zeek/scripts/base/protocols/ssl/main.zeek
Johanna Amann 5479ce607a Add ssl_history field to ssl.log
This is the equivalent to a connection history for SSL - and contains
information about which protocol messages were exchanged in which order.

Tests currently don't pass - I will update the ssl.log baselines after
doing another a bit invasive change that will change all the logs.
2021-06-29 14:10:02 +01:00

502 lines
15 KiB
Text

##! Base SSL analysis script. This script logs information about the SSL/TLS
##! handshaking and encryption establishment process.
@load base/frameworks/notice/weird
@load ./consts
@load base/protocols/conn/removal-hooks
module SSL;
export {
redef enum Log::ID += { LOG };
global log_policy: Log::PolicyHook;
## The record type which contains the fields of the SSL log.
type Info: record {
## Time when the SSL connection was first detected.
ts: time &log;
## Unique ID for the connection.
uid: string &log;
## The connection's 4-tuple of endpoint addresses/ports.
id: conn_id &log;
## Numeric SSL/TLS version that the server chose.
version_num: count &optional;
## SSL/TLS version that the server chose.
version: string &log &optional;
## SSL/TLS cipher suite that the server chose.
cipher: string &log &optional;
## Elliptic curve the server chose when using ECDH/ECDHE.
curve: string &log &optional;
## Value of the Server Name Indicator SSL/TLS extension. It
## indicates the server name that the client was requesting.
server_name: string &log &optional;
## Session ID offered by the client for session resumption.
## Not used for logging.
session_id: string &optional;
## Flag to indicate if the session was resumed reusing
## the key material exchanged in an earlier connection.
resumed: bool &log &default=F;
## Flag to indicate if we saw a non-empty session ticket being
## sent by the client using an empty session ID. This value
## is used to determine if a session is being resumed. It's
## not logged.
client_ticket_empty_session_seen: bool &default=F;
## Flag to indicate if we saw a client key exchange message sent
## by the client. This value is used to determine if a session
## is being resumed. It's not logged.
client_key_exchange_seen: bool &default=F;
## Track if the client sent a pre-shared-key extension.
## Used to determine if a TLS 1.3 session is being resumed.
## Not logged.
client_psk_seen: bool &default=F;
## Last alert that was seen during the connection.
last_alert: string &log &optional;
## Next protocol the server chose using the application layer
## next protocol extension, if present.
next_protocol: string &log &optional;
## The analyzer ID used for the analyzer instance attached
## to each connection. It is not used for logging since it's a
## meaningless arbitrary number.
analyzer_id: count &optional;
## Flag to indicate if this ssl session has been established
## successfully, or if it was aborted during the handshake.
established: bool &log &default=F;
## Flag to indicate if this record already has been logged, to
## prevent duplicates.
logged: bool &default=F;
## SSL history showing which types of packets we received in which order.
## Letters have the following meaning with client-sent letters being capitalized:
## H hello_request
## C client_hello
## S server_hello
## V hello_verify_request
## T NewSessionTicket
## X certificate
## K server_key_exchange
## R certificate_request
## N server_hello_done
## Y certificate_verify
## G client_key_exchange
## F finished
## W certificate_url
## U certificate_status
## A supplemental_data
## Z unassigned_handshake_type
## I change_cipher_spec
## B heartbeat
## D application_data
## E end_of_early_data
## O encrypted_extensions
## P key_update
## M message_hash
## J hello_retry_request
## L alert
## Q unknown_content_type
ssl_history: string &log &default="";
};
## The default root CA bundle. By default, the mozilla-ca-list.zeek
## script sets this to Mozilla's root CA list.
const root_certs: table[string] of string = {} &redef;
## The record type which contains the field for the Certificate
## Transparency log bundle.
type CTInfo: record {
## Description of the Log
description: string;
## Operator of the Log
operator: string;
## Public key of the Log.
key: string;
## Maximum merge delay of the Log
maximum_merge_delay: count;
## URL of the Log
url: string;
};
## The Certificate Transparency log bundle. By default, the ct-list.zeek
## script sets this to the current list of known logs. Entries
## are indexed by (binary) log-id.
option ct_logs: table[string] of CTInfo = {};
## If true, detach the SSL analyzer from the connection to prevent
## continuing to process encrypted traffic. Helps with performance
## (especially with large file transfers).
option disable_analyzer_after_detection = T;
## Delays an SSL record for a specific token: the record will not be
## logged as long as the token exists or until 15 seconds elapses.
global delay_log: function(info: Info, token: string);
## Undelays an SSL record for a previously inserted token, allowing the
## record to be logged.
global undelay_log: function(info: Info, token: string);
## Event that can be handled to access the SSL
## record as it is sent on to the logging framework.
global log_ssl: event(rec: Info);
# Hook that can be used to perform actions right before the log record
# is written.
global ssl_finishing: hook(c: connection);
## SSL finalization hook. Remaining SSL info may get logged when it's called.
## The :zeek:see:`SSL::ssl_finishing` hook may either
## be called before this finalization hook for established SSL connections
## or during this finalization hook for SSL connections may have info still
## left to log.
global finalize_ssl: Conn::RemovalHook;
}
redef record connection += {
ssl: Info &optional;
};
redef record Info += {
# Adding a string "token" to this set will cause the SSL script
# to delay logging the record until either the token has been removed or
# the record has been delayed.
delay_tokens: set[string] &optional;
};
const ssl_ports = {
443/tcp, 563/tcp, 585/tcp, 614/tcp, 636/tcp,
989/tcp, 990/tcp, 992/tcp, 993/tcp, 995/tcp, 5223/tcp
};
# There are no well known DTLS ports at the moment. Let's
# just add 443 for now for good measure - who knows :)
const dtls_ports = { 443/udp };
redef likely_server_ports += { ssl_ports, dtls_ports };
# Priority needs to be higher than priority of zeek_init in ssl/files.zeek
event zeek_init() &priority=6
{
Log::create_stream(SSL::LOG, [$columns=Info, $ev=log_ssl, $path="ssl", $policy=log_policy]);
Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL, ssl_ports);
Analyzer::register_for_ports(Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS, dtls_ports);
}
function set_session(c: connection)
{
if ( ! c?$ssl )
{
c$ssl = [$ts=network_time(), $uid=c$uid, $id=c$id];
Conn::register_removal_hook(c, finalize_ssl);
}
}
function add_to_history(c: connection, is_orig: bool, char: string)
{
if ( is_orig )
c$ssl$ssl_history = c$ssl$ssl_history+to_upper(char);
else
c$ssl$ssl_history = c$ssl$ssl_history+to_lower(char);
}
function delay_log(info: Info, token: string)
{
if ( ! info?$delay_tokens )
info$delay_tokens = set();
add info$delay_tokens[token];
}
function undelay_log(info: Info, token: string)
{
if ( info?$delay_tokens && token in info$delay_tokens )
delete info$delay_tokens[token];
}
function log_record(info: Info)
{
if ( info$logged )
return;
if ( ! info?$delay_tokens || |info$delay_tokens| == 0 )
{
Log::write(SSL::LOG, info);
info$logged = T;
}
else
{
when ( |info$delay_tokens| == 0 )
{
log_record(info);
}
timeout 15secs
{
# We are just going to log the record anyway.
delete info$delay_tokens;
log_record(info);
}
}
}
# remove_analyzer flag is used to prevent disabling analyzer for finished
# connections.
function finish(c: connection, remove_analyzer: bool)
{
log_record(c$ssl);
if ( remove_analyzer && disable_analyzer_after_detection && c?$ssl && c$ssl?$analyzer_id )
{
disable_analyzer(c$id, c$ssl$analyzer_id);
delete c$ssl$analyzer_id;
}
}
event ssl_client_hello(c: connection, version: count, record_version: count, possible_ts: time, client_random: string, session_id: string, ciphers: index_vec, comp_methods: index_vec) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
# Save the session_id if there is one set.
if ( |session_id| > 0 && session_id != /^\x00{32}$/ )
{
c$ssl$session_id = bytestring_to_hexstr(session_id);
c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen = F;
}
}
event ssl_server_hello(c: connection, version: count, record_version: count, possible_ts: time, server_random: string, session_id: string, cipher: count, comp_method: count) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
# If it is already filled, we saw a supported_versions extensions which overrides this.
if ( ! c$ssl?$version_num )
{
c$ssl$version_num = version;
c$ssl$version = version_strings[version];
}
c$ssl$cipher = cipher_desc[cipher];
if ( c$ssl?$session_id && c$ssl$session_id == bytestring_to_hexstr(session_id) && c$ssl$version_num/0xFF != 0x7F && c$ssl$version_num != TLSv13 )
c$ssl$resumed = T;
}
event ssl_extension_supported_versions(c: connection, is_orig: bool, versions: index_vec)
{
if ( is_orig || |versions| != 1 )
return;
set_session(c);
c$ssl$version_num = versions[0];
c$ssl$version = version_strings[versions[0]];
}
event ssl_ecdh_server_params(c: connection, curve: count, point: string) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
c$ssl$curve = ec_curves[curve];
}
event ssl_extension_key_share(c: connection, is_orig: bool, curves: index_vec)
{
if ( is_orig || |curves| != 1 )
return;
set_session(c);
c$ssl$curve = ec_curves[curves[0]];
}
event ssl_extension_server_name(c: connection, is_orig: bool, names: string_vec) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
if ( is_orig && |names| > 0 )
{
c$ssl$server_name = names[0];
if ( |names| > 1 )
Reporter::conn_weird("SSL_many_server_names", c, cat(names));
}
}
event ssl_extension_application_layer_protocol_negotiation(c: connection, is_orig: bool, protocols: string_vec)
{
set_session(c);
if ( is_orig )
return;
if ( |protocols| > 0 )
c$ssl$next_protocol = protocols[0];
}
event ssl_handshake_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, msg_type: count, length: count) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
if ( is_orig && msg_type == SSL::CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE )
c$ssl$client_key_exchange_seen = T;
switch ( msg_type )
{
case SSL::HELLO_REQUEST:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "h");
break;
case SSL::CLIENT_HELLO:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "c");
break;
case SSL::SERVER_HELLO:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "s");
break;
case SSL::HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "v");
break;
case SSL::SESSION_TICKET:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "t");
break;
# end of early data
case 5:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "e");
break;
case SSL::HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "j");
break;
case SSL::ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "o");
break;
case SSL::CERTIFICATE:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "x");
break;
case SSL::SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "k");
break;
case SSL::CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "r");
break;
case SSL::SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "n");
break;
case SSL::CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "y");
break;
case SSL::CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "g");
break;
case SSL::FINISHED:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "f");
break;
case SSL::CERTIFICATE_URL:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "w");
break;
case SSL::CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "u");
break;
case SSL::SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "a");
break;
case SSL::KEY_UPDATE:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "p");
break;
# message hash
case 254:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "m");
break;
default:
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "z");
break;
}
}
# Extension event is fired _before_ the respective client or server hello.
# Important for client_ticket_empty_session_seen.
event ssl_extension(c: connection, is_orig: bool, code: count, val: string) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
if ( is_orig && code == SSL_EXTENSION_SESSIONTICKET_TLS && |val| > 0 )
# In this case, we might have an empty ID. Set back to F in client_hello event
# if it is not empty after all.
c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen = T;
else if ( is_orig && code == SSL_EXTENSION_PRE_SHARED_KEY )
# In this case, the client sent a PSK extension which can be used for resumption
c$ssl$client_psk_seen = T;
else if ( ! is_orig && code == SSL_EXTENSION_PRE_SHARED_KEY && c$ssl$client_psk_seen )
# In this case, the server accepted the PSK offered by the client.
c$ssl$resumed = T;
}
event ssl_change_cipher_spec(c: connection, is_orig: bool) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "i");
if ( is_orig && c$ssl$client_ticket_empty_session_seen && ! c$ssl$client_key_exchange_seen )
c$ssl$resumed = T;
}
event ssl_alert(c: connection, is_orig: bool, level: count, desc: count) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "l");
c$ssl$last_alert = alert_descriptions[desc];
}
event ssl_heartbeat(c: connection, is_orig: bool, length: count, heartbeat_type: count, payload_length: count, payload: string)
{
set_session(c);
add_to_history(c, is_orig, "b");
}
event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=7
{
c$ssl$established = T;
}
event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=20
{
set_session(c);
hook ssl_finishing(c);
}
event ssl_established(c: connection) &priority=-5
{
finish(c, T);
}
hook finalize_ssl(c: connection)
{
if ( ! c?$ssl )
return;
if ( ! c$ssl$logged )
hook ssl_finishing(c);
# called in case a SSL connection that has not been established terminates
finish(c, F);
}
event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count) &priority=5
{
if ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL || atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS )
{
set_session(c);
c$ssl$analyzer_id = aid;
}
}
event ssl_plaintext_data(c: connection, is_orig: bool, record_version: count, content_type: count, length: count) &priority=5
{
set_session(c);
if ( ! c$ssl?$version || c$ssl$established || content_type != APPLICATION_DATA )
return;
local wi = Weird::Info($ts=network_time(), $name="ssl_early_application_data", $uid=c$uid, $id=c$id);
Weird::weird(wi);
}
event protocol_violation(c: connection, atype: Analyzer::Tag, aid: count,
reason: string) &priority=5
{
if ( c?$ssl && ( atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_SSL || atype == Analyzer::ANALYZER_DTLS ) )
finish(c, T);
}