zeek/scripts/base/frameworks/analyzer/dpd.zeek
Arne Welzel bc8fd5a4c6 Introduce generic analyzer_confirmation_info and analyzer_violation_info
Introduce two new events for analyzer confirmation and analyzer violation
reporting. The current analyzer_confirmation and analyzer_violation
events assume connection objects and analyzer ids are available which
is not always the case. We're already passing aid=0 for packet analyzers
and there's not currently a way to report violations from file analyzers
using analyzer_violation, for example.

These new events use an extensible Info record approach so that additional
(optional) information can be added later without changing the signature.
It would allow for per analyzer extensions to the info records to pass
analyzer specific info to script land. It's not clear that this would be
a good idea, however.

The previous analyzer_confirmation and analyzer_violation events
continue to exist, but are deprecated and will be removed with Zeek 6.1.
2022-09-27 17:49:51 +02:00

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##! Activates port-independent protocol detection and selectively disables
##! analyzers if protocol violations occur.
module DPD;
export {
## Add the DPD logging stream identifier.
redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
## A default logging policy hook for the stream.
global log_policy: Log::PolicyHook;
## The record type defining the columns to log in the DPD logging stream.
type Info: record {
## Timestamp for when protocol analysis failed.
ts: time &log;
## Connection unique ID.
uid: string &log;
## Connection ID containing the 4-tuple which identifies endpoints.
id: conn_id &log;
## Transport protocol for the violation.
proto: transport_proto &log;
## The analyzer that generated the violation.
analyzer: string &log;
## The textual reason for the analysis failure.
failure_reason: string &log;
};
## Ongoing DPD state tracking information.
type State: record {
## Current number of protocol violations seen per analyzer instance.
violations: table[count] of count;
};
## Number of protocol violations to tolerate before disabling an analyzer.
option max_violations: table[Analyzer::Tag] of count = table() &default = 5;
## Analyzers which you don't want to throw
option ignore_violations: set[Analyzer::Tag] = set();
## Ignore violations which go this many bytes into the connection.
## Set to 0 to never ignore protocol violations.
option ignore_violations_after = 10 * 1024;
}
redef record connection += {
dpd: Info &optional;
dpd_state: State &optional;
## The set of services (analyzers) for which Zeek has observed a
## violation after the same service had previously been confirmed.
service_violation: set[string] &default=set();
};
event zeek_init() &priority=5
{
Log::create_stream(DPD::LOG, [$columns=Info, $path="dpd", $policy=log_policy]);
}
event analyzer_confirmation_info(atype: AllAnalyzers::Tag, info: AnalyzerConfirmationInfo) &priority=10
{
if ( ! is_protocol_analyzer(atype) && ! is_packet_analyzer(atype) )
return;
if ( ! info?$c )
return;
local c = info$c;
local analyzer = Analyzer::name(atype);
add c$service[analyzer];
}
event analyzer_violation_info(atype: AllAnalyzers::Tag, info: AnalyzerViolationInfo) &priority=10
{
if ( ! is_protocol_analyzer(atype) && ! is_packet_analyzer(atype) )
return;
if ( ! info?$c )
return;
local c = info$c;
local analyzer = Analyzer::name(atype);
# If the service hasn't been confirmed yet, don't generate a log message
# for the protocol violation.
if ( analyzer !in c$service )
return;
delete c$service[analyzer];
add c$service_violation[analyzer];
local dpd: Info;
dpd$ts = network_time();
dpd$uid = c$uid;
dpd$id = c$id;
dpd$proto = get_port_transport_proto(c$id$orig_p);
dpd$analyzer = analyzer;
# Encode data into the reason if there's any as done for the old
# analyzer_violation event, previously.
local reason = info$reason;
if ( info?$data )
{
local ellipsis = |info$data| > 40 ? "..." : "";
local data = info$data[0:40];
reason = fmt("%s [%s%s]", reason, data, ellipsis);
}
dpd$failure_reason = reason;
c$dpd = dpd;
}
event analyzer_violation_info(atype: AllAnalyzers::Tag, info: AnalyzerViolationInfo ) &priority=5
{
if ( ! is_protocol_analyzer(atype) && ! is_packet_analyzer(atype) )
return;
if ( ! info?$c || ! info?$aid )
return;
if ( atype in ignore_violations )
return;
local c = info$c;
local aid = info$aid;
local size = c$orig$size + c$resp$size;
if ( ignore_violations_after > 0 && size > ignore_violations_after )
return;
if ( ! c?$dpd_state )
{
local s: State;
c$dpd_state = s;
}
if ( aid in c$dpd_state$violations )
++c$dpd_state$violations[aid];
else
c$dpd_state$violations[aid] = 1;
if ( c?$dpd || c$dpd_state$violations[aid] > max_violations[atype] )
{
# Disable an analyzer we've previously confirmed, but is now in
# violation, or else any analyzer in excess of the max allowed
# violations, regardless of whether it was previously confirmed.
disable_analyzer(c$id, aid, F);
}
}
event analyzer_violation_info(atype: AllAnalyzers::Tag, info: AnalyzerViolationInfo ) &priority=-5
{
if ( ! is_protocol_analyzer(atype) && ! is_packet_analyzer(atype) )
return;
if ( ! info?$c )
return;
if ( info$c?$dpd )
{
Log::write(DPD::LOG, info$c$dpd);
delete info$c$dpd;
}
}