zeek/policy/ssh.bro

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@load functions
@load notice
@load software
module SSH;
redef enum Notice::Type += {
SSH_Login,
SSH_PasswordGuessing,
SSH_LoginByPasswordGuesser,
SSH_Login_From_Interesting_Hostname,
SSH_Bytecount_Inconsistency,
};
redef enum Log::ID += { SSH };
redef enum Software::Type += {
SSH_SERVER,
SSH_CLIENT,
};
# Configure DPD and the packet filter
redef capture_filters += { ["ssh"] = "tcp port 22" };
redef dpd_config += { [ANALYZER_SSH] = [$ports = set(22/tcp)] };
export {
type Log: record {
ts: time;
id: conn_id;
status: string &default="";
direction: string &default="";
remote_location: geo_location &optional;
client: string &default="";
server: string &default="";
resp_size: count &default=0;
};
# This is the prototype for the event that the logging framework tries
# to generate if there is a handler for it.
global log: event(rec: Log);
const password_guesses_limit = 30 &redef;
# The size in bytes at which the SSH connection is presumed to be
# successful.
const authentication_data_size = 5500 &redef;
# The amount of time to remember presumed non-successful logins to build
# model of a password guesser.
const guessing_timeout = 30 mins &redef;
# If you want to lookup and log geoip data in the event of a failed login.
const log_geodata_on_failure = F &redef;
# The set of countries for which you'd like to throw notices upon successful login
# requires Bro compiled with libGeoIP support
const watched_countries: set[string] = {"RO"} &redef;
# Strange/bad host names to originate successful SSH logins
const interesting_hostnames =
/^d?ns[0-9]*\./ |
/^smtp[0-9]*\./ |
/^mail[0-9]*\./ |
/^pop[0-9]*\./ |
/^imap[0-9]*\./ |
/^www[0-9]*\./ |
/^ftp[0-9]*\./ &redef;
# This is a table with orig subnet as the key, and subnet as the value.
const ignore_guessers: table[subnet] of subnet &redef;
# If true, we tell the event engine to not look at further data
# packets after the initial SSH handshake. Helps with performance
# (especially with large file transfers) but precludes some
# kinds of analyses (e.g., tracking connection size).
const skip_processing_after_detection = F &redef;
# Keeps count of how many rejections a host has had
global password_rejections: table[addr] of TrackCount
&default=default_track_count
&write_expire=guessing_timeout;
# Keeps track of hosts identified as guessing passwords
# TODO: guessing_timeout doesn't work correctly here. If a user redefs
# the variable, it won't take effect.
global password_guessers: set[addr] &read_expire=guessing_timeout+1hr;
# The list of active SSH connections and the associated session info.
global active_conns: table[conn_id] of Log &read_expire=2mins;
global log_ssh: event(rec: Log);
}
function local_filter(rec: record { id: conn_id; } ): bool
{
return is_local_addr(rec$id$resp_h);
}
event bro_init()
{
# Create the stream.
# First argument is the ID for the stream.
# Second argument is the log record type.
Log::create_stream(SSH, [$columns=SSH::Log, $ev=log_ssh]);
# Add a default filter that simply logs everything to "ssh.log" using the default writer.
Log::add_default_filter(SSH);
}
event check_ssh_connection(c: connection, done: bool)
{
# If this is no longer a known SSH connection, just return.
if ( c$id !in active_conns )
return;
# If this is still a live connection and the byte count has not
# crossed the threshold, just return and let the resheduled check happen later.
if ( !done && c$resp$size < authentication_data_size )
return;
# Make sure the server has sent back more than 50 bytes to filter out
# hosts that are just port scanning. Nothing is ever logged if the server
# doesn't send back at least 50 bytes.
if ( c$resp$size < 50 )
return;
local ssh_log = active_conns[c$id];
local status = "failure";
local direction = is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h) ? "to" : "from";
local location: geo_location;
if ( done && c$resp$size < authentication_data_size )
{
# presumed failure
if ( log_geodata_on_failure )
location = (direction == "to") ? lookup_location(c$id$resp_h) : lookup_location(c$id$orig_h);
if ( c$id$orig_h !in password_rejections )
password_rejections[c$id$orig_h] = default_track_count(c$id$orig_h);
# Track the number of rejections
if ( !(c$id$orig_h in ignore_guessers &&
c$id$resp_h in ignore_guessers[c$id$orig_h]) )
++password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n;
if ( default_check_threshold(password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]) )
{
add password_guessers[c$id$orig_h];
NOTICE([$note=SSH_PasswordGuessing,
$conn=c,
$msg=fmt("SSH password guessing by %s", c$id$orig_h),
$sub=fmt("%d failed logins", password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n),
$n=password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n]);
}
}
# TODO: This is to work around a quasi-bug in Bro which occasionally
# causes the byte count to be oversized.
# Watch for Gregors work that adds an actual counter of bytes transferred.
else if ( c$resp$size < 20000000 )
{
# presumed successful login
status = "success";
location = (direction == "to") ? lookup_location(c$id$resp_h) : lookup_location(c$id$orig_h);
if ( password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n > password_guesses_limit &&
c$id$orig_h !in password_guessers)
{
add password_guessers[c$id$orig_h];
NOTICE([$note=SSH_LoginByPasswordGuesser,
$conn=c,
$n=password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n,
$msg=fmt("Successful SSH login by password guesser %s", c$id$orig_h),
$sub=fmt("%d failed logins", password_rejections[c$id$orig_h]$n)]);
}
local message = fmt("SSH login %s %s \"%s\" \"%s\" %f %f %s (triggered with %d bytes)",
direction, location$country_code, location$region, location$city,
location$latitude, location$longitude,
id_string(c$id), c$resp$size);
# TODO: rewrite the message once a location variable can be put in notices
NOTICE([$note=SSH_Login,
$conn=c,
$msg=message,
$sub=location$country_code]);
# Check to see if this login came from an interesting hostname
when( local hostname = lookup_addr(c$id$orig_h) )
{
if ( interesting_hostnames in hostname )
{
NOTICE([$note=SSH_Login_From_Interesting_Hostname,
$conn=c,
$msg=fmt("Strange login from %s", hostname),
$sub=hostname]);
}
}
}
else if ( c$resp$size >= 200000000 )
{
NOTICE([$note=SSH_Bytecount_Inconsistency,
$conn=c,
$msg="During byte counting in SSH analysis, an overly large value was seen.",
$sub=fmt("%d",c$resp$size)]);
}
ssh_log$remote_location = location;
ssh_log$status = status;
ssh_log$direction = direction;
ssh_log$resp_size = c$resp$size;
Log::write(SSH, ssh_log);
delete active_conns[c$id];
# Stop watching this connection, we don't care about it anymore.
if ( skip_processing_after_detection )
{
skip_further_processing(c$id);
set_record_packets(c$id, F);
}
}
event connection_state_remove(c: connection)
{
event check_ssh_connection(c, T);
}
event ssh_watcher(c: connection)
{
local id = c$id;
# don't go any further if this connection is gone already!
if ( !connection_exists(id) )
{
delete active_conns[id];
return;
}
event check_ssh_connection(c, F);
if ( c$id in active_conns )
schedule +15secs { ssh_watcher(c) };
}
event ssh_client_version(c: connection, version: string)
{
if ( c$id in active_conns )
active_conns[c$id]$client = version;
else
{
active_conns[c$id] = [$ts=c$start_time, $id=c$id];
schedule +15secs { ssh_watcher(c) };
}
# Get rid of the protocol information when passing to the software framework.
local cleaned_version = sub(version, /^SSH[0-9\.\-]+/, "");
local si = Software::parse(cleaned_version, c$id$orig_h, SSH_CLIENT);
Software::found(c, si);
}
event ssh_server_version(c: connection, version: string)
{
if ( c$id in active_conns )
active_conns[c$id]$server = version;
# Get rid of the protocol information when passing to the software framework.
local cleaned_version = sub(version, /SSH[0-9\.\-]{2,}/, "");
local si = Software::parse(cleaned_version, c$id$resp_h, SSH_SERVER);
Software::found(c, si);
}
event protocol_confirmation(c: connection, atype: count, aid: count)
{
if ( atype == ANALYZER_SSH )
{
active_conns[c$id] = [$ts=c$start_time, $id=c$id];
schedule +15secs { ssh_watcher(c) };
}
}