICE([$note=Weak_Cipher,
$msg=fmt("Host established connection using unsafe ciper suite %s", c$ssl$cipher),
$conn=c, $suppress_for=1day,
$identifier=cat(c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_h, c$ssl$cipher)
]);
}
event ssl_dh_server_params(c: connection, p: string, q: string, Ys: string) &priority=3
{
if ( ! addr_matches_host(c$id$resp_h, notify_weak_keys) )
return;
local key_length = |p| * 8; # length of the used prime number in bits
if ( key_length < notify_minimal_key_length )
NOTICE([$note=Weak_Key,
$msg=fmt("Host uses weak DH parameters with %d key bits", key_length),
$conn=c, $suppress_for=1day,
$identifier=cat(c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p, key_length)
]);
if ( notify_dh_length_shorter_cert_length &&
c?$ssl && c$ssl?$cert_chain && |c$ssl$cert_chain| > 0 && c$ssl$cert_chain[0]?$x509 &&
c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509?$certificate && c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate?$key_type &&
(c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate$key_type == "rsa" ||
c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate$key_type == "dsa" ))
{
if ( c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate?$key_length &&
c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate$key_length > key_length )
NOTICE([$note=Weak_Key,
$msg=fmt("DH key length of %d bits is smaller certificate key length of %d bits",
key_length, c$ssl$cert_chain[0]$x509$certificate$key_length),
$conn=c, $suppress_for=1day,
$identifier=cat(c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p)
]);
}
}