zeek/src/Teredo.cc
Robin Sommer 1290ed6b95 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/topic/jsiwek/delay-teredo-confirm'
* origin/topic/jsiwek/delay-teredo-confirm:
  Add new Tunnel::delay_teredo_confirmation option, default to true.

Closes #890.
2012-10-03 16:01:42 -07:00

254 lines
5.9 KiB
C++

#include "Teredo.h"
#include "IP.h"
#include "Reporter.h"
void Teredo_Analyzer::Done()
{
Analyzer::Done();
Event(udp_session_done);
}
bool TeredoEncapsulation::DoParse(const u_char* data, int& len,
bool found_origin, bool found_auth)
{
if ( len < 2 )
{
Weird("truncated_Teredo");
return false;
}
uint16 tag = ntohs((*((const uint16*)data)));
if ( tag == 0 )
{
// Origin Indication
if ( found_origin )
// can't have multiple origin indications
return false;
if ( len < 8 )
{
Weird("truncated_Teredo_origin_indication");
return false;
}
origin_indication = data;
len -= 8;
data += 8;
return DoParse(data, len, true, found_auth);
}
else if ( tag == 1 )
{
// Authentication
if ( found_origin || found_auth )
// can't have multiple authentication headers and can't come after
// an origin indication
return false;
if ( len < 4 )
{
Weird("truncated_Teredo_authentication");
return false;
}
uint8 id_len = data[2];
uint8 au_len = data[3];
uint16 tot_len = 4 + id_len + au_len + 8 + 1;
if ( len < tot_len )
{
Weird("truncated_Teredo_authentication");
return false;
}
auth = data;
len -= tot_len;
data += tot_len;
return DoParse(data, len, found_origin, true);
}
else if ( ((tag & 0xf000)>>12) == 6 )
{
// IPv6
if ( len < 40 )
{
Weird("truncated_IPv6_in_Teredo");
return false;
}
// There's at least a possible IPv6 header, we'll decide what to do
// later if the payload length field doesn't match the actual length
// of the packet.
inner_ip = data;
return true;
}
return false;
}
RecordVal* TeredoEncapsulation::BuildVal(const IP_Hdr* inner) const
{
static RecordType* teredo_hdr_type = 0;
static RecordType* teredo_auth_type = 0;
static RecordType* teredo_origin_type = 0;
if ( ! teredo_hdr_type )
{
teredo_hdr_type = internal_type("teredo_hdr")->AsRecordType();
teredo_auth_type = internal_type("teredo_auth")->AsRecordType();
teredo_origin_type = internal_type("teredo_origin")->AsRecordType();
}
RecordVal* teredo_hdr = new RecordVal(teredo_hdr_type);
if ( auth )
{
RecordVal* teredo_auth = new RecordVal(teredo_auth_type);
uint8 id_len = *((uint8*)(auth + 2));
uint8 au_len = *((uint8*)(auth + 3));
uint64 nonce = ntohll(*((uint64*)(auth + 4 + id_len + au_len)));
uint8 conf = *((uint8*)(auth + 4 + id_len + au_len + 8));
teredo_auth->Assign(0, new StringVal(
new BroString(auth + 4, id_len, 1)));
teredo_auth->Assign(1, new StringVal(
new BroString(auth + 4 + id_len, au_len, 1)));
teredo_auth->Assign(2, new Val(nonce, TYPE_COUNT));
teredo_auth->Assign(3, new Val(conf, TYPE_COUNT));
teredo_hdr->Assign(0, teredo_auth);
}
if ( origin_indication )
{
RecordVal* teredo_origin = new RecordVal(teredo_origin_type);
uint16 port = ntohs(*((uint16*)(origin_indication + 2))) ^ 0xFFFF;
uint32 addr = ntohl(*((uint32*)(origin_indication + 4))) ^ 0xFFFFFFFF;
teredo_origin->Assign(0, new PortVal(port, TRANSPORT_UDP));
teredo_origin->Assign(1, new AddrVal(htonl(addr)));
teredo_hdr->Assign(1, teredo_origin);
}
teredo_hdr->Assign(2, inner->BuildPktHdrVal());
return teredo_hdr;
}
void Teredo_Analyzer::DeliverPacket(int len, const u_char* data, bool orig,
int seq, const IP_Hdr* ip, int caplen)
{
Analyzer::DeliverPacket(len, data, orig, seq, ip, caplen);
if ( orig )
valid_orig = false;
else
valid_resp = false;
TeredoEncapsulation te(this);
if ( ! te.Parse(data, len) )
{
ProtocolViolation("Bad Teredo encapsulation", (const char*) data, len);
return;
}
const EncapsulationStack* e = Conn()->GetEncapsulation();
if ( e && e->Depth() >= BifConst::Tunnel::max_depth )
{
Weird("tunnel_depth", true);
return;
}
IP_Hdr* inner = 0;
int rslt = sessions->ParseIPPacket(len, te.InnerIP(), IPPROTO_IPV6, inner);
if ( rslt > 0 )
{
if ( inner->NextProto() == IPPROTO_NONE && inner->PayloadLen() == 0 )
// Teredo bubbles having data after IPv6 header isn't strictly a
// violation, but a little weird.
Weird("Teredo_bubble_with_payload", true);
else
{
delete inner;
ProtocolViolation("Teredo payload length", (const char*) data, len);
return;
}
}
if ( rslt == 0 || rslt > 0 )
{
if ( orig )
valid_orig = true;
else
valid_resp = true;
if ( BifConst::Tunnel::yielding_teredo_decapsulation &&
! ProtocolConfirmed() )
{
// Only confirm the Teredo tunnel and start decapsulating packets
// when no other sibling analyzer thinks it's already parsing the
// right protocol.
bool sibling_has_confirmed = false;
if ( Parent() )
{
LOOP_OVER_GIVEN_CONST_CHILDREN(i, Parent()->GetChildren())
{
if ( (*i)->ProtocolConfirmed() )
{
sibling_has_confirmed = true;
break;
}
}
}
if ( ! sibling_has_confirmed )
Confirm();
else
{
delete inner;
return;
}
}
else
// Aggressively decapsulate anything with valid Teredo encapsulation.
Confirm();
}
else
{
delete inner;
ProtocolViolation("Truncated Teredo", (const char*) data, len);
return;
}
Val* teredo_hdr = 0;
if ( teredo_packet )
{
teredo_hdr = te.BuildVal(inner);
Conn()->Event(teredo_packet, 0, teredo_hdr);
}
if ( te.Authentication() && teredo_authentication )
{
teredo_hdr = teredo_hdr ? teredo_hdr->Ref() : te.BuildVal(inner);
Conn()->Event(teredo_authentication, 0, teredo_hdr);
}
if ( te.OriginIndication() && teredo_origin_indication )
{
teredo_hdr = teredo_hdr ? teredo_hdr->Ref() : te.BuildVal(inner);
Conn()->Event(teredo_origin_indication, 0, teredo_hdr);
}
if ( inner->NextProto() == IPPROTO_NONE && teredo_bubble )
{
teredo_hdr = teredo_hdr ? teredo_hdr->Ref() : te.BuildVal(inner);
Conn()->Event(teredo_bubble, 0, teredo_hdr);
}
EncapsulatingConn ec(Conn(), BifEnum::Tunnel::TEREDO);
sessions->DoNextInnerPacket(network_time, 0, inner, e, ec);
}