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e14eddeb97
This PR changes the way in which the SSL analyzer tracks the direction of connections. So far, the SSL analyzer assumed that the originator of a connection would send the client hello (and other associated client-side events), and that the responder would be the SSL servers. In some circumstances this is not true, and the initiator of a connection is the server, with the responder being the client. So far this confused some of the internal statekeeping logic and could lead to mis-parsing of extensions. This reversal of roles can happen in DTLS, if a connection uses STUN - and potentially in some StartTLS protocols. This PR tracks the direction of a TLS connection using the hello request, client hello and server hello handshake messages. Furthermore, it changes the SSL events from providing is_orig to providing is_client, where is_client is true for the client_side of a connection. Since the argument positioning in the event has not changed, old scripts will continue to work seamlessly - the new semantics are what everyone writing SSL scripts will have expected in any case. There is a new event that is raised when a connection is flipped. A weird is raised if a flip happens repeatedly. Addresses GH-2198.
13 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
13 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
### BTest baseline data generated by btest-diff. Do not edit. Use "btest -U/-u" to update. Requires BTest >= 0.63.
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#separator \x09
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#set_separator ,
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#empty_field (empty)
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#unset_field -
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#path notice
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#open XXXX-XX-XX-XX-XX-XX
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#fields ts uid id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p fuid file_mime_type file_desc proto note msg sub src dst p n peer_descr actions email_dest suppress_for remote_location.country_code remote_location.region remote_location.city remote_location.latitude remote_location.longitude
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#types time string addr port addr port string string string enum enum string string addr addr port count string set[enum] set[string] interval string string string double double
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XXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXX CHhAvVGS1DHFjwGM9 192.168.4.149 54233 162.219.2.166 4443 - - - tcp Heartbleed::SSL_Heartbeat_Attack Heartbeat before ciphertext. Probable attack or scan. Length: 32, is_client: 1 - 192.168.4.149 162.219.2.166 4443 32 - Notice::ACTION_LOG (empty) 3600.000000 - - - - -
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XXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXX CHhAvVGS1DHFjwGM9 192.168.4.149 54233 162.219.2.166 4443 - - - tcp Heartbleed::SSL_Heartbeat_Odd_Length Heartbeat message smaller than minimum required length. Probable attack. Message length: 32. Required length: 48. Cipher: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA. Cipher match: /^?(_256_CBC_SHA$)$?/ - 192.168.4.149 162.219.2.166 4443 32 - Notice::ACTION_LOG (empty) 3600.000000 - - - - -
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XXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXX CHhAvVGS1DHFjwGM9 192.168.4.149 54233 162.219.2.166 4443 - - - tcp Heartbleed::SSL_Heartbeat_Attack_Success An encrypted TLS heartbleed attack was probably detected! First packet client record length 32, first packet server record length 48. Time: 0.351035 - 192.168.4.149 162.219.2.166 4443 - - Notice::ACTION_LOG (empty) 3600.000000 - - - - -
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#close XXXX-XX-XX-XX-XX-XX
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